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   The	  field	  of	  moral	  psychology	  has	  made	  tremendous	  advances	  in	  the	  last	  two	  
decades,	  spurred	  on	  by	  the	  reconsideration	  of	  many	  prior	  assumptions	  that	  undergirded	  its	  
study	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  	  These	  new	  discoveries	  largely	  involved	  
the	  application	  of	  new	  psychological	  tools	  to	  the	  puzzles	  of	  moral	  judgment	  and	  decision-­‐
making,	  often	  confirming	  intuitions	  ruled	  out	  by	  previous	  models,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  needed	  to	  
be	  revised	  to	  accommodate	  new	  evidence.	  	  This	  dissertation	  seeks	  to	  consolidate	  much	  of	  
this	  research	  under	  the	  umbrella	  concept	  of	  “virtue,”	  showing	  that	  this	  idea	  has	  important	  
motivational	  significance	  for	  the	  study	  of	  moral	  psychology.	  	  This	  concept	  of	  virtue	  will	  be	  
examined	  and	  demonstrated	  to	  be	  of	  import	  to	  three	  major	  areas	  of	  investigation	  by	  moral	  
psychologists:	  (1)	  moral	  judgments,	  (2)	  moral	  decisions,	  and	  (3)	  moral	  character.	  	  This	  
research	  program	  will	  provide	  a	  framework	  from	  which	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  revision	  of	  many	  
popular	  and	  expert	  a	  priori	  assumptions	  about	  what	  the	  boundaries	  of	  morality	  are	  and	  
how	  ethics	  relates	  to	  happiness,	  and	  suggest	  additional	  avenues	  for	  future	  research.
	   i	  
	  
	  
Table	  of	  Contents	  
LIST	  OF	  FIGURES	  .................................................................................................................................................	  iii	  
LIST	  OF	  TABLES	  .....................................................................................................................................................	  v	  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	  .......................................................................................................................................	  vi	  
CHAPTER	  1:	  THE	  MODERN	  INCOMPATIBILITY	  OF	  MORALITY	  AND	  HAPPINESS	  ...........................	  1	  
1.1	   MODERN	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  MORALITY	  .........................................................................................................................	  3	  
1.2	   MODERN	  DEFINITIONS	  OF	  HAPPINESS	  ........................................................................................................................	  8	  
CHAPTER	  2:	  THE	  MOTIVATIONAL	  ALTERNATIVE	  ..................................................................................	  12	  
2.1	   A	  MOTIVATIONAL	  UNDERSTANDING	  OF	  MORALITY	  ...............................................................................................	  13	  
2.2	   A	  MOTIVATIONAL	  UNDERSTANDING	  OF	  HAPPINESS	  ..............................................................................................	  16	  
CHAPTER	  3:	  MORAL	  JUDGMENT	  -­‐	  VIRTUE	  AS	  REFERENCE	  POINT	  ....................................................	  20	  
3.1	   INSIGHTS	  FROM	  PHILOSOPHY	  .....................................................................................................................................	  22	  
3.2	   SELF-­‐REGULATORY	  REFERENCE	  POINTS	  .................................................................................................................	  25	  
3.3	   CONNECTION	  TO	  INTUITIVE	  SCENARIOS	  ...................................................................................................................	  28	  
Study	  1:	  Bad	  Effects	  Versus	  Non-­‐Good	  Effects	  .......................................................................................................	  31	  
Study	  2a:	  Intuition	  Versus	  Reasoning	  .......................................................................................................................	  41	  
Study	  2b:	  Negative	  Consequences	  Absent	  Versus	  Present	  ................................................................................	  46	  
Study	  2c:	  Purity	  Ideals	  .....................................................................................................................................................	  51	  
Study	  3a:	  Boundary	  Conditions	  ....................................................................................................................................	  56	  
Study	  3b:	  Extensions	  .........................................................................................................................................................	  63	  
3.4	   THE	  ROLE	  OF	  VIRTUE	  IN	  MORAL	  JUDGMENT	  ...........................................................................................................	  66	  
3.5	   IMPLICATIONS	  FOR	  FUTURE	  RESEARCH	  ...................................................................................................................	  68	  
CHAPTER	  4:	  MORAL	  DECISIONS	  -­‐	  VIRTUE	  AS	  SELF-­‐GUIDE	  ..................................................................	  71	  
4.1	   HAPPINESS	  AND	  MULTIPLE	  GOALS	  ...........................................................................................................................	  74	  
4.2	   INSIGHTS	  FROM	  PHILOSOPHY	  .....................................................................................................................................	  76	  
4.3	   MORALITY	  AND	  BECOMING	  ........................................................................................................................................	  77	  
4.4	   REGULATORY	  SELF-­‐GUIDES	  AND	  REGULATORY	  FIT	  ...............................................................................................	  80	  
Study	  1:	  Charitable	  Behavior	  from	  Fit	  ......................................................................................................................	  82	  
	   ii	  
	  
Study	  2:	  Emotions	  from	  Charitable	  Decisions	  .......................................................................................................	  87	  
Study	  3:	  Fit	  Effects	  On	  Volunteering	  Time	  ..............................................................................................................	  93	  
4.5	   THE	  ROLE	  OF	  VIRTUE	  IN	  MORAL	  DECISIONS	  ...........................................................................................................	  98	  
4.6	   IMPLICATIONS	  FOR	  FUTURE	  RESEARCH	  ...................................................................................................................	  99	  
CHAPTER	  5:	  MORAL	  CHARACTER	  -­‐	  VIRTUE	  AS	  INTEGRITY	  ..............................................................	  102	  
5.1	   REVIEW	  OF	  EXISTING	  LITERATURE	  .........................................................................................................................	  103	  
5.2	   SITUATIONS,	  PERSONS,	  AND	  VIRTUES	  ....................................................................................................................	  105	  
5.3	   MOTIVATIONAL	  INTEGRITY	  AND	  THE	  VIRTUOUS	  SOUL	  ........................................................................................	  110	  
5.4	   EFFECTIVENESS	  OF	  MOTIVE	  ORGANIZATION	  .........................................................................................................	  112	  
Study	  1:	  Effectiveness	  of	  Motive	  Organization	  ....................................................................................................	  116	  
Study	  2:	  Distinguishing	  EMO	  and	  Existing	  Happiness-­‐Related	  Constructs	  ............................................	  124	  
Study	  3:	  EMO	  and	  Values	  ..............................................................................................................................................	  130	  
Study	  4:	  EMO	  and	  Past	  Altruism	  ................................................................................................................................	  132	  
Study	  5:	  EMO	  and	  Future	  Giving	  ...............................................................................................................................	  136	  
Study	  6:	  EMO	  and	  Present	  Helping	  ...........................................................................................................................	  140	  
5.5	   THE	  ROLE	  OF	  VIRTUE	  IN	  MORAL	  CHARACTER	  ......................................................................................................	  145	  
5.6	   IMPLICATIONS	  FOR	  FUTURE	  RESEARCH	  .................................................................................................................	  146	  
CHAPTER	  6:	  IMPLICATIONS	  AND	  CONCLUSIONS	  .................................................................................	  149	  
6.1	   RECONCEPTUALIZING	  MORALITY	  ............................................................................................................................	  149	  
Implications	  for	  Moral	  Philosophy	  ...........................................................................................................................	  150	  
6.2	   RECONCEPTUALIZING	  HAPPINESS	  ...........................................................................................................................	  153	  
Implications	  for	  Positive	  Psychology	  .......................................................................................................................	  154	  
6.3	   CONVERGENCE	  OF	  THE	  TWO	  MEANINGS	  OF	  THE	  GOOD	  LIFE	  ..............................................................................	  156	  
REFERENCES	  .....................................................................................................................................................	  160	  
APPENDIX:	  EFFECTIVENESS	  OF	  MOTIVE	  ORGANIZATION	  SCALE	  ...................................................	  181	  
	   	  
	   iii	  
	  
List	  of	  Figures	  
3.1	   Moral	  wrongness	  of	  incest	  over	  regulatory	  focus	  priming…………………………………...	  37	  
	  
3.2	   The	  impact	  of	  motivational	  induction	  on	  the	  variance	  of	  moral	  judgments	  of	  	  
incest………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..	  38	  	  
	  
3.3	   Moral	  wrongness	  of	  incest	  over	  regulatory	  focus	  priming	  by	  reasoning	  versus	  
intuition……………………………………………………………………………………………………………	  45	  
	  
3.4	   The	  impact	  of	  regulatory	  focus	  and	  directions	  for	  how	  to	  judge	  the	  scenarios	  on	  the	  
variance	  of	  moral	  judgments	  of	  incest………………………………………………………………...	  46	  
	  
3.5	   Moral	  wrongness	  of	  incest	  over	  regulatory	  focus	  priming	  by	  the	  potential	  for	  
harmful	  consequences……………………………………………………………………………………….	  49	  
	  
3.6	   The	  impact	  of	  regulatory	  focus	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  harmful	  consequences	  on	  the	  
variance	  of	  moral	  judgments	  of	  incest………………………………………………………………...	  50	  
	  
3.7	   Moral	  wrongness	  of	  incest	  over	  regulatory	  focus	  priming	  by	  endorsement	  of	  the	  
purity/sanctity	  moral	  foundation……………………………………………………………………….	  55	  
	  
3.8	   The	  impact	  of	  regulatory	  focus	  and	  purity	  concerns	  on	  the	  variance	  of	  moral	  
judgments	  of	  incest……………………………………………………………………………………………	  56	  
	  
3.9	   The	  impact	  of	  motivational	  induction	  on	  the	  variance	  of	  responses……………………..	  61	  
	  
3.10	   The	  impact	  of	  motivational	  induction	  on	  judgments	  of	  moral	  wrongness	  of	  incest	  
and	  cheating………………………………………………………………………………………………..........	  62	  
	  
3.11	   Moral	  wrongness	  of	  incest	  over	  regulatory	  focus	  priming	  by	  approach	  versus	  
avoidance	  priming……………………………………………………………………………………….…….	  66	  
	  
3.12	   Moral	  wrongness	  of	  family	  dog-­‐eating	  over	  regulatory	  focus	  priming	  by	  approach	  
versus	  avoidance	  priming……………………………………………………………………………….….	  67	  
	  
4.1	   Amount	  given	  predicted	  by	  priming	  and	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  predominance...	  86	  
	  
4.2	   Amount	  given	  predicted	  by	  appeal	  wording	  and	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  
predominance……………………………………………………………………………………………..........	  87	  
	  
4.3	   Amount	  given	  as	  a	  function	  of	  contextual	  focus	  priming	  and	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  
predominance……………………………………………………………………………………………..........	  90	  
	  
	   iv	  
	  
4.4	   Presence	  of	  guilt	  feelings	  predicted	  by	  giving	  and	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  
predominance…………………………………………………………………………………………………...	  91	  
	  
4.5	   Presence	  of	  virtuous	  feelings	  predicted	  by	  giving	  and	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  
predominance…………………………………………………………………………………………………...	  92	  
	  
4.6	   The	  number	  of	  time	  slots	  volunteered	  as	  a	  function	  of	  “recall	  a	  time”	  promotion	  
emphasis	  or	  prevention	  emphasis	  and	  perceiving	  the	  anagram	  performance	  
feedback	  as	  success	  or	  failure……………………………………………………….……………………	  97	  
	  
5.1	   Value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  effectiveness	  as	  a	  function	  of	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  
organization	  scale	  scores………………………………………………………..………………………..	  119	  
	  
5.2	   Value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  effectiveness	  variance	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  
motive	  organization………………………………………………………………………………………...	  120	  
	  
5.3	   Predicted	  likelihood	  of	  giving	  to	  charity	  in	  the	  past	  four	  weeks	  at	  round	  two,	  
predicted	  by	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  at	  round	  one……….…………..	  139	  
	  
5.4	   Likelihood	  of	  helping	  associated	  with	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  over	  and	  
above	  flourishing	  and	  satisfaction	  with	  life…………………………………………………........	  144	  
	  
	   	  
	   v	  
	  
	  
List	  of	  Tables	  
5.1	   Relationship	  between	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  and	  24	  fundamental	  
character	  strengths	  and	  virtues………………………………………………………………………..	  122	  
	  
5.2	   Relationship	  between	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  and	  other	  	  
constructs……………………………………………………………………………………………………….	  127	  
	  
5.3	   Multiple	  regressions	  for	  each	  scale	  predicting	  happiness	  and	  predicting	  
meaningfulness………………………………………………………………………………………….……	  128	  
	  
5.4	   Multiple	  regressions	  for	  the	  association	  between	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  
organization,	  happiness,	  and	  meaningfulness	  over	  and	  above	  each	  alternative	  
scale…………………………………………………………………………………………………………..……	  129	  
	  
5.5	   Relations	  between	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  and	  relative	  value	  	  
emphasis………………………………………………………………………………………………………...	  132	  
	  
5.6	   Correlations	  between	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  and	  frequency	  of	  
engaging	  in	  particular	  altruistic	  behaviors…………………………………….………………….	  135	  
	   	  
	   vi	  
	  
Acknowledgments	  
	   No	  research	  project	  is	  ever	  an	  enterprise	  undertaken	  by	  any	  lone	  individual,	  and	  I	  
am	  greatly	  humbled	  by	  the	  guidance	  and	  support	  that	  I	  have	  been	  blessed	  to	  receive	  over	  
the	  course	  of	  my	  graduate	  education.	  	  The	  research	  in	  this	  dissertation	  would	  not	  have	  
been	  possible	  without	  the	  incredible	  direction	  and	  encouragement	  of	  Tory	  Higgins,	  who	  
was	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  a	  great	  mentor	  and	  inspiration	  for	  those	  of	  us	  who	  have	  benefitted	  
from	  his	  leadership	  and	  enthusiasm.	  	  I	  have	  also	  benefited	  greatly	  from	  the	  considered	  
judgment	  and	  practical	  insight	  of	  Dave	  Krantz,	  whose	  careful	  thinking	  and	  steady	  support	  
have	  been	  invaluable	  in	  pursuing	  this	  and	  related	  research.	  	  I	  am	  also	  exceptionally	  grateful	  
to	  Betsy	  Sparrow,	  whose	  unique	  perspective	  and	  style	  has	  contributed	  in	  many	  ways	  both	  
to	  my	  research	  and	  my	  approach	  as	  an	  educator.	  	  This	  research	  and	  its	  philosophical	  
foundation	  has	  also	  benefitted	  immensely	  from	  the	  interdisciplinary	  expertise	  of	  John	  Jost,	  
and	  I	  wish	  to	  thank	  both	  him	  and	  Steve	  Stroessner	  for	  applying	  their	  time	  and	  considerable	  
experience	  to	  the	  improvement	  of	  this	  research	  as	  members	  of	  my	  committee.	  
	   Beyond	  my	  committee,	  there	  are	  others	  who	  are	  deserving	  of	  gratitude	  for	  
contributing	  in	  substantial	  ways	  to	  this	  program	  of	  research.	  	  First	  and	  foremost,	  I	  am	  
indebted	  to	  Becca	  Franks,	  whose	  collaboration	  and	  insights	  are	  largely	  responsible	  for	  the	  
existence	  of	  the	  Effectiveness	  of	  Motive	  Organization	  scale	  that	  serves	  as	  the	  foundation	  for	  
a	  goodly	  portion	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  I	  am	  also	  indebted	  to	  the	  tireless	  work	  and	  creativity	  
of	  Serena	  De	  Stefani,	  a	  talented	  student	  and	  no	  doubt	  a	  successful	  future	  research	  scientist.	  	  
I	  have	  also	  benefited	  greatly	  from	  Victor	  Austin,	  who	  is	  largely	  responsible	  for	  introducing	  
me	  to	  the	  philosophical	  ideas	  underlying	  this	  research.	  	  Special	  thanks	  go	  also	  to	  Yaacov	  
Trope,	  in	  whose	  lab	  I	  volunteered	  and	  learned	  the	  ropes	  all	  those	  years	  back.	  	  The	  research	  
projects	  themselves	  in	  this	  dissertation	  also	  required	  the	  commitment,	  both	  in	  terms	  of	  
time	  and	  in	  terms	  of	  intellect,	  of	  a	  host	  of	  other	  students	  to	  make	  it	  a	  reality:	  Carl	  Jago,	  
Bradley	  Swain,	  Gohar	  Harutyunyan,	  Yasmine	  Calil,	  Amanda	  Brief,	  Nora	  Gerien-­‐Chen,	  Sam	  
Gutman,	  Anuya	  Patil,	  Anastasia	  Blank,	  and	  Aschley	  Klecak.	  
	   Of	  course,	  the	  work	  of	  research	  toward	  a	  dissertation	  is	  an	  ongoing	  process,	  and	  it	  
would	  never	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  the	  input	  and	  encouragement	  of	  my	  fellow	  
students	  and	  collaborators	  along	  the	  way.	  	  Thanks	  in	  particular	  to	  my	  cohort—Jeff	  Craw,	  
Juliet	  Davidow,	  Bruce	  Doré,	  Katherine	  Thompson	  Fox-­‐Glassman,	  Greg	  Jensen,	  Mariana	  
Martins,	  Barbie	  Huelser	  Messa,	  Travis	  Riddle,	  Christine	  Webb,	  and	  Lisa	  Zaval—and	  to	  all	  of	  
other	  students	  and	  researchers	  who	  have	  had	  such	  a	  big	  impact	  along	  the	  way—Allison	  
Bajger,	  Ljubica	  Chatman,	  Raymond	  Crookes,	  and	  all	  of	  the	  members	  of	  the	  Higgins	  and	  
CRED	  Labs,	  both	  past	  and	  present.	  
	   So	  many	  ideas	  are	  formed	  outside	  of	  the	  walls	  of	  academia,	  and	  so	  I	  want	  to	  thank	  
my	  friends	  for	  all	  of	  the	  thought-­‐provoking	  conversations	  over	  the	  years,	  especially	  Jesse	  
Adelaar,	  Stella	  Gold,	  Brian	  Luczkiewicz,	  and	  Frank	  Reinauer.	  	  Finally,	  and	  perhaps	  most	  
importantly,	  not	  one	  bit	  of	  this	  research	  would	  have	  been	  possible	  without	  the	  amazing	  
foundation	  provided	  by	  my	  parents,	  Cheryl	  and	  Jim	  Cornwell,	  and	  of	  my	  wonderful	  and	  
brilliant	  wife	  Sarah,	  who	  was	  subjected	  to	  many	  earlier	  iterations	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  and	  
nevertheless	  has	  been	  supportive	  every	  step	  of	  the	  way.	  
	   1	  
	  
	  
Chapter	  1:	  The	  Modern	  Incompatibility	  of	  Morality	  and	  Happiness	  
	  
Ethical	  questions	  have	  lain	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  human	  experience	  since	  the	  dawn	  of	  
civilization.	  	  Ancient	  texts	  reveal	  that,	  despite	  the	  varied	  experiences	  of	  early	  civilizations,	  
questions	  of	  good	  and	  evil,	  right	  and	  wrong	  were	  bound	  up	  intrinsically	  with	  beliefs	  about	  
ultimate	  reality	  (Bellah,	  2011).	  This	  nearly	  universal	  fact	  about	  ethics	  has	  been	  one	  of	  its	  
centrally	  defining	  characteristics	  across	  ages	  and	  cultures.	  As	  such,	  many	  ancient	  and	  
classical	  philosophers	  and	  theologians	  reasoned	  that	  questions	  about	  the	  “good	  life”	  
touched	  upon	  both	  senses	  in	  which	  we	  use	  the	  word	  “good”—a	  life	  marked	  both	  by	  
personal	  happiness	  and	  by	  moral	  excellence	  (Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009;	  Aquinas,	  1274/1981;	  
Walshe,	  1995).	  	  This	  is	  perhaps	  most	  evident	  in	  ancient	  Greek	  societies,	  among	  whose	  
thinkers	  questions	  about	  how	  to	  be	  happy	  were	  addressed	  through	  appeals	  to	  ideals	  and	  
principles	  of	  ethics	  (Plato,	  trans.	  1992;	  Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009).	  	  It	  was	  generally	  understood	  
that	  questions	  of	  the	  good	  for	  human	  beings	  and	  other	  animals	  had	  a	  moral	  answer,	  and	  
that	  the	  personal	  flourishing	  of	  individuals	  and	  their	  ethical	  character	  converged.	  
This	  approach	  shifted	  dramatically	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Enlightenment.	  	  
Rationality	  took	  a	  decidedly	  empirical	  and	  rationalist	  turn	  (Bacon,	  1605/2001),	  with	  
questions	  of	  happiness	  and	  morality	  being	  subject	  to	  the	  rigors	  applied	  to	  our	  
understanding	  of	  other	  features	  of	  the	  natural	  world	  (Locke	  1689/1996;	  Hume,	  
1751/1983).	  	  Morality,	  no	  longer	  seen	  as	  intrinsically	  related	  to	  personal	  happiness,	  came	  
to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  tool	  that	  preserves	  social	  peace	  and	  tranquility	  to	  provide	  space	  for	  other	  
human	  capacities	  to	  achieve	  what	  is	  good	  for	  human	  beings,	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “summum	  
bonum”	  being	  set	  aside	  (Hobbes,	  1651/2009).	  	  Happiness,	  no	  longer	  inexorably	  coupled	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with	  morality,	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  effective	  achievement	  of	  desired	  ends	  (Mill,	  1863/2007).	  I	  
want	  to	  argue	  that	  this	  split	  leads	  inexorably	  to	  a	  view	  of	  morality	  as	  a	  system	  of	  rules	  and	  
obligations	  the	  purpose	  of	  which	  is	  to	  constrain	  or	  regulate	  decisions	  and	  behavior	  away	  
from	  anti-­‐social	  (“selfish”)	  choices	  and	  toward	  pro-­‐social	  (“selfless”)	  choices.	  	  This	  model	  
assumes	  that	  what	  is	  in	  one’s	  own	  best	  interest	  is	  at	  best	  orthogonal	  to,	  and	  at	  worst	  in	  
opposition	  to,	  what	  is	  in	  the	  best	  interest	  of	  others.	  
	   I	  aim	  to	  show,	  through	  a	  program	  of	  research,	  that	  this	  approach	  to	  morality	  is	  
incomplete.	  	  The	  problem	  with	  it	  lies	  in	  two	  category	  mistakes	  that	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  ways	  of	  
thinking	  that	  came	  to	  full	  maturity	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  John	  Stuart	  Mill	  (1863/2007).	  	  The	  
first	  is	  the	  category	  error	  associating	  “morality”	  only	  with	  duties	  and	  obligations	  (i.e.	  what	  
is	  “forbidden”	  or	  “obligatory;”	  see	  Cornwell	  &	  Higgins,	  2014).	  	  The	  second	  is	  a	  conflation	  of	  
happiness	  with	  utility,	  which	  reduces	  “happiness”	  to	  the	  acquisition	  or	  achievement	  of	  
desired	  results	  (Bentham,	  1776/1988).	  	  While	  these	  categorizations	  have	  led	  to	  advances	  
in	  behavioral	  sciences	  and	  moral	  philosophy,	  they	  fall	  short	  of	  a	  complete	  description	  of	  
how	  morality	  enters	  into	  judgments,	  decisions,	  and	  lifestyles	  (Williams,	  1986).	  	  Centrally,	  
these	  approaches	  ignore	  a	  long	  and	  theoretically	  fruitful	  tradition	  found	  in	  virtue	  ethics	  
(Jost	  &	  Jost,	  2009),	  not	  to	  mention	  the	  intuitions	  of	  everyday	  men	  and	  women.	  
	   Drawing	  on	  ancient	  and	  classical	  thought,	  I	  propose	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  viewing	  
both	  morality	  and	  happiness,	  which,	  in	  the	  end,	  shows	  that	  the	  two	  are	  mutually	  
supporting	  rather	  than	  in	  tension	  with	  one	  another.	  	  This	  involves	  expanding	  the	  concept	  of	  
morality	  beyond	  the	  current	  boundaries	  of	  duty	  and	  obligation	  to	  include	  the	  important	  
area	  of	  ideals	  and	  virtues.	  	  It	  also	  involves	  expanding	  the	  concept	  of	  happiness	  to	  mean	  not	  
only	  the	  achievement	  of	  desired	  outcomes	  or	  results	  (“value”),	  but	  also	  the	  satisfaction	  of	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two	  additional	  motivations:	  establishing	  what	  is	  real	  (“truth”)	  and	  managing	  what	  happens	  
(“control;”	  see	  Higgins,	  2012).	  	  I	  argue	  and	  aim	  to	  show	  empirically	  that	  these	  motivations,	  
when	  in	  proper	  relation	  with	  one	  another,	  produce	  both	  morality	  and	  happiness,	  thereby	  
demonstrating	  that	  the	  two	  senses	  of	  “good”	  in	  “the	  good	  life”	  are	  related	  by	  more	  than	  just	  
semantics—that	  doing	  good	  and	  doing	  well	  are	  intrinsically	  linked.	  	  Before	  laying	  out	  this	  
alternative	  view,	  it	  is	  important	  first	  to	  delineate	  the	  source	  and	  boundaries	  of	  the	  current	  
perspective.	  
1.1	   Modern	  Definitions	  of	  Morality	  
	  
	   The	  study	  of	  morality	  since	  the	  Enlightenment	  has	  been	  a	  project	  largely	  dedicated	  
to	  the	  locating	  of	  external	  or	  “objective”	  foundations	  on	  which	  our	  moral	  judgments	  could	  
rest.	  	  Though	  Enlightenment	  philosophers	  from	  Hume	  (1751/1983)	  to	  Kant	  (1785/1993)	  
largely	  accepted	  the	  ethical	  systems	  provided	  by	  a	  thoroughly	  Christian	  European	  society	  
(MacIntyre,	  1981),	  they	  desired	  to	  systematically	  explain	  and	  justify	  our	  moral	  beliefs	  and	  
intuitions	  apart	  from	  the	  doctrines	  and	  magisterial	  authorities	  that	  constituted	  the	  
religious	  sectors	  of	  life.	  	  This	  project	  was	  a	  response	  to	  the	  increasingly	  undeniable	  
religious	  pluralism	  of	  human	  beings	  throughout	  the	  world,	  both	  within	  Europe	  (e.g.	  the	  
different	  forms	  of	  Christian	  organization	  and	  practice	  from	  Anabaptists	  to	  Roman	  
Catholicism)	  and	  beyond	  Europe	  (e.g.	  the	  Native	  Americans	  across	  the	  Atlantic	  or	  Muslims	  
in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  North	  Africa).	  	  Hugo	  Grotius	  (1625/2004),	  the	  seventeenth	  century	  
political	  theologian,	  is	  credited	  with	  putting	  forth	  the	  argument	  that	  moral	  doctrines	  (in	  his	  
case,	  doctrines	  regarding	  international	  rules	  of	  war)	  require	  that	  they	  be	  justified	  etsi	  deus	  
non	  daretur—which	  roughly	  translates	  to	  “as	  if	  God	  did	  not	  exist.”	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   Thus	  began	  the	  modern	  project	  of	  discovering	  rational	  principles	  of	  morality	  to	  
which	  all	  people	  everywhere,	  regardless	  of	  culture,	  religion,	  or	  ethnic	  origin	  could	  assent	  
with	  purity	  of	  will.	  	  Arguments	  of	  this	  era	  often	  take	  on	  a	  character	  similar	  to	  those	  taking	  
place	  between	  moral	  psychologists	  in	  our	  own	  contemporary	  era.	  	  David	  Hume	  
(1751/1983),	  for	  example,	  argued	  that	  the	  justification	  for	  morality	  lies	  in	  our	  sentiments	  
like	  benevolence,	  whereas	  Immanuel	  Kant	  (1785/1993)	  argued	  that	  only	  rational	  
principles	  of	  consistency	  can	  give	  us	  a	  truly	  universal	  morality.	  	  These	  arguments	  parallel	  
those	  taking	  place	  between	  social-­‐intuitionist	  moral	  psychologists	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  (e.g.	  
Haidt,	  2001),	  and	  cognitive-­‐developmental	  psychologists	  on	  the	  other	  (e.g.	  Kohlberg,	  
1969),	  with	  the	  former	  rooting	  our	  moral	  judgments	  in	  immediate	  intuitive	  experience	  and	  
the	  later	  finding	  them	  in	  our	  capacities	  to	  reason.	  
	   It	  is	  unnecessary	  to	  take	  sides	  in	  the	  reasoning	  versus	  intuition	  debate	  in	  order	  to	  
see	  that	  both	  Hume	  and	  Kant	  had	  a	  common	  object	  for	  their	  intellectual	  explorations,	  in	  
spite	  of	  their	  differences:	  the	  rooting	  of	  moral	  judgments	  in	  fundamental	  human	  
characteristics	  that	  are	  intrinsically	  motivating.	  	  For	  Hume	  (1751/1983),	  this	  took	  the	  form	  
of	  affections	  or	  passions,	  which	  he	  argued	  inexorably	  push	  or	  pull	  human	  beings	  into	  more	  
beneficent	  and	  happiness-­‐maximizing	  relations	  with	  one	  another.	  	  For	  Kant	  (1785/1993),	  
this	  took	  the	  form	  of	  a	  need	  for	  rational	  consistency,	  which	  he	  argued	  must	  push	  or	  pull	  
human	  beings	  into	  acting	  in	  ways	  that	  necessarily	  take	  into	  account	  the	  value	  of	  others.	  	  
Each	  pushed	  for	  universality	  by	  grounding	  morals	  in	  faculties	  presumed	  to	  be	  universally	  
human.	  
	   The	  arguments	  against	  each	  of	  these	  perspectives	  are	  well	  known	  to	  those	  familiar	  
with	  philosophy.	  	  Hume’s	  view	  fails	  to	  distinguish	  between	  emotions	  that	  motivate	  us	  to	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behave	  ethically	  with	  those	  that	  motivate	  us	  to	  behave	  unethically	  without	  acknowledging	  
the	  need	  for	  a	  ‘superior’	  rational	  faculty	  that	  can	  adjudicate	  between	  the	  two	  based	  on	  
principles	  that	  must	  have	  their	  root	  in	  something	  other	  than	  those	  same	  affections	  (see	  
MacIntyre,	  1981).	  	  Kant’s	  view	  fails	  to	  describe	  how	  precisely	  logical	  consistency	  is	  
supposed	  to	  actually	  motivate	  behavior,	  and	  often	  rests	  some	  of	  his	  ethical	  arguments	  on	  
principles	  obviously	  drawn	  from	  affective	  faculties	  (such	  as	  in	  his	  discussion	  of	  the	  
prohibition	  against	  suicide;	  see	  MacIntyre,	  1981).	  	  
This	  quixotic	  search	  for	  a	  universal	  grounding	  moral	  faculty	  in	  which	  our	  moral	  
principles	  could	  find	  an	  objective	  foundation	  was	  eventually	  implicitly	  declared	  a	  failure	  by	  
Søren	  Kierkegaard.	  	  Seeing	  the	  flaws	  in	  each	  of	  the	  arguments	  (or,	  rather,	  reiterating	  
Hume’s	  flaws	  as	  revealed	  by	  Kant	  and	  Kant’s	  flaws	  as	  revealed	  by	  Hume),	  Kierkegaard	  
(1843/1988)	  presented	  an	  allegorical	  work	  suggesting	  an	  alternative	  view;	  one	  in	  which	  
there	  is	  no	  justifying	  ground	  for	  an	  ethical	  life	  aside	  from	  the	  basic	  decision	  to	  live	  in	  
accordance	  with	  ethical	  precepts.	  	  Another	  way	  of	  looking	  at	  this	  move	  is	  that	  it	  removes	  
moral	  motivation	  from	  the	  question	  of	  action	  justification,	  because	  people	  are	  not	  moral	  for	  
reasons,	  since	  such	  reasons	  have	  no	  grounding	  in	  external	  reality.	  	  Kierkegaard	  
accomplished	  this	  through	  the	  presentation	  of	  ethical	  choices	  as	  flowing	  from	  a	  primordial	  
decision:	  the	  decision	  to	  either	  live	  an	  ethical	  life	  (the	  life	  of	  duty)	  or	  an	  aesthetic	  life	  (the	  
life	  of	  selfish	  pleasure;	  see	  Kierkegaard,	  1843/1988).	  	  Even	  as	  motivation	  was	  
surreptitiously	  removed	  from	  the	  consideration	  of	  moral	  judgment	  and	  decision	  making,	  
morality	  was	  placed	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  one’s	  desires.	  
	   It	  is	  in	  this	  context	  that	  Sigmund	  Freud	  was	  born	  and	  raised,	  and	  our	  current	  
understanding	  of	  morality	  in	  moral	  psychology	  can	  largely	  be	  traced	  to	  his	  thought	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(1933/1990).	  	  Freud,	  in	  a	  way,	  followed	  Kierkegaard	  (1843/1988),	  arguing	  that	  “morality”	  
and	  what	  one	  desires	  are	  in	  a	  fundamental	  opposition.	  	  For	  Freud,	  the	  rules	  of	  society	  
(“morality”—which	  he	  eventually	  associated	  with	  the	  “superego”)	  were	  in	  fundamental	  
opposition	  to	  the	  desires	  of	  an	  individual	  (personal	  “happiness”	  or	  “pleasure”—conflated	  
first	  by	  Mill,	  1863/2007—which	  he	  associated	  with	  the	  “id”).	  	  Freud	  saw	  these	  motivations	  
as	  being	  necessarily	  in	  conflict:	  that	  the	  desires	  of	  the	  individual	  will	  necessarily	  run	  up	  
against	  the	  demands	  of	  society,	  and	  the	  individual’s	  rational	  self	  (the	  “ego”)	  would	  have	  to	  
somehow	  navigate	  between	  them	  (Freud,	  1933/1990).	  	  Thus,	  even	  for	  Freud,	  moral	  
decision	  making	  and	  action	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  primordial	  choice	  between	  ethical	  duties	  and	  
selfish	  pleasures.	  	  Piaget	  (1932/2008)—who,	  together	  with	  Freud,	  may	  fairly	  be	  called	  the	  
father	  of	  moral	  psychology—though	  he	  distanced	  himself	  from	  Freud’s	  psychodynamic	  
construction	  of	  human	  psychology,	  still	  retained	  the	  notion	  that	  morality	  is	  an	  essentially	  
rule-­‐based	  source	  of	  social	  security:	  either	  demanding	  one	  act	  on	  one’s	  obligations,	  or	  that	  
one	  not	  act	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  forbidden.	  	  	  	  This	  point	  of	  view	  is	  so	  deeply	  embedded	  among	  
psychologists	  that	  the	  APA	  definition	  of	  “morality”	  reflects	  this	  “ought	  premise:”	  	  
A	  system	  of	  beliefs	  and	  values	  that	  ensures	  that	  individuals	  will	  keep	  their	  
obligations	  to	  others	  [i.e.	  doing	  right]	  in	  society	  and	  will	  behave	  in	  ways	  that	  
do	  not	  interfere	  with	  the	  rights	  and	  interests	  of	  others	  [i.e.	  not	  doing	  wrong]”	  
(Gerrig	  &	  Zimbardo,	  2002,	  emphasis	  mine).	  
	   Today	  most	  modern	  moral	  philosophers	  (and	  many	  psychologists	  following	  them)	  
have	  organized	  themselves	  into	  two	  schools:	  deontology	  (following	  Kant)	  and	  
consequentialism	  (following	  Hume	  and	  Mill;	  see	  Taylor,	  2007).	  	  However,	  whether	  
psychologists	  join	  with	  the	  former	  group	  (placing	  the	  grounding	  of	  these	  rules	  in	  our	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reason)	  or	  the	  latter	  (placing	  the	  grounding	  of	  these	  rules	  in	  our	  affections),	  there	  is	  the	  
sense	  in	  which	  these	  rules	  are,	  at	  best,	  orthogonal	  to	  a	  happy	  life.	  	  Whether	  morality	  is	  
reduced	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  maximizing	  the	  greatest	  total	  happiness	  or	  about	  adhering	  to	  a	  
principle	  of	  universality,	  this	  principle	  finds	  its	  motivating	  power	  through	  the	  use	  of	  an	  
“ought;”	  a	  duty	  that	  demands	  integral	  fulfillment	  and	  resists	  any	  attempt	  to	  exceed	  it	  by	  
definition	  (MacIntyre,	  1981;	  Taylor,	  2007).1	  	  These	  rules	  either	  ensure	  the	  security	  of	  
society	  so	  as	  to	  allow	  each	  person	  to	  pursue	  his	  or	  her	  own	  good,	  or	  they	  obligate	  us	  to	  
work	  toward	  that	  good,	  but	  none	  of	  them	  see	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  these	  obligations	  as	  
constitutive	  of	  a	  happy	  life.	  Put	  another	  way,	  they	  all	  tend	  “to	  focus	  on	  what	  it	  is	  right	  to	  do	  
rather	  than	  on	  what	  it	  is	  good	  to	  be,	  on	  defining	  the	  content	  of	  obligation	  rather	  than	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  good	  life”	  (Taylor,	  1989).	  	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  contemporary	  philosophers	  of	  
both	  the	  deontological	  school	  (e.g.	  Rawls,	  1988)	  and	  the	  consequentialist	  school	  (e.g.	  Hare,	  
1982),	  both	  of	  which	  argue	  that	  the	  moral	  Right	  is	  prior	  to	  the	  ethical	  Good.	  
	   On	  this	  view	  of	  morality,	  living	  in	  accordance	  with	  ethical	  principles	  is	  at	  best	  
orthogonal	  to	  the	  achievement	  of	  personal	  happiness,	  and	  at	  worst	  in	  opposition	  to	  it.	  	  This	  
represents	  a	  far	  cry	  from	  older	  views	  of	  ethics	  which	  argued	  that	  personal	  happiness	  was	  
bound	  up	  with	  ethical	  principles	  (e.g.	  Plato,	  trans.	  1992;	  Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009;	  Aquinas,	  
1274/1981).	  	  This	  is	  most	  obvious	  with	  Kantian	  or	  deontological	  views	  of	  morality,	  which	  
explicitly	  argue	  that	  the	  moral	  rightness	  or	  wrongness	  of	  an	  action	  is	  entirely	  divorced	  
from	  the	  happiness	  of	  the	  actor	  or	  the	  consequences	  of	  the	  action	  (Kant,	  1785/1993).	  	  
However,	  another	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  consequentialist	  view,	  still	  makes	  a	  claim	  to	  ground	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Further	  explication	  of	  these	  characteristics	  and	  their	  inability	  to	  deal	  with	  ethical	  notions	  such	  as	  
supererogation,	  and	  for	  a	  general	  explication	  of	  the	  shortcomings	  of	  consequentialism	  and	  Kantianism	  taken	  
in	  isolation	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Smart	  and	  Williams	  (1973)	  and	  Williams	  (1981;	  1985).	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principles	  of	  right	  in	  an	  understanding	  of	  what’s	  good	  for	  human	  beings,	  but,	  as	  I	  will	  argue	  
in	  the	  next	  section,	  this	  approach	  generally	  relies	  on	  a	  diminished	  understanding	  of	  
happiness	  rather	  than	  arguing	  that	  they	  are	  intrinsically	  bound	  up	  with	  one	  another.	  	  
1.2	   Modern	  Definitions	  of	  Happiness	  
	  
Happiness,	  like	  morality,	  was	  understood	  for	  centuries	  in	  a	  manner	  far	  removed	  
from	  the	  way	  the	  thinkers	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  have	  since	  conceptualized	  it.	  	  What	  was	  
once	  understood	  to	  be	  the	  experience	  of	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  virtues	  has	  become	  
understood	  instead	  as	  simply	  a	  desired	  end-­‐state	  where	  pleasure	  is	  maximized	  and	  pain	  is	  
minimized	  (Bentham,	  1776/1988).	  	  This	  conflation	  of	  happiness	  and	  pleasure	  was	  
probably	  most	  notoriously	  accomplished	  by	  John	  Stuart	  Mill	  (1863/2007),	  who	  argued	  for	  
the	  identification	  of	  the	  greatest	  total	  happiness	  with	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  aggregate	  utility	  
(i.e.,	  highest	  aggregate	  desired	  end-­‐states).	  	  
All	  goods,	  according	  to	  Mill,	  are	  essentially	  quantifiable	  in	  terms	  of	  this	  idea	  of	  
“utility.”	  The	  moral	  worth	  of	  an	  individual	  is	  determined	  by	  how	  much	  general	  utility	  he	  or	  
she	  brings	  about;	  those	  who	  achieve	  the	  greatest	  amount	  of	  general	  utility	  are	  considered	  
the	  most	  good.	  	  Many	  economic	  theorists,	  while	  rejecting	  some	  of	  the	  problematic	  
philosophical	  confusions	  of	  Mill’s	  theory,	  still	  endorse	  this	  general	  model	  of	  human	  
decision	  making	  and	  motivation	  where	  all	  goals	  collapse	  into	  one	  maximizing	  continuum	  
rather	  than	  exerting	  independent	  influence	  (e.g.	  Hare,	  1982).	  	  	  
	   On	  this	  view,	  happiness	  is	  something	  that	  can	  be	  measured	  through	  the	  experiences	  
of	  pleasure	  and	  pain	  by	  every	  individual,	  summing	  the	  multitude	  of	  scores	  with	  one	  
another.	  It	  is	  an	  outcome:	  one	  that	  revolves	  around	  either	  the	  objective	  satisfaction	  of	  
desire	  (or	  avoidance	  of	  loss)	  or	  the	  subjective	  experience	  of	  personal	  satisfaction	  (or	  the	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avoidance	  of	  pain).	  	  Put	  another	  way,	  consequentialism	  does	  not	  argue	  that	  happiness	  is	  
constituted	  by	  an	  ethical	  way	  of	  life,	  but	  instead	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  one’s	  
desires,	  which	  may	  or	  may	  not	  include	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  ethics,	  dependent	  upon	  
how	  much	  pleasure	  one	  derives	  from	  being	  ethical	  (Mill,	  1863/2007).	  	  One	  ethical	  principle	  
is	  brought	  to	  bear	  upon	  this	  grand	  calculation:	  the	  greatest	  total	  happiness	  achieved	  
through	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  greatest	  amount	  of	  desire	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  action	  (or	  
inhibition).	  	  	  
This	  ethical	  approach	  appeals	  to	  many	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  moral	  philosophy	  and	  
psychology,	  particularly	  because	  it	  grounds	  itself	  in	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  human	  nature,	  
one	  which	  we	  share	  with	  other	  animals:	  approach	  pleasure	  and	  avoid	  pain.	  	  This	  allows	  
those	  who	  adopt	  the	  view	  to	  take	  an	  empirical	  approach	  to	  questions	  about	  human	  
happiness	  and	  morality.	  	  Human	  beings,	  like	  all	  animals,	  are	  motivated	  to	  approach	  positive	  
outcomes	  and	  avoid	  negative	  outcomes.	  Therefore,	  an	  ethical	  system	  built	  upon	  this	  
fundamental	  principle	  should	  not	  only	  largely	  explain	  human	  behavior,	  but	  should	  also	  lead	  
to	  an	  empirically	  verifiable	  understanding	  of	  morality.	  	  This	  has	  led	  to	  some	  quixotic	  
attempts	  to	  define	  the	  principles	  of	  ethics	  once	  and	  for	  all,	  or	  at	  least	  argue	  that	  these	  
premises	  can	  lead	  to	  an	  entirely	  empirical	  set	  of	  moral	  judgments	  (e.g.,	  Harris,	  2010)	  
There	  are	  two	  basic	  problems	  with	  this	  view,	  however.	  	  First,	  it	  fundamentally	  
misunderstands	  important	  aspects	  of	  human	  motivation.	  	  Second,	  it	  has	  a	  notoriously	  
flawed	  track	  record	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  predicting	  human	  decision	  making	  and	  behavior.	  	  
Indeed,	  the	  entire	  field	  of	  behavioral	  economics	  seems	  created	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  
cataloging	  and	  classifying	  the	  myriad	  ways	  in	  which	  human	  behavior	  deviates	  from	  the	  
“rational”	  prescriptions	  of	  expected	  utility	  theory;	  a	  theory	  based	  solely	  on	  the	  principles	  of	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approach	  and	  avoidance.	  
	   With	  regard	  to	  the	  first	  difficulty,	  reducing	  human	  motivation	  (not	  to	  mention	  the	  
motivation	  of	  non-­‐human	  animals)	  to	  approaching	  positive	  outcomes	  and	  avoiding	  
negative	  outcomes	  leaves	  us	  with	  an	  impoverished	  understanding	  of	  behavior	  and	  its	  
purposes.2	  On	  the	  one	  side,	  approach	  and	  avoidance	  (or,	  put	  another	  way,	  valuation	  of	  
stimuli)	  can	  be	  further	  subdivided	  into	  the	  promotion	  and	  prevention	  systems	  (Higgins,	  
1997;	  1998).	  	  Goals	  can	  be	  approached	  as	  either	  ideal	  goals	  (promotion)	  or	  as	  ought	  goals	  
(prevention).	  	  Furthermore,	  approach	  and	  avoidance	  represent	  only	  one	  aspect	  of	  
motivation,	  that	  of	  value	  (the	  desire	  to	  have	  good	  results,	  see	  Higgins,	  2012).	  	  Two	  other	  
aspects	  of	  motivation,	  truth	  (the	  desire	  to	  establish	  what	  is	  real)	  and	  control	  (the	  desire	  to	  
manage	  what	  happens),	  represent	  different,	  and	  in	  certain	  ways	  perhaps	  even	  more	  
fundamental,	  kinds	  of	  motivation	  that	  are	  left	  out	  of	  models	  of	  expected	  utility	  theory	  
entirely.	  
Even	  if,	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  argument,	  we	  grant	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  desire	  its	  place	  in	  this	  
system	  despite	  its	  inability	  to	  accurately	  describe	  the	  way	  human	  beings	  actually	  go	  about	  
making	  decisions	  (see	  Krantz	  &	  Kunreuther,	  2007	  for	  a	  summary	  of	  and	  response	  to	  the	  
difficulties	  with	  expected	  utility	  theory),	  and	  then	  we	  make	  the	  additional	  assumption	  that	  
these	  desires	  (grounded	  in	  approach	  and	  avoidance)	  reflect	  the	  most	  fundamental	  aspects	  
of	  human	  motivation,	  we	  are	  still	  left	  with	  a	  still	  more	  serious	  fundamental	  problem.	  	  These	  
desires,	  whatever	  they	  may	  be,	  are,	  by	  definition,	  considered	  “good.”	  	  However,	  a	  cursory	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  It	  is	  perhaps	  this	  impoverished	  understanding	  that	  leads	  many	  supporters	  of	  consequentialist	  approaches	  to	  
ethics	  to	  believe	  that	  deontological	  and	  virtue	  ethical	  approaches	  can	  simply	  be	  “consequentialized”—
reinterpreted	  as	  consequentialist	  systems	  (e.g.	  Hare,	  1982;	  1993).	  	  Philosophers	  have	  rejected	  this	  approach	  
and,	  indeed,	  have	  recently	  noted	  that	  there	  are	  particular	  approaches	  to	  ethics,	  which,	  by	  definition,	  resist	  
“consequentialization”	  (Brown,	  2011).	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glance	  at	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  human	  experience	  leads	  one	  to	  the	  obvious	  conclusion	  that	  
what	  is	  “good”	  is	  precisely	  the	  question	  about	  which	  there	  is	  so	  much	  disagreement.	  	  	  
It	  is	  precisely	  the	  difficulty	  with	  this	  question	  that	  motivated	  Rawls	  (1988)	  to	  banish	  
questions	  of	  the	  Good	  from	  the	  public	  realm	  in	  favor	  of	  an	  overlapping	  consensus	  
concerning	  what	  is	  Right.	  	  Indeed,	  when	  you	  get	  beyond	  the	  basic	  elements	  of	  survival	  that	  
constitute	  the	  secure	  foundation	  from	  which	  any	  individual	  is	  capable	  of	  achieving	  a	  happy	  
life,	  the	  consensus	  becomes	  less	  and	  less	  universal.	  Even	  consequentialism,	  then,	  is	  forced	  
to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  a	  question	  that	  it	  prefers	  to	  assume	  as	  translatable	  to	  some	  sort	  of	  
empirical	  currency:	  what	  is	  the	  Good?	  It	  is	  precisely	  when	  butting	  up	  against	  this	  question	  
of	  human	  flourishing	  (a	  fuller	  definition	  of	  “happiness”)	  that	  many	  of	  the	  difficulties	  of	  
ethical	  systems	  that	  exclusively	  focus	  on	  the	  Right	  begin	  to	  become	  apparent	  (Williams,	  
1985).	  I	  will	  be	  arguing	  in	  this	  dissertation	  that	  they	  leave	  to	  one	  side	  fundamental	  aspects	  
of	  human	  motivation,	  which	  I	  consider	  next.	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Chapter	  2:	  The	  Motivational	  Alternative	  
	  
	   In	  this	  dissertation,	  I	  aim	  to	  show	  that	  understanding	  ethics	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  
motivation	  science	  can	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  fuller	  understanding	  of	  both	  morality	  and	  of	  
happiness,	  and	  even	  suggest	  how	  the	  two	  subjects—far	  from	  being	  in	  conflict—may	  
actually	  work	  together.	  	  Consistent	  with	  lay	  intuitions	  that	  truly	  happy	  people	  are	  good	  
people,	  research	  on	  evaluations	  of	  happiness	  have	  consistently	  found	  that	  assessments	  of	  
whether	  a	  given	  individual	  is	  really	  “happy”	  have	  an	  irreducibly	  moral	  element	  (King	  &	  
Napa,	  1998;	  Phillips,	  Misenheimer,	  &	  Knobe,	  2011).	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  different	  
way	  to	  understand	  morality	  and	  happiness	  than	  that	  discussed	  above—one	  that	  can	  offer	  a	  
richer	  understanding	  of	  the	  good	  life	  than	  that	  provided	  by	  a	  socialized	  hedonic	  principle.	  
A	  quick	  overview	  of	  ancient	  wisdom	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  happiness	  finds	  very	  scant	  
evidence	  for	  a	  “desired	  end-­‐state”	  perspective:	  Aristotle	  states	  that	  happiness	  is	  
constituted	  by	  a	  life	  lived	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  virtues	  in	  his	  Nichomachean	  Ethics	  (trans.	  
2009),	  Jesus	  of	  Nazareth	  admonishes	  us	  to	  put	  the	  “Kingdom	  of	  God”	  and	  God’s	  
“righteousness”	  before	  the	  acquisition	  of	  worldly	  possessions	  or	  satisfaction	  of	  earthly	  
desires	  in	  the	  Gospel	  of	  Matthew	  (KJV,	  1997),	  the	  Buddha	  remarks	  that	  the	  essential	  
qualities	  for	  a	  noble	  life	  are	  ethics	  and	  wisdom,	  explicitly	  setting	  aside	  things	  like	  high	  birth	  
and	  wealth	  (Walshe,	  1995).	  	  These	  ancient	  thinkers,	  as	  well	  as	  contemporary	  scientists,	  
paint	  an	  alternative	  picture	  of	  “happiness”	  that	  relates	  more	  to	  “the	  good	  life”	  where	  
morality	  and	  happiness	  are	  inextricably	  linked.	  	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  provide	  a	  theoretical	  
foundation	  for	  expanded	  understandings	  of	  morality	  and	  happiness	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  
motivation.	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2.1	   A	  Motivational	  Understanding	  of	  Morality	  
	  
The	  Right-­‐dominant	  ethical	  systems	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  each	  assume	  
that	  morality	  is	  the	  exclusive	  purview	  of	  oughts.	  	  However,	  research	  on	  regulatory	  focus	  
theory	  has	  shown	  that	  reference	  to	  duty	  and	  obligation	  is	  actually	  only	  one	  kind	  of	  
motivation,	  associated	  with	  the	  prevention	  focus	  (Higgins,	  1997;	  1998).	  	  There	  is	  another	  
kind	  of	  motivation	  as	  well,	  associated	  with	  the	  promotion	  focus,	  which	  uses	  lofty	  ideals	  and	  
aspirations	  as	  its	  referent.	  	  Specifically,	  the	  prevention	  focus	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  
achievement	  of	  safety	  and	  security	  goals,	  and	  the	  maintaining	  of	  non-­‐losses	  and	  avoidance	  
of	  losses.	  	  The	  promotion	  focus	  is	  associated	  with	  the	  achievement	  of	  nurturance	  and	  
growth	  goals,	  and	  the	  attaining	  of	  gains	  and	  avoidance	  of	  non-­‐gains.	  	  Each	  represents	  an	  
orthogonal	  subsystem	  within	  the	  overall	  approach/avoidance	  valuation	  framework.	  	  As	  
discussed	  above,	  researchers	  of	  morality	  tend	  to	  emphasize	  issues	  of	  duty	  and	  obligation	  
when	  studying	  morality,	  often	  seeing	  behaviors	  as	  existing	  on	  a	  single	  continuum	  that	  runs	  
from	  “forbidden”	  through	  “permissible”	  to	  “obligated”	  (e.g.	  Cushman,	  Young,	  &	  Hauser,	  
2006).	  However,	  the	  desire	  for	  the	  achievement	  of	  ideals	  is	  a	  distinct	  motivation	  to	  that	  of	  
fulfilling	  one’s	  duties	  and	  obligations,	  and	  the	  pursuit	  and	  attainment	  of	  these	  ideals	  can	  
just	  as	  easily	  involve	  morality	  (Haidt	  &	  Joseph,	  2004;	  2007).	  	  
The	  notion	  of	  ideals	  (or,	  in	  the	  parlance	  of	  moral	  philosophers,	  the	  Good)	  as	  a	  kind	  
of	  value	  motivation	  in	  ethics	  is	  not	  something	  new.	  	  In	  fact,	  relative	  to	  a	  prioritization	  of	  the	  
Right	  in	  moral	  philosophy,	  it	  is	  actually	  quite	  old.	  	  The	  earliest	  philosophers	  of	  ethics	  
through	  the	  pre-­‐modern	  philosophers,	  from	  Aristotle	  (trans.	  2009)	  to	  Thomas	  Aquinas	  
(1274/1981),	  emphasized	  an	  ethical	  system	  grounded	  in	  ideals	  of	  human	  character—the	  
virtues.	  	  The	  movement	  away	  from	  the	  prioritization	  of	  the	  Good	  over	  the	  Right	  to	  its	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opposite	  had	  a	  number	  of	  motivations,	  many	  of	  which	  were	  sound.	  	  First,	  as	  mentioned	  
above,	  theories	  of	  the	  Good	  tend	  to	  demand	  a	  comprehensiveness	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  
exclusion	  or	  suppression	  of	  alternative	  theories.	  	  This	  was	  Rawls’s	  primary	  argument	  for	  
the	  prioritization	  of	  the	  Right	  over	  the	  Good	  (Rawls,	  1988).	  	  Second,	  the	  Good,	  resting	  as	  it	  
does	  on	  ideals	  of	  perfection,	  can	  lead	  to	  despair	  among	  those	  who	  find	  it	  difficult	  to	  attain	  
and	  condescension	  for	  those	  who	  do	  not	  (see	  Aristotle’s	  treatment	  of	  slaves	  and	  women	  in	  
Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009,	  or	  the	  various	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  egalitarian	  spirit	  led	  to	  a	  more	  
duty-­‐based	  view	  of	  morality	  in	  Taylor,	  2007).	  	  The	  Right,	  with	  its	  penchant	  for	  basic	  
universalism,	  offers	  a	  more	  easily	  attained	  set	  of	  precepts,	  and	  makes	  their	  supersession	  a	  
matter	  of	  choice,	  rather	  than	  goodness.	  
This	  is	  not	  to	  argue	  in	  favor	  of	  maintaining	  the	  current	  valuation	  of	  the	  Right	  over	  
the	  Good	  as	  it	  exists	  in	  moral	  philosophy	  and	  psychology;	  only	  to	  note	  that	  the	  current	  state	  
of	  affairs	  is	  not	  indefensible,	  and,	  in	  arguing	  for	  a	  relaxation	  of	  this	  prioritization,	  to	  avoid	  
overlooking	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  it	  exists	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  Right’s	  
supremacy	  in	  morality	  has	  led	  to	  a	  number	  of	  ‘dead	  ends’	  in	  moral	  philosophy	  and	  
unanswered	  questions	  in	  moral	  psychology	  that	  a	  dynamical	  theory	  that	  embraced	  both	  
the	  Good	  and	  the	  Right	  as	  independently	  motivating	  foundations	  of	  ethical	  value	  might	  be	  
able	  to	  overcome,	  while	  still	  maintaining	  a	  vigilant	  eye	  to	  guard	  against	  the	  excesses	  
associated	  with	  giving	  too	  much	  priority	  to	  the	  Good.	  	  In	  recent	  decades,	  some	  moral	  
philosophers	  have	  been	  arguing	  for	  the	  conceptual	  independence	  of	  these	  two	  ways	  of	  
grounding	  morality	  (Trianosky,	  1986).	  
I	  want	  to	  argue	  for	  a	  similar	  approach	  to	  psychology	  as	  has	  been	  ably	  proposed	  in	  
philosophy	  (e.g.	  MacIntyre,	  1981).	  	  I	  aim	  to	  show	  that	  understanding	  morality	  as	  consisting	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both	  of	  oughts	  and	  ideals	  can	  help	  us	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  moral	  
judgments	  as	  they	  are	  actually	  found	  puzzle	  moral	  psychologists,	  and	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  
fuller	  account	  of	  moral	  motivation	  in	  behavior	  and	  decision	  making.	  	  I	  argue	  for	  ethics	  
consisting	  of	  two	  distinct	  systems:	  a	  system	  of	  oughts	  that	  aims	  at	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  duties	  
and	  avoidance	  of	  transgressions,	  and	  a	  system	  of	  ideals	  that	  aims	  at	  the	  attainment	  of	  
virtues	  and	  avoidance	  of	  vices.	  	  The	  next	  two	  chapters	  will	  further	  delineate	  the	  character	  of	  
these	  two	  systems.	  	  An	  additional	  intriguing	  implication	  of	  this	  linking	  of	  the	  promotion	  
focus	  to	  the	  desire	  for	  virtue	  is	  that	  the	  promotion	  focus	  is	  also	  associated	  with	  feeling	  
happy	  (Higgins,	  2001),	  thus	  suggesting	  that,	  in	  this	  way,	  the	  two	  are	  intrinsically	  linked.	  	  
More	  will	  be	  said	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  happiness	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  
While	  an	  approach	  to	  ethics	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  the	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  value	  
achieved	  through	  the	  use	  of	  moral	  rules	  (prevention)	  and	  virtuous	  exemplars	  (promotion)	  
can	  tell	  us	  much	  about	  how	  judgments	  and	  decisions	  are	  made	  in	  light	  of	  such	  values,	  it	  
lacks	  a	  full	  account	  of	  how	  these	  values	  impact	  motivation	  beyond	  their	  desired	  end-­‐states:	  
that	  is,	  how	  they	  impose	  themselves	  upon	  us	  as	  true	  and	  also	  provide	  imperatives	  of	  action.	  	  
That	  is,	  they	  presuppose	  the	  presence	  of	  epistemic	  (truth)	  and	  volitional	  (control)	  
motivation	  whereas	  it	  is	  their	  relation	  to	  truth	  and	  control,	  working	  together	  effectively	  or	  
ineffectively,	  that	  must	  be	  considered	  in	  addition	  to	  questions	  of	  value	  (Crittenden,	  2012;	  
analogous	  to	  the	  three	  kinds	  of	  fundamental	  motivation	  found	  in	  Higgins,	  2012).	  	  	  
It	  is	  precisely	  this	  fuller	  account	  that	  is	  necessary	  when	  considering	  an	  ethics	  based	  
upon	  the	  virtues	  that	  has	  flourishing	  as	  its	  aim.	  	  A	  morality	  based	  on	  rights,	  in	  contrast,	  only	  
seeks	  to	  establish	  the	  best	  set	  of	  rules,	  while	  the	  fuller	  picture	  aims	  at	  an	  account	  for	  the	  
best	  internal	  organization	  of	  motives	  (value,	  truth,	  and	  control)	  toward	  which	  an	  individual	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can	  aspire.3	  	  The	  virtues	  consist	  in	  training	  of	  the	  self	  so	  that	  beliefs,	  desires,	  and	  actions	  all	  
align,	  whereas	  a	  system	  of	  obligatory	  rules	  often	  (though	  not	  necessarily)	  operates	  in	  spite	  
of	  ones	  desires	  or	  beliefs.	  	  Thus	  an	  account	  of	  morality	  that	  involves	  an	  ethics	  based	  on	  
virtues	  demands	  attention	  to	  truth	  and	  control	  motivations	  as	  well	  as	  value	  motivations.	  
2.2	   A	  Motivational	  Understanding	  of	  Happiness	  
	  
	   Virtues	  aim	  at	  happiness	  (Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009).	  	  Thus	  any	  motivational	  account	  of	  
an	  ethics	  of	  virtue	  must	  also	  provide	  a	  motivational	  account	  of	  happiness.	  	  As	  mentioned	  in	  
the	  previous	  chapter,	  modern	  notions	  of	  happiness	  tend	  to	  collapse	  it	  into	  a	  general	  notion	  
of	  satisfying	  desires.	  	  This	  would	  not	  be	  entirely	  wrong	  if	  “desires”	  were	  understood	  in	  
their	  fullest	  sense	  of	  what	  makes	  life	  worthwhile;	  that	  is,	  referring	  not	  only	  to	  value	  
motivation	  (having	  desired	  results)	  but	  also	  truth	  motivation	  (establishing	  what	  is	  real)	  
and	  control	  motivation	  (managing	  what	  happens).	  	  This	  is	  because	  ethics,	  as	  an	  account	  of	  
what	  it	  means	  to	  flourish,	  must	  take	  into	  account	  human	  nature	  in	  its	  full	  extent.	  	  	  	  
Human	  beings	  are	  motivated	  to	  understand	  the	  world	  as	  it	  actually	  is,	  and	  this	  
motivation	  exists	  independent	  of	  value	  motivation	  (Higgins,	  2012).	  	  In	  humans,	  this	  takes	  
the	  form	  of	  shared	  reality.	  	  For	  a	  variety	  of	  reasons,	  human	  beings	  are	  “hypersocial”—their	  
understanding	  of	  the	  way	  things	  are	  is	  bound	  up	  in	  the	  way	  others	  understand	  it	  (Hardin	  &	  
Higgins,	  1996).	  	  This	  is	  perhaps	  most	  obvious	  in	  the	  area	  of	  ethics.	  	  Ethical	  beliefs	  are	  not	  
empirical	  beliefs:	  they	  are	  not	  “out	  there”	  in	  nature	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  make	  them	  capable	  
of	  precise	  measurement.	  	  And	  yet,	  to	  a	  certain	  extent,	  ethical	  beliefs	  carry	  with	  them	  a	  
sense	  of	  objectivity	  (Goodwin	  &	  Darley,	  2008).	  	  One	  does	  not	  say,	  “Killing	  an	  innocent	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  For	  an	  allegorical	  expression	  of	  this	  difference,	  compare	  the	  implicit	  ethics	  of	  Dante’s	  Inferno	  to	  that	  of	  his	  
Purgatorio.	  	  The	  former	  is	  concerned	  primarily	  with	  behaviors,	  while	  the	  latter	  is	  concerned	  more	  with	  
motives.	  	  The	  former	  with	  what	  is	  expected	  to	  avoid	  hell,	  the	  latter	  with	  what	  must	  be	  achieved	  in	  order	  to	  
merit	  heaven	  (Alleghieri,	  2011).	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person	  is	  wrong	  for	  me;”	  one	  says,	  “Killing	  an	  innocent	  person	  is	  wrong.”	  	  Moral	  notions	  
cannot	  be	  merely	  subjective	  notions	  without	  ceasing	  to	  be	  truly	  moral	  notions.	  They	  must	  
be	  objective.	  
How	  is	  this	  sense	  of	  objectivity	  achieved?	  Research	  on	  shared	  reality	  argues	  that	  
perceived	  objectivity	  is	  a	  function	  of	  shared	  inner	  states	  between	  or	  among	  individuals	  
(Echterhoff,	  Higgins,	  &	  Levine,	  2009).	  These	  inner	  states	  (feelings;	  beliefs)	  are	  always	  with	  
respect	  to	  a	  third	  referent	  apart	  from	  the	  two	  individuals;	  i.e.,	  they	  are	  always	  about	  
something.	  	  With	  respect	  to	  morality,	  it	  is	  precisely	  this	  sharing	  of	  inner	  states	  with	  respect	  
to	  certain	  behaviors	  (i.e.,	  their	  valuation	  as	  either	  good	  or	  bad,	  right	  or	  wrong)	  that,	  when	  
aligned,	  produce	  a	  sense	  of	  moral	  objectivity	  (a	  sense	  that	  can	  be	  disrupted	  should	  
majorities	  deviate	  from	  what	  one	  presumes	  to	  be	  a	  settled	  moral	  issue,	  see	  Jago,	  Cornwell,	  
&	  Higgins,	  2014).	  	  
The	  key	  takeaway	  point	  is	  that	  the	  value	  of	  the	  rule	  or	  virtue	  in	  question,	  in	  order	  
that	  it	  be	  pursued	  as	  an	  ethical	  goal,	  cannot	  be	  based	  entirely	  upon	  a	  sense	  of	  desire	  of	  the	  
self.	  Morals	  have	  their	  roots	  in	  our	  shared	  sense	  of	  what	  is	  objectively	  true,	  which	  could	  
account	  for	  their	  higher	  perceived	  objectivity	  over	  things	  like	  “taste”	  (Goodwin	  &	  Darley,	  
2008).	  	  Thus	  in	  order	  to	  be	  happy,	  one	  needs	  not	  only	  to	  pursue	  goals,	  but	  also	  to	  pursue	  
goals	  that	  one	  believes	  are	  truly	  worthy	  and	  valuable	  apart	  from	  one’s	  desires	  alone.	  In	  
humans,	  this	  sense	  of	  the	  worthiness	  of	  goals	  arises	  out	  of	  social	  interactions	  with	  trusted	  
others	  (e.g.,	  Stryker	  &	  Gottlieb,	  1981;	  Stryker	  &	  Statham,	  1985)	  through	  the	  sharing	  of	  
inner	  states	  (Hardin	  &	  Higgins,	  1996).	  	  Therefore	  any	  consideration	  of	  human	  flourishing	  
must	  have	  truth	  motivation	  as	  an	  important	  element.	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Still	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  merely	  to	  have	  goals	  and	  perceive	  them	  as	  objectively	  (really)	  
desirable.	  	  One	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  able	  to	  instantiate	  them	  in	  one’s	  own	  life,	  and	  to	  change	  
one’s	  own	  behavior	  dependent	  upon	  feedback	  and	  progress	  along	  the	  way.	  	  This	  involves	  
the	  notion	  of	  “becoming,”	  another	  uniquely	  human	  capacity	  (Higgins,	  2005b).	  	  This	  could	  
be	  seen	  as	  related	  to	  the	  uniquely	  human	  penchant	  for	  narrative	  (Smith,	  2007;	  Bellah,	  
2011).	  	  Through	  narrative,	  we	  get	  a	  sense	  of	  where	  we	  have	  been	  and	  where	  we	  are	  going,	  
and	  can	  relate	  this	  back	  to	  our	  moral	  obligations	  and	  ideals.	  
“Call	  no	  man	  happy	  until	  he	  is	  dead.”	  	  This	  quote,	  sometimes	  attributed	  to	  the	  
ancient	  Athenian	  statesman	  Solon,	  cited	  approvingly	  by	  Aristotle	  (trans.	  2009),	  carries	  with	  
it	  the	  idea	  that	  human	  life	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  always	  in	  motion,	  and	  that	  our	  position	  relative	  to	  
our	  ideals	  and	  obligations	  is	  always	  in	  a	  state	  of	  flux.	  	  Thus,	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  we	  are	  
truly	  happy	  is	  always	  open	  to	  change,	  and	  thus	  demands	  ongoing	  maintenance	  of	  our	  
duties	  and	  striving	  towards	  ever	  greater	  virtue.	  	  The	  sense	  that	  one	  has	  autonomy	  to	  bring	  
about	  these	  two	  ways	  of	  having	  success	  is,	  in	  many	  ways,	  just	  as	  integral	  to	  happiness	  as	  
their	  achievement.	  	  Ethics,	  particularly	  an	  ethics	  grounded	  in	  the	  virtues,	  is	  related	  to	  a	  life	  
of	  activity	  (Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009).	  	  One	  in	  which	  one	  is	  able	  to	  bring	  about	  the	  Right	  and	  the	  
Good	  as	  a	  result	  of	  one’s	  own	  action.	  	  
Thus,	  happiness	  is	  not	  merely	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  desires,	  but	  the	  sense	  of	  becoming	  a	  
truly	  valuable	  person	  and	  becoming	  requires	  controlling	  one’s	  life,	  controlling	  change,	  
managing	  to	  make	  things	  happen;	  in	  brief,	  it	  requires	  control	  motivation	  in	  addition	  to	  
value	  motivation	  and	  truth	  motivation	  (Higgins,	  2012).	  And	  this	  is	  not	  the	  end	  of	  the	  story	  
because	  what	  is	  critical	  is	  that	  value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  motivations	  work	  together	  as	  
partners	  in	  life’s	  goal	  pursuits	  in	  maintaining	  duties	  and	  striving	  towards	  greater	  virtue.	  A	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full	  understanding	  of	  happiness	  isn’t	  so	  much	  about	  aggregate	  desire	  satisfaction	  as	  it	  is	  
about	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  one	  is	  capable	  of	  shaping	  one’s	  life	  in	  harmony	  with	  the	  way	  we	  
perceive	  the	  world	  to	  really	  be	  and	  the	  ethical	  values	  that	  flow	  from	  this	  reality	  that	  we	  can	  
manage	  to	  fulfill,	  to	  make	  happen	  in	  our	  lives—three	  kinds	  of	  motivations	  working	  
together	  in	  concert	  (see	  “What	  is	  the	  good	  life?”	  in	  Higgins,	  2012;	  see	  also	  the	  discussion	  of	  
the	  “effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization”	  in	  Franks	  &	  Higgins,	  2012,	  or	  Cornwell,	  Franks,	  &	  
Higgins,	  2014a).	  	  	  
Thus	  the	  reason	  morality	  and	  happiness	  seem	  orthogonal	  to	  one	  another	  in	  spite	  of	  
lay	  intuitions	  to	  the	  contrary	  could	  be	  due	  to	  overly	  constrained	  views	  of	  each.	  	  By	  
expanding	  morality	  to	  include	  ethics	  of	  the	  Good	  as	  well	  as	  morals	  of	  the	  Right	  and	  by	  
expanding	  happiness	  to	  mean	  motivational	  integrity	  as	  well	  as	  having	  desired	  end-­‐states,	  
we	  can	  see	  a	  point	  of	  convergence	  between	  the	  two	  in	  the	  attainment	  of	  the	  life	  of	  virtue.	  
I	  have	  so	  far	  laid	  out	  what	  I	  view	  to	  be	  the	  conceptual	  problem	  facing	  moral	  
psychology:	  that	  it	  studies	  only	  a	  form	  of	  morality	  based	  on	  obligation	  that	  aims	  at	  
maintaining	  peace	  and	  security,	  and	  that	  it	  is	  less	  devoted	  to	  the	  study	  of	  ethical	  notions	  
aiming	  at	  happiness	  (analogous	  to	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  Right	  over	  the	  Good;	  see	  Taylor,	  
2007).	  An	  alternative	  approach	  to	  ethics,	  grounded	  in	  the	  virtues,	  has	  important	  
implications	  for	  three	  major	  areas	  of	  research	  in	  moral	  psychology:	  moral	  judgment,	  moral	  
decisions,	  and	  moral	  character.	  	  In	  the	  following	  three	  chapters,	  I	  will	  explore	  empirical	  
evidence	  for	  this	  alternative	  approach	  to	  ethics,	  and	  discuss	  its	  implications	  for	  each	  of	  
these	  important	  areas	  of	  moral	  psychology	  research.	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Chapter	  3:	  Moral	  Judgment	  -­‐	  Virtue	  as	  Reference	  Point	  
	   Many	  researchers	  in	  moral	  psychology	  have	  relatively	  recently	  demonstrated	  the	  
importance	  of	  unconscious	  intuitions	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  our	  moral	  judgments	  of	  others’	  
behavior	  (Haidt,	  2001;	  Cushman,	  Young,	  &	  Hauser,	  2006).	  	  This	  represents	  a	  departure	  
from	  traditional	  investigations	  of	  moral	  psychology,	  which	  see	  moral	  judgments	  as	  an	  
essentially	  rational	  or	  cognitive	  phenomenon	  (e.g.	  Kohlberg,	  Levine,	  &	  Hewer,	  1983).	  	  This	  
development	  has	  led	  to	  two	  alternative	  perspectives	  within	  the	  field.	  
	   On	  the	  one	  hand,	  some	  see	  these	  intuitive	  judgments	  as	  deviations	  from	  a	  rational	  
model	  of	  human	  reasoning.	  	  They	  argue	  that	  these	  intuitions,	  due	  to	  their	  lack	  of	  a	  
foundation	  in	  reason,	  represent	  at	  best	  impediments	  to	  the	  attainment	  of	  a	  higher	  moral	  
consciousness	  or	  moral	  society	  (e.g.	  Baron,	  1994;	  Greene	  &	  Cohen,	  2004;	  Greene	  2007),	  
and	  at	  worst	  immoral	  deviations	  from	  a	  morally	  normative	  model	  of	  how	  decisions	  ought	  to	  
be	  made	  (e.g.	  some	  examples	  explored	  in	  Pinker,	  2002).4	  	  These	  researchers	  often	  highlight	  
the	  importance	  of	  disgust	  as	  an	  emotion	  for	  the	  intensification	  of	  moral	  judgments	  
(Wheatley	  &	  Haidt,	  2005;	  Schnall,	  Haidt,	  &	  Clore,	  2008),	  in	  order	  then	  to	  go	  on	  to	  argue	  that	  
judgments	  that	  they	  claim	  are	  supported	  by	  such	  feelings	  are	  illegitimate.	  
	   An	  alternative	  interpretation	  is	  that	  these	  judgments	  do	  in	  fact	  have	  a	  foundation	  
accessible	  to	  moral	  reasoning,	  but	  that	  the	  judgments	  themselves	  are	  made	  using	  
intuitions.	  	  Research	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  “character”	  to	  understanding	  
deviations	  from	  “rational”	  models	  of	  judgment	  support	  this	  view	  (Pizarro	  &	  Tannenbaum,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  Another	  possibility	  is	  explored	  by	  Turiel	  (1983),	  who	  argued	  that	  things	  seen	  as	  morally	  wrong	  apart	  from	  
social	  consensus	  are	  “moral;”	  other	  normative	  rules	  are	  mere	  “convention.”	  	  However,	  the	  examples	  typically	  
invoked	  by	  social	  intuitionists	  tend	  not	  to	  fit	  this	  mold:	  table	  manners	  and	  incest	  are	  arguably	  on	  a	  different	  
ethical	  plane,	  at	  least	  in	  our	  society.	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2011).	  This	  view	  involves	  the	  invocation	  of	  abstract	  concepts	  of	  virtue,	  the	  pursuit	  of	  which	  
is	  argued	  to	  carry	  moral	  force	  (Haidt	  &	  Joseph,	  2004;	  2007).	  	  Disgust,	  in	  this	  case,	  would	  
simply	  be	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  an	  otherwise	  straightforward	  process,	  one	  that	  we	  have	  not	  been	  
able	  to	  pinpoint	  simply	  because,	  similar	  to	  old	  discrepancies	  between	  measurement	  and	  
intuition	  in	  the	  field	  of	  personality,	  “our	  intuitions	  have	  been	  better	  than	  our	  research”	  
(Mischel	  &	  Shoda,	  1995).	  
	   I	  believe	  that	  seeing	  moral	  judgments	  as	  motivated	  by	  movement	  toward	  a	  
particular	  standard,	  a	  standard	  based	  either	  on	  one’s	  ideals	  or	  one’s	  oughts,	  can	  aid	  in	  
understanding	  the	  role	  of	  intuitions	  in	  moral	  judgments	  because	  previous	  research	  has	  
shown	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  promotion	  (ideal)	  focus	  and	  making	  decisions	  with	  
feelings	  rather	  than	  reasons,	  and	  a	  connection	  between	  the	  prevention	  (ought)	  focus	  and	  
making	  decisions	  with	  reasons	  rather	  than	  feelings	  (Pham	  &	  Avnet,	  2004;	  Avnet	  &	  Higgins,	  
2006).	  The	  scenarios	  of	  social	  intuitionists	  offer	  a	  useful	  context	  in	  which	  to	  test	  this	  
hypothesis	  because	  individuals	  using	  a	  more	  intuitive	  (feelings)	  process	  to	  make	  
judgments	  of	  them	  come	  to	  a	  different	  moral	  conclusion	  than	  those	  using	  a	  more	  rationalist	  
(reasons)	  process	  (Haidt,	  2001).	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  these	  scenarios	  are	  of	  interest	  to	  moral	  
psychologists	  because	  common	  judgments	  that	  the	  behaviors	  are	  immoral	  are	  thought	  to	  
defy	  rationality.	  
However,	  I	  want	  to	  argue,	  along	  with	  the	  researchers	  cited	  above,	  that	  they	  only	  
defy	  “rationality”	  insofar	  as	  “rational”	  reasons	  for	  judging	  an	  action	  as	  wrong	  are	  limited	  to	  
moral	  systems	  associated	  with	  the	  Right:	  systems	  of	  oughts.	  	  A	  moral	  psychology	  that	  
allows	  for	  an	  ethics	  of	  ideal	  virtues,	  and	  not	  just	  duties	  and	  obligations,	  would	  not	  find	  
these	  judgments	  “irrational”	  (though	  they	  would	  not	  be	  based	  on	  reasons	  per	  se).	  	  According	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to	  this	  view,	  actions	  without	  apparent	  harm	  are	  judged	  as	  wrong	  because	  the	  person	  
behaving	  in	  the	  associated	  scenarios	  is	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  some	  vice	  (which,	  
according	  to	  virtue	  theorists,	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  moral	  defect	  or	  impediment	  to	  moral	  ideal	  
perfection;	  see	  Anscombe,	  2005).	  	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  will	  detail	  this	  philosophical	  
connection	  between	  an	  ethics	  of	  virtue	  and	  these	  intuitive	  judgments,	  before	  exploring	  
empirically	  whether	  the	  promotion	  or	  prevention	  system	  is	  more	  closely	  associated	  with	  
them.	  
3.1	   Insights	  from	  Philosophy	  
	  
Moral	  philosophy,	  as	  noted	  above,	  tends	  to	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  schools	  when	  it	  
comes	  to	  questions	  about	  the	  manner	  of	  pursuit	  of	  moral	  goals.	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  
philosophers	  have	  delineated	  the	  notion	  of	  moral	  Right,	  or	  principles	  of	  moral	  obligation,	  
which	  have	  been	  the	  foundation	  for	  most	  systems	  of	  deontological	  (e.g.	  Kant,	  1993/1785)	  
and	  many	  forms	  of	  consequentialist	  (e.g.	  Mill,	  1863/2007)	  ethics.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  many	  
have	  also	  delineated	  the	  notion	  of	  ethical	  Goods,	  or	  ideals	  of	  moral	  perfection,	  which	  have	  
been	  the	  foundation	  for	  virtue	  ethics	  (e.g.	  Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009)	  and	  more	  modern	  notions	  
of	  ethics	  that	  still	  base	  their	  judgments	  on	  virtues	  of	  character	  (e.g.	  some	  aspects	  of	  Hume,	  
1751/1998).	  	  What	  these	  two	  approaches	  signify	  are	  two	  different	  moral	  reference	  points:	  
the	  Right	  signifying	  the	  necessary	  or	  obligatory	  standards	  by	  which	  social	  peace	  is	  
maintained,	  and	  the	  Good	  signifying	  the	  ideals	  of	  character	  or	  virtues	  the	  attainment	  of	  
which	  constitutes	  a	  happy	  or	  good	  life.	  
These	  two	  different	  reference	  points	  (the	  “Right”	  and	  the	  “Good”),	  in	  their	  
exploration	  by	  philosophers,	  have	  led	  to	  a	  number	  of	  differences	  with	  how	  ethical	  goals	  are	  
processed,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  of	  particular	  relevance	  for	  the	  present	  investigation	  of	  the	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difference	  between	  intuition	  and	  reasoning	  in	  moral	  judgment.	  In	  his	  magisterial	  work,	  The	  
Sources	  of	  the	  Self,	  Charles	  Taylor	  (1989)	  presents	  two	  ways	  rational	  considerations	  can	  
provide	  backgrounds	  to	  moral	  judgments.	  	  According	  to	  the	  first,	  
…one	  could	  argue	  that	  a	  great	  many	  of	  our	  socially	  defined	  obligations,	  
including	  some	  of	  the	  more	  serious	  ones,	  like	  those	  forbidding	  killing,	  injury,	  
lying,	  and	  the	  like,	  are	  shaped	  in	  part	  by	  the	  functional	  requirements	  of	  any	  
human	  society.	  	  Social	  life,	  with	  the	  minimum	  of	  trust	  and	  solidarity	  it	  
demands,	  couldn’t	  consist	  with	  unrestricted	  violence	  and	  deceit.	  
Here	  we	  see	  the	  sort	  of	  rationale	  typically	  offered	  first	  by	  those	  judging	  incest	  (Haidt,	  
2001)—that	  there	  is	  some	  danger	  that	  could	  undermine	  the	  safety	  of	  an	  unborn	  child	  or	  
the	  security	  of	  interpersonal	  relations.	  	  
According	  to	  Taylor	  (1989),	  however,	  there	  is	  a	  second	  way	  to	  rationally	  ground	  
these	  judgments;	  individuals	  may,	  	  
“…also	  see	  these	  restrictions	  as	  justified	  by	  a	  perception	  of	  the	  good.	  	  They	  
have	  some	  notion	  of	  the	  sanctity	  or	  dignity	  of	  human	  life,	  bodily	  integrity,	  
and	  the	  aspiration	  to	  truth	  which	  these	  infringements	  violate….”	  	  	  
It	  is	  these	  latter	  considerations	  that	  would	  be	  more	  related	  with	  a	  virtue-­‐based	  form	  of	  
judgment.	  	  Articulating	  precisely	  how	  certain	  actions	  violate	  these	  aspirational	  standards	  
would	  certainly	  be	  difficult,	  particularly	  to	  someone	  who	  does	  not	  share	  them.	  	  Taylor	  
argues	  that	  this	  is	  most	  true	  when	  dealing	  with	  “virtue	  terms	  which	  apply	  to	  features	  of	  our	  
lives	  as	  individuals	  […]	  where	  everything	  depends	  on	  grasping	  a	  certain	  vision	  of	  the	  good”	  
(Taylor,	  1989).	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  the	  “ethics	  of	  inarticulacy”	  (Taylor’s	  term)	  may	  be	  a	  
product	  of	  our	  inability	  to	  articulate	  abstract	  principles	  of	  the	  good	  in	  a	  systematic	  way,	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rather	  than	  a	  mere	  reliance	  on	  emotional	  or	  affective	  reactions	  to	  behavioral	  stimuli.	  
Differences	  in	  whether	  feelings	  (intuitions)	  versus	  reasons	  are	  experienced	  as	  more	  
convincing	  could	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  this	  tendency.	  
	   Another	  way	  to	  say	  this	  is	  that	  a	  moral	  wrong	  in	  the	  Good-­‐referent	  way	  of	  thinking	  
is	  not	  so	  much	  a	  matter	  of	  doing	  something	  that	  is	  necessarily	  wrong,	  but	  instead	  acting	  in	  a	  
way	  inconsistent	  with	  ideals	  which	  one	  should	  find	  intrinsically	  appealing	  and	  inspiring.	  	  
Being	  moved	  by	  such	  ideals	  and	  not	  by	  lesser	  goals	  (that	  may	  be	  considered	  “base”	  or	  
“common”)	  is	  evidence	  of	  a	  virtuous	  character.	  In	  contrast,	  supplanting	  these	  higher	  ideals	  
for	  lesser	  goals	  is	  what	  philosophers	  have	  traditionally	  called	  a	  “vicious”	  act	  or	  one	  tending	  
toward	  vice	  (Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009).	  
	   This	  latter	  point	  is	  important,	  because	  it	  suggests	  how	  such	  a	  system	  is	  brought	  to	  
bear	  upon	  judgments	  of	  moral	  wrongs.	  	  “Vices”	  are	  defects	  in	  character	  reflected	  in	  the	  
supersession	  of	  lofty	  aspirational	  virtues	  (such	  as	  justice	  or	  chastity)	  by	  goals	  that	  are	  
considered	  less	  important	  (such	  as	  self-­‐interest	  or	  pleasure).	  	  The	  latter	  goals	  aren’t	  
necessarily	  or	  intrinsically	  wrong	  in	  and	  of	  themselves,	  but	  they	  become	  wrong	  when	  they	  
are	  pursued	  in	  a	  way	  that	  obstructs	  or	  comes	  in	  direct	  conflict	  with	  the	  achievement	  of	  
higher	  goals.	  	  That	  is,	  they	  are	  wrong	  insofar	  as	  they	  deprive	  someone	  of	  an	  ideally	  virtuous	  
character.	  
	   In	  moral	  psychology,	  which	  tends	  to	  focus	  on	  judgments	  of	  actions	  taken	  in	  isolated	  
vignettes	  or	  scenarios,	  actions	  are	  not	  simply	  judged	  with	  reference	  to	  what	  is	  necessarily	  
universally	  obligated.	  	  They	  can	  also	  be	  clues	  as	  to	  the	  actor’s	  organization	  of	  motives—and	  
action	  may	  be	  considered	  vicious	  simply	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  is	  the	  sort	  of	  action	  one	  
expects	  a	  person	  motivated	  by	  vice	  to	  commit	  (Anscombe,	  2005).	  	  This	  judgment	  could	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occur	  quite	  independently	  of	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  act	  itself	  (i.e.	  the	  potential	  for	  
negative	  consequences),	  or	  its	  relationship	  to	  categorical	  imperatives	  of	  action	  (i.e.	  its	  
deductive	  derivation	  from	  principles	  of	  duty).	  	  	  
	   For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper,	  we	  will	  use	  the	  word	  “aretaic”	  (“arete”	  is	  the	  
phonetic	  representation	  of	  the	  Greek	  word	  for	  “virtue”)	  to	  describe	  judgments	  occurring	  
with	  respect	  to	  virtues	  and	  vices	  and	  “deontic”	  (“deon”	  is	  the	  phonetic	  representation	  of	  
the	  Greek	  word	  for	  “necessity”	  or	  “obligation”)	  to	  describe	  judgments	  occurring	  with	  
respect	  to	  principles	  of	  duty	  and	  transgression,	  deriving	  this	  terminology	  from	  another	  
philosopher	  who	  has	  investigated	  the	  two	  systems	  and	  argued	  for	  their	  conceptual	  
independence	  cited	  above	  (Trianosky,	  1986).	  	  In	  the	  next	  section,	  I	  associate	  these	  two	  
philosophical	  reference	  points	  with	  the	  two	  self-­‐regulatory	  systems	  associated	  with	  
judging	  value	  (Higgins,	  2012).	  	  
3.2	   Self-­‐Regulatory	  Reference	  Points	  
	  
	   These	  two	  ways	  of	  judging	  in	  moral	  philosophy	  correspond	  to	  two	  different	  kinds	  of	  
reference	  points,	  which	  I	  associate	  with	  the	  prevention	  and	  promotion	  regulatory	  focus	  
systems.	  	  The	  former	  relies	  on	  “ought”	  reference	  points:	  standards	  that	  provide	  moral	  
security	  and	  protect	  against	  harms.	  	  The	  latter	  relies	  on	  “ideal”	  reference	  points:	  standards	  
that	  provide	  moral	  growth	  and	  protect	  against	  defects	  of	  character.	  	  Another	  way	  to	  think	  
about	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  these	  two	  systems	  function	  is	  to	  view	  the	  prevention	  system	  as	  
accentuating	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  “0”	  status	  quo	  and	  the	  “-­‐1”	  of	  a	  worse	  state,	  
whereas	  the	  promotion	  system	  accentuates	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  “+1”	  possible	  better	  
end-­‐state	  against	  the	  “0”	  of	  the	  status	  quo.	  	  The	  prevention	  system	  uses	  a	  moral	  “0”	  as	  its	  
point	  of	  reference,	  whereas	  the	  promotion	  system	  uses	  a	  moral	  “+1.”	  	  Therefore,	  in	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considering	  any	  given	  situation,	  those	  using	  the	  prevention	  focus	  will	  engage	  in	  negative	  
counterfactuals	  (“Is	  this	  satisfactory?	  What	  could	  I	  have	  done,	  or	  could	  do,	  to	  maintain	  a	  
satisfactory	  state?”),	  whereas	  those	  processing	  in	  the	  promotion	  focus	  will	  engage	  in	  
positive	  counterfactuals	  (“Is	  this	  optimal?	  What	  could	  I	  have	  done,	  or	  could	  do,	  to	  make	  it	  
better?”).	  	  Research	  has	  shown	  that	  the	  former	  question	  is	  more	  of	  a	  fit	  for	  the	  prevention	  
focus	  whereas	  the	  latter	  questions	  are	  more	  of	  a	  fit	  for	  the	  promotion	  focus	  (Markman	  et	  al,	  
2006;	  Roese,	  Hur,	  &	  Pennington,	  1999).	  
	   Therefore,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  avoiding	  moral	  wrongs,	  those	  processing	  a	  situation	  in	  
the	  prevention	  system	  would	  find	  behaviors	  wrong	  if	  they	  could	  cause	  concrete	  harm	  to	  a	  
moral	  status	  quo,	  whereas	  those	  processing	  in	  the	  promotion	  system	  would	  find	  behavior	  
wrong	  that	  feels	  like	  it	  deviates	  from	  or	  impedes	  the	  attainment	  of	  virtuous	  ideals	  (i.e.,	  a	  
feeling	  that	  things	  could	  have	  been	  better).	  	  In	  the	  parlance	  of	  the	  philosophical	  schools	  
cited	  above,	  the	  prevention	  system	  would	  be	  associated	  with	  deontic	  judgments	  and	  the	  
promotion	  system	  associated	  with	  aretaic	  judgments.	  	  Another	  way	  of	  seeing	  this	  
distinction	  is	  that	  those	  processing	  in	  the	  prevention	  system	  point	  to	  a	  principle	  that,	  
deductively	  applied,	  provides	  security	  as	  the	  reference	  point	  in	  making	  moral	  judgments,	  
whereas	  those	  processing	  in	  the	  promotion	  system	  point	  to	  an	  exemplar	  that,	  associatively	  
applied,	  embodies	  ideals	  of	  moral	  character—rather	  than	  asking	  whether	  this	  action	  is	  
right	  or	  wrong	  in	  a	  basic	  sense	  (“0;”	  relevant	  for	  prevention),	  instead	  asking	  whether	  it	  is	  
the	  sort	  of	  thing	  a	  good	  person	  would	  do	  (“+1;”	  relevant	  for	  promotion).	  	  This	  leaves	  open	  
the	  possibility	  of	  actions	  that	  it	  might	  be	  acceptable	  to	  do,	  but	  it	  would	  be	  better	  not	  to	  do.	  	  	  
	   This	  notion	  of	  an	  alternative	  system	  of	  morality	  is	  in	  no	  way	  alien	  to	  moral	  
psychology.	  	  For	  example,	  in	  their	  theoretical	  works,	  Haidt	  and	  Joseph	  (2004;	  2007)	  argued	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that	  virtue	  ethics	  provides	  a	  useful	  framework	  for	  understanding	  how	  moral	  systems	  vary	  
between	  cultures,	  and	  explicitly	  connected	  moral	  intuitions	  with	  virtue	  ethics.	  	  Right	  and	  
wrong	  within	  communities	  is	  not	  simply	  reducible	  to	  actions	  that	  cause	  some	  sort	  of	  
damage	  or	  harm	  (or,	  put	  in	  motivational	  terms,	  a	  loss),	  but	  those	  too	  which	  inhibit	  or	  stall	  
moral	  growth	  through	  the	  development	  of	  vice	  (which,	  in	  turn,	  is	  a	  defect	  obstructing	  an	  
ideal	  character,	  or,	  put	  in	  motivational	  terms,	  a	  non-­‐gain).	  	  Virtue	  ethics	  is	  useful,	  they	  
argue,	  because	  it	  allows	  the	  teaching	  of	  moral	  rules	  more	  through	  example	  than	  through	  
promulgation	  of	  rules,	  and	  explicitly	  allows	  for	  the	  use	  of	  intuitions	  in	  making	  moral	  
judgments	  in	  a	  way	  that	  deontology	  and	  consequentialism	  do	  not	  (Haidt	  &	  Joseph,	  2004;	  
2007).	  
A	  related	  line	  of	  research	  on	  construal	  level	  theory	  has	  shown	  that	  when	  processing	  
in	  a	  higher	  construal,	  moral	  judgments	  of	  intuitive	  or	  symbolic	  wrongs	  are	  considered	  
more	  wrong	  (Eyal,	  Liberman,	  &	  Trope,	  2008).	  	  The	  researchers	  argued	  that	  since	  moral	  
ideals	  are	  experienced	  as	  cognitively	  “higher,”	  processing	  judgments	  at	  a	  higher	  construal	  
intensifies	  them	  because	  it	  brings	  them	  closer	  to	  the	  ideals	  against	  which	  they	  are	  viewed	  
as	  wrong	  (Eyal,	  Liberman,	  &	  Trope,	  2008).	  	  It	  is	  perhaps	  helpfully	  relevant	  to	  note	  here	  that	  
high	  construal	  (or	  abstraction)	  is	  also	  associated	  with	  promotion	  type	  goals	  (Pennington	  &	  
Roese,	  2003;	  Semin	  et	  al,	  2005).	  	  
Other	  work	  in	  moral	  psychology	  has	  shown	  that	  judgments	  of	  motives	  are	  an	  
important	  aspect	  of	  morality	  beyond	  behavior	  and	  its	  consequences.	  	  For	  example,	  for	  
many,	  perceived	  meta-­‐desires	  (what	  an	  individual	  ultimately	  wants	  to	  accomplish)	  are	  
often	  the	  target	  of	  moral	  credit	  or	  blame,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  action	  itself,	  noting	  that	  when	  
an	  individual	  disavows	  emotions	  consistent	  with	  the	  striving	  for	  an	  ideal	  character,	  the	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moral	  credit	  typically	  assigned	  for	  his	  actions	  is	  reduced	  (Pizarro,	  Uhlmann,	  &	  Salovey,	  
2003).	  Researchers	  investigating	  profiting	  off	  of	  others	  misfortune	  have	  also	  argued	  that	  
judgments	  of	  the	  moral	  wrongness	  of	  an	  action	  may	  not	  only	  be	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  
action	  transgresses	  some	  categorical	  rule,	  but	  also	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  an	  action	  is	  “the	  
sort	  of	  thing	  a	  good	  person	  would	  do”	  (Inbar,	  Pizarro,	  &	  Cushman,	  2011).	  
Given	  the	  above	  research,	  there	  is	  considerable	  theoretical	  grounding	  already	  
established	  in	  the	  field	  for	  seeing	  virtues	  and	  vices	  as	  functioning	  as	  a	  system	  distinct	  from	  
principles	  of	  obligation	  or	  duty.	  	  We	  have	  reason	  to	  believe,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  promotion	  
focus	  and	  prevention	  focus	  will	  produce	  different	  manners	  of	  judgment	  of	  moral	  rights	  and	  
wrongs	  consistent	  with	  the	  aretaic	  and	  deontic	  approaches	  to	  moral	  reasoning	  outlined	  
above.	  	  We	  believe	  that	  these	  differences,	  under	  particular	  circumstances,	  may	  produce	  
differences	  in	  the	  severity	  of	  judgment.	  	  We	  believe	  the	  case	  of	  non-­‐procreative	  ‘harmless’	  
incest	  offers	  just	  such	  a	  circumstance.	  	  
3.3	   Connection	  to	  Intuitive	  Scenarios	  
	  
	   As	  noted	  above,	  the	  scenarios	  put	  forward	  by	  social	  intuitionists	  in	  which	  a	  
harmless	  behavior	  viewed	  as	  wrong	  represents	  an	  ideal	  context	  in	  which	  to	  test	  this	  
hypothesis.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  infamous	  case	  of	  non-­‐procreative	  incest	  introduced	  in	  Haidt,	  
Bjorklund,	  and	  Murphy	  (2000)	  represents	  a	  prime	  example	  where	  “intuitive”	  and	  	  
“deliberative”	  judgments	  would	  come	  into	  direct	  conflict,	  offering	  an	  ideal	  situation	  in	  
which	  to	  test	  whether	  these	  two	  ways	  of	  making	  judgments	  have	  a	  motivational	  
component.	  
	   The	  scenario	  involves	  a	  brother	  and	  sister	  who	  decide	  to	  make	  love	  a	  single	  time,	  
both	  using	  contraception,	  and	  agree	  to	  keep	  it	  a	  secret	  afterwards	  without	  doing	  it	  again	  in	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the	  future.	  	  Most	  people	  see	  this	  behavior	  as	  morally	  wrong,	  but	  when	  asked	  why	  they	  
believe	  such	  behavior	  is	  wrong,	  they	  generally	  rely	  on	  deliberative	  consequentialist	  
arguments	  that	  are	  actually	  undercut	  by	  the	  explicit	  facts	  of	  the	  scenario	  (e.g.,	  a	  baby	  
resulting	  from	  such	  a	  union	  could	  have	  deformities;	  the	  family	  of	  the	  brother	  and	  sister	  
could	  be	  emotionally	  hurt	  by	  learning	  about	  the	  act;	  see	  Haidt,	  2001).	  
	   But	  are	  these	  consequentialist	  arguments	  the	  only	  kinds	  of	  reasons	  why	  those	  who	  
morally	  oppose	  incest	  believe	  it	  to	  be	  wrong?	  	  Historically,	  this	  has	  not	  been	  the	  reasoning.	  	  
For	  example,	  Augustine	  of	  Hippo,	  writing	  in	  the	  5th	  century	  in	  City	  of	  God	  (1993)	  gives	  the	  
following	  justification	  for	  moral	  opposition	  to	  incest:	  
As,	  therefore,	  the	  human	  race,	  subsequently	  to	  the	  first	  marriage	  of	  the	  man	  
who	  was	  made	  of	  dust,	  and	  his	  wife	  who	  was	  made	  out	  of	  his	  side,	  required	  
the	  union	  of	  males	  and	  females	  in	  order	  that	  it	  might	  multiply,	  and	  as	  there	  
were	  no	  human	  beings	  except	  those	  who	  had	  been	  born	  of	  these	  two,	  men	  
took	  their	  sisters	  for	  wives—an	  act	  which	  was	  as	  certainly	  dictated	  by	  
necessity	  in	  these	  ancient	  days	  as	  afterwards	  it	  was	  condemned	  by	  the	  
prohibitions	  of	  religion.	  For	  it	  is	  very	  reasonable	  and	  just	  that	  men,	  among	  
whom	  concord	  is	  honorable	  and	  useful,	  should	  be	  bound	  together	  by	  various	  
relationships;	  and	  one	  man	  should	  not	  himself	  sustain	  many	  relationships,	  
but	  that	  the	  various	  relationships	  should	  be	  distributed	  among	  several,	  and	  
should	  thus	  serve	  to	  bind	  together	  the	  greatest	  number	  in	  the	  same	  social	  
interests.	  
He	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  reference	  pagan	  laws	  which	  allow	  for	  brothers	  to	  marry	  their	  sisters,	  
but	  that	  even	  in	  these	  circumstances	  where	  it	  is	  permissible,	  it	  is	  still	  considered	  wrong	  by	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“custom”	  which,	  “with	  a	  finer	  morality,	  prefers	  to	  forego	  this	  license.”	  	  So	  according	  to	  
Augustine,	  incest	  is	  wrong	  not	  because	  of	  its	  negative	  consequences,	  but	  because	  it	  
substitutes	  the	  ideal	  of	  broadly	  extending	  familial	  love	  over	  the	  lesser	  good	  of	  satisfying	  
“sexual	  lust.”	  	  Augustine	  himself	  recognized	  the	  need	  for	  two	  distinct	  standards	  in	  ethics,	  
often	  making	  a	  distinction	  between	  “precepts”	  or	  “commands”	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  
“counsels”	  on	  the	  other.	  	  The	  former	  represent	  what	  is	  “lawful,”	  whereas	  the	  latter	  
represent	  what	  is	  “perfect.”	  	  Thus,	  he	  states	  that	  if	  something	  is	  a	  counsel,	  “it	  is	  lawful	  to	  do,	  
but	  it	  is	  better	  not	  to	  do”	  (Augustine,	  2009,	  emphasis	  mine).	  
This	  is	  in	  line	  with	  a	  more	  contemporary	  example	  as	  well.	  	  The	  Church	  of	  England,	  in	  
a	  1987	  resolution,	  decreed	  that	  “sexual	  intercourse	  is	  an	  act	  of	  total	  commitment	  which	  
belongs	  properly	  within	  a	  permanent	  married	  relationship”	  and	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  enumerate	  
those	  sexual	  practices	  deemed	  illicit	  which	  “fall	  short	  of	  this	  ideal”	  (our	  emphasis).	  
“Christians,”	  says	  the	  same	  document,	  “are	  called	  to	  be	  exemplary	  in	  all	  spheres	  of	  morality”	  
(my	  emphasis).	  	  That	  is,	  membership	  in	  this	  particular	  community	  involves	  holding	  oneself	  
and	  one’s	  own	  to	  a	  “higher”	  moral	  standard,	  i.e.,	  to	  be	  “exemplary,”	  rather	  than	  referencing	  
what	  is	  generally	  universally	  obligated.	  	  Given	  the	  connection	  between	  virtues	  and	  
intuitions	  (Haidt	  &	  Joseph,	  2004;	  2007)	  and	  between	  ideals	  and	  feelings	  (Avnet	  &	  Higgins,	  
2006;	  Pham	  &	  Avnet,	  2004),	  it	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  these	  judgments	  about	  what	  
is	  morally	  best	  would	  take	  place	  intuitively,	  rather	  than	  deductively	  or	  deliberatively.	  
	   Thus	  we	  see	  that	  in	  many	  cases,	  morals	  of	  sexual	  propriety,	  when	  argued	  for	  by	  
those	  who	  actually	  hold	  them	  throughout	  history,	  tend	  to	  occur	  with	  reference	  to	  ideals	  of	  
moral	  perfection.	  	  This	  would	  be	  especially	  relevant	  for	  the	  promotion	  system,	  which	  is	  
associated	  with	  striving	  for	  the	  maximum	  best,	  in	  a	  way	  that	  the	  prevention	  system	  is	  not	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(Higgins,	  1997,	  1998;	  Shah	  &	  Higgins,	  1997).	  Thus,	  for	  cases	  like	  incest,	  the	  relevant	  
question	  may	  not	  in	  fact	  be,	  “Can	  anything	  bad	  come	  of	  this?”	  	  Instead,	  it	  may	  be,	  ”Can	  
anything	  good	  come	  of	  this?”	  	  Even	  if	  the	  first	  answer	  is	  “no,”	  the	  second	  answer	  may	  also	  
be	  “no,”	  and	  thereby	  the	  action	  may	  be	  judged	  to	  be	  wrong	  by	  those	  for	  whom	  moral	  gains	  
versus	  non-­‐gains	  are	  especially	  important	  (i.e.,	  those	  with	  a	  promotion	  focus).	  The	  
following	  series	  of	  studies	  aimed	  to	  examine	  this	  central	  question.	  	  Results	  in	  favor	  of	  this	  
hypothesis	  would	  argue	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  concepts	  of	  virtues	  (and	  vices)	  in	  moral	  
judgment.	  	  	  
Study	  1:	  Bad	  Effects	  Versus	  Non-­‐Good	  Effects	  
	  
In	  this	  study,	  we	  examine	  the	  basic	  effect	  of	  an	  experimental	  induction	  into	  either	  a	  
promotion	  focus	  or	  prevention	  focus	  on	  moral	  judgment	  severity.	  If	  the	  promotion	  focus	  is	  
more	  severe,	  the	  “vice”	  hypothesis	  will	  be	  supported.	  I	  will	  also	  determine	  whether	  the	  
effects	  are	  mediated	  by	  emotional	  reactions,	  including	  disgust,5	  judgments	  regarding	  bad	  
effects	  of	  the	  action,	  or	  judgments	  regarding	  good	  effects	  of	  the	  action.	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
	   Fifty-­‐five	  participants	  (27	  females	  and	  28	  males)	  were	  recruited	  from	  the	  
Mechanical	  Turk	  subject	  pool	  for	  the	  sum	  of	  one	  dollar.	  	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  sex	  
differences	  for	  any	  of	  the	  variables	  measured	  in	  this	  study.	  	  Participants	  were	  randomly	  
assigned	  to	  each	  of	  the	  conditions	  described	  below.	  
Procedure	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  This	  is	  especially	  relevant	  in	  this	  case,	  since	  disgust	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  the	  intensification	  of	  moral	  
judgments	  (Schnall,	  Haidt,	  &	  Clore,	  2008),	  and	  would	  be	  more	  associated	  with	  the	  prevention	  focus	  because	  it	  
is	  an	  emotional	  reaction	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  rejection	  of	  a	  negative	  (Higgins,	  1997;	  1998).	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   After	  providing	  informed	  consent,	  participants	  were	  induced	  into	  either	  a	  
promotion	  or	  a	  prevention	  state	  via	  priming	  using	  the	  Regulatory	  Focus	  Induction	  
Instrument	  (Freitas	  &	  Higgins,	  2002;	  Higgins,	  Roney,	  Crowe,	  &	  Hymes,	  1994).	  This	  
instrument	  primes	  participants	  into	  thinking	  about	  their	  hopes	  and	  aspirations	  (promotion	  
ideals)	  or	  their	  duties	  and	  obligations	  (prevention	  oughts).	  	  The	  promotion	  induction	  was	  
worded	  as	  follows:	  
For	  this	  task,	  we	  would	  like	  you	  to	  think	  about	  how	  your	  current	  hopes	  and	  
aspirations	  are	  different	  now	  from	  what	  they	  were	  when	  you	  were	  growing	  
up.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  accomplishments	  would	  you	  ideally	  like	  to	  meet	  at	  
this	  point	  in	  your	  life?	  What	  accomplishments	  did	  you	  ideally	  want	  to	  meet	  
when	  you	  were	  a	  child?	  In	  the	  space	  below,	  please	  write	  a	  brief	  essay	  
describing	  how	  your	  hopes	  and	  aspirations	  have	  changed	  from	  when	  you	  
were	  a	  child	  to	  now.	  
Similarly,	  the	  prevention	  induction	  was	  worded	  as	  follows:	  
For	  this	  task,	  we	  would	  like	  you	  to	  think	  about	  how	  your	  current	  duties	  and	  
obligations	  are	  different	  now	  from	  what	  they	  were	  when	  you	  were	  growing	  
up.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  responsibilities	  do	  you	  think	  you	  ought	  to	  meet	  at	  
this	  point	  in	  your	  life?	  What	  responsibilities	  did	  you	  think	  you	  ought	  to	  meet	  
when	  you	  were	  a	  child?	  In	  the	  space	  below,	  please	  write	  a	  brief	  essay	  
describing	  how	  your	  duties	  and	  obligations	  have	  changed	  from	  when	  you	  
were	  a	  child	  to	  now.	  
Following	  this	  instrument,	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  set	  of	  scenarios	  of	  widely	  
varying	  moral	  relevance,	  content,	  and	  valence.	  Five	  of	  these	  scenarios	  were	  designed	  to	  act	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as	  general	  “filler”	  ethical	  dilemmas	  and	  scenarios	  (chastising	  a	  family	  for	  littering,	  
prioritizing	  loyalty	  over	  merit	  when	  choosing	  whom	  to	  give	  a	  raise,	  adopting	  a	  
handicapped	  child	  when	  receiving	  a	  tax	  break	  for	  doing	  so,	  keeping	  one’s	  promises	  to	  an	  
acquaintance,	  and	  quitting	  a	  job	  rather	  than	  recanting	  unpopular	  religious	  beliefs).	  These	  
scenarios	  were	  included	  to	  mask	  the	  fact	  that	  participants’	  judgments	  of	  incest	  were	  of	  
particular	  interest	  in	  the	  study,	  thereby	  avoiding	  demand	  effects	  that	  might	  be	  extant	  if	  the	  
incest	  scenario	  were	  presented	  in	  isolation	  from	  other	  scenarios	  and	  dilemmas.	  	  There	  
were	  no	  regulatory	  focus	  predictions	  associated	  with	  any	  filler	  scenarios	  and	  there	  were	  no	  
consistent	  effects	  across	  studies,	  nor	  was	  the	  content	  of	  any	  scenario	  related	  to	  the	  central	  
purpose	  of	  this	  research.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  results	  from	  these	  filler	  scenarios	  will	  not	  be	  
subject	  to	  analysis.	  
	   One	  of	  the	  scenarios	  was	  the	  incest	  scenario	  of	  interest	  (placed	  third;	  again,	  in	  an	  
effort	  to	  avoid	  demand	  effects	  caused	  by	  placing	  it	  too	  prominently),	  which	  was	  worded	  as	  
follows:	  
A	  brother	  and	  sister	  are	  alone	  in	  the	  house	  and	  decide	  to	  make	  love	  just	  once.	  
The	  sister	  is	  already	  taking	  birth	  control	  pills	  and	  the	  brother	  uses	  a	  condom.	  
They	  both	  enjoy	  the	  act	  but	  decide	  not	  to	  do	  it	  again.	  They	  promise	  each	  
other	  to	  keep	  it	  a	  secret.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  avoid	  biasing	  responses	  since	  the	  valence	  of	  the	  scenarios	  was	  mixed,	  for	  each	  
scenario,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  judge	  both	  how	  morally	  wrong	  the	  behavior	  was	  (9	  =	  
“extremely	  morally	  wrong”;	  1	  =	  “not	  at	  all	  morally	  wrong”)	  and	  how	  morally	  right	  the	  
behavior	  was	  (1	  =	  “not	  at	  all	  morally	  right”;	  9	  =	  “exceptionally	  morally	  right”).	  	  Since	  
participants	  consistently	  judge	  incest	  to	  be	  morally	  wrong,	  and	  therefore	  it	  would	  be	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difficult	  to	  interpret	  moral	  rightness	  judgments	  for	  this	  behavior	  (especially	  given	  the	  
asymmetry	  of	  wrongness	  and	  rightness	  judgments	  suggested	  in	  work	  by	  Janoff-­‐Bulman,	  
Sheikh,	  &	  Hepp,	  2009),	  we	  focused	  our	  analysis	  on	  moral	  wrongness	  judgments.	  
	   For	  each	  behavior,	  participants	  were	  also	  asked	  two	  questions	  about	  the	  ultimate	  
outcomes	  of	  the	  behaviors	  in	  the	  scenarios:	  “To	  what	  extent	  do	  you	  think	  something	  good	  
will	  result	  from	  this	  action?”	  and	  “To	  what	  extent	  do	  you	  think	  something	  bad	  will	  result	  
from	  this	  action?”	  	  Each	  of	  these	  questions	  was	  rated	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  9	  with	  1	  
representing	  “not	  at	  all	  likely”	  and	  9	  representing	  “very	  likely.”	  	  Finally,	  participants	  were	  
also	  asked	  to	  rate	  their	  current	  emotional	  reactions	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  9	  with	  1	  
representing	  “not	  at	  all”	  and	  9	  representing	  “very	  much”	  on	  each	  of	  the	  following	  emotional	  
dimensions:	  happiness,	  anger,	  disappointment,	  sadness,	  disgust,	  anxiety,	  and	  elation.	  
Analysis	  
	   Given	  the	  nature	  of	  our	  main	  dependent	  variable	  (moral	  wrongness),	  and	  our	  desire	  
to	  potentially	  control	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  covariates,	  we	  approached	  the	  data	  using	  standard	  
linear	  models.	  	  However,	  given	  the	  negative	  skew	  of	  the	  data	  (due	  to	  the	  heavy	  selection	  of	  
the	  most	  extreme	  judgment	  “9”	  by	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  participants),	  making	  the	  data	  
resistant	  to	  transformation	  to	  a	  normal	  distribution,	  we	  thought	  it	  best	  to	  supplement	  
these	  analyses	  with	  an	  additional	  form	  of	  analysis.	  	  Given	  the	  large	  proportion	  of	  extreme	  
judgments,	  variance	  comparisons	  can	  serve	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  deviation	  from	  that	  extreme	  
judgment	  and	  thus	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  ambivalence	  in	  making	  the	  judgment,	  so	  we	  included	  
robust	  variance	  comparison	  tests	  to	  measure	  this	  spread	  (Browne	  &	  Forsythe,	  1974)	  in	  
addition	  to	  the	  linear	  regression	  results.	  
Results	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   Manipulation	  checks.	  	  The	  promotion	  and	  prevention	  essays	  were	  rated	  for	  their	  
content	  by	  two	  raters	  who	  were	  blind	  to	  the	  experimental	  assignment.	  	  Raters	  were	  asked	  
to	  indicate	  on	  scales	  varying	  from	  1	  to	  5	  (1	  =	  “not	  at	  all;”	  5	  =	  “very	  much”)	  the	  degree	  to	  
which	  the	  essays	  were	  about	  (1)	  the	  achievement	  of	  ideals	  or	  aspirations,	  and	  were	  about	  
(2)	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  duties	  and	  obligations.	  	  Raters	  were	  also	  asked	  to	  indicate	  the	  degree	  
to	  which	  the	  essays	  were	  about	  (3)	  approaching	  a	  positive	  goal,	  and	  were	  about	  (4)	  
avoiding	  a	  negative	  problem	  on	  the	  same	  scale.	  	  These	  latter	  evaluations	  were	  necessitated	  
in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  the	  specific	  ideal/ought	  construct	  of	  regulatory	  focus	  with	  the	  more	  
general	  approach/avoidance	  construct	  associated	  with	  the	  hedonic	  principle.	  	  In	  recent	  
research	  concerning	  moral	  motivation,	  regulatory	  focus	  theory	  has	  been	  treated	  as	  a	  
particular	  expression	  of	  a	  more	  general	  theory	  of	  approach	  and	  avoidance	  (Janoff-­‐Bulman,	  
Sheikh,	  &	  Baldacci,	  2008;	  Janoff-­‐Bulman,	  Sheikh,	  &	  Hepp,	  2009;	  Janoff-­‐Bulman,	  2009;	  
Janoff-­‐Bulman	  &	  Carnes,	  2013).	  However,	  regulatory	  focus	  theory	  (Higgins,	  1997;	  1998)	  
proposes	  that	  the	  promotion	  system	  and	  the	  prevention	  system	  are	  two	  distinct	  kinds	  of	  
approach	  and	  two	  distinct	  kinds	  of	  avoidance,	  and	  there	  is	  support	  for	  distinguishing	  
regulatory	  focus	  from	  the	  more	  general	  approach/avoidance	  construct	  (e.g.,	  Förster	  et	  al,	  
2001;	  Scholer	  &	  Higgins,	  2008;	  Spiegel,	  Grant-­‐Pillow,	  &	  Higgins,	  2004).	  	  Nevertheless,	  since	  
experimental	  manipulations	  can	  induce	  both	  promotion/prevention	  and	  
approach/avoidance	  (cf.	  Friedman	  &	  Förster,	  2001;	  Friedman	  &	  Förster,	  2005),	  and	  there	  
are	  chronic	  measures	  (e.g.,	  Lockwood,	  Jordan,	  &	  Kunda,	  2002)	  that	  do	  not	  clearly	  
differentiate	  between	  these	  constructs	  (Summerville	  &	  Roese,	  2008),	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  
establish	  that	  the	  effects	  in	  our	  research	  are	  due	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  ideal/ought	  
distinction	  of	  regulatory	  focus	  and	  not	  the	  more	  general	  approach/avoidance	  distinction.	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   Interrater	  reliability	  was	  high	  for	  ratings	  of	  ideals	  (α	  =	  0.93),	  oughts	  (α	  =	  0.96),	  
approach	  (α	  =	  0.85),	  and	  avoidance	  (α	  =	  0.73),	  so	  averages	  were	  taken	  of	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  
ratings.	  	  As	  expected,	  those	  primed	  with	  the	  promotion	  focus	  prompt	  (M(ideals)	  =	  4.72;	  
M(oughts)	  =	  1.16)	  wrote	  essays	  significantly	  more	  about	  ideals	  (t(53)	  =	  -­‐16.83,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  
and	  significantly	  less	  about	  oughts	  (t(53)	  =	  24.33,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  compared	  to	  those	  primed	  
with	  a	  prevention	  focus	  prompt	  (M(ideals)	  =	  1.77;	  M(oughts)	  =	  4.63).	  	  There	  were	  no	  
significant	  differences	  with	  respect	  to	  approach	  (t	  <	  1)	  or	  avoidance	  (t	  <	  1).	  Thus,	  as	  
expected,	  the	  experimental	  manipulation	  was	  successful	  in	  inducing	  either	  a	  promotion	  
focus	  or	  a	  prevention	  focus	  but	  not	  a	  general	  approach	  or	  avoidance	  state.	  	  
	   Judgments	  of	  Incest.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  “vice”	  hypothesis	  above,	  those	  induced	  
into	  a	  promotion	  state	  (M	  =	  8.36)	  saw	  non-­‐procreative	  incest	  as	  significantly	  more	  wrong	  
compared	  to	  those	  induced	  into	  a	  prevention	  state	  (M	  =	  7.4;	  β	  =	  0.28,	  t(53)	  =	  -­‐2.09,	  p	  =	  
0.04).	  This	  main	  effect	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  3.1.	  	  Our	  hypothesis	  is	  also	  that	  these	  mean	  
differences	  are	  the	  result	  of	  a	  different	  manner	  of	  judgment	  based	  on	  the	  reference	  point	  
being	  used.	  	  Specifically,	  those	  making	  more	  deontic	  judgments	  (in	  the	  prevention	  system)	  
are	  judging	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  behavior	  conforms	  to	  necessary	  oughts	  (moral	  “0”),	  that	  is,	  
whether	  or	  not	  the	  behavior	  is	  permissible	  or	  forbidden.	  	  Those	  making	  more	  aretaic	  
judgments,	  in	  contrast,	  are	  judging	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  this	  action	  deviates	  from	  ideals	  of	  
character	  (moral	  “+1”),	  that	  is,	  judgments	  about	  how	  non-­‐good	  the	  behavior	  is.	  	  Thus,	  we	  
would	  expect	  judgments	  of	  incest	  to	  be	  less	  severe	  in	  the	  prevention	  condition	  because	  	  




Figure	  3.1:	  Moral	  wrongness	  of	  incest	  over	  regulatory	  focus	  priming	  (error	  bars	  represent	  
+/-­‐	  1	  standard	  error	  relative	  to	  the	  mean).	  
	  
	  
some	  participants	  are	  judging	  incest	  as	  not	  wrong	  at	  all,	  whereas	  some	  in	  the	  promotion	  
condition	  are	  simply	  judging	  it	  as	  less	  wrong.	  	  	  
	   If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  we	  should	  see	  variance	  differences.	  Applying	  a	  robust	  test	  for	  
the	  equality	  of	  variances	  between	  the	  groups	  (see	  Brown	  &	  Forsythe,	  1974),	  we	  found	  a	  
significant	  difference	  in	  variance	  between	  conditions	  (F(1,	  53)	  =	  6.98,	  p	  =	  0.01),	  with	  the	  
standard	  deviation	  of	  the	  prevention	  condition	  (SD	  =	  2.06)	  being	  significantly	  higher	  than	  
that	  of	  the	  promotion	  condition	  (SD	  =	  1.12).	  	  This	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  a	  graph	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  
responses	  in	  Figure	  3.2.	  
	   Emotional	  reactions.	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  ideal	  and	  
ought	  priming	  conditions	  with	  respect	  to	  happiness	  (t	  <	  1),	  anger	  (t	  <	  1),	  disappointment	  (t	  
<	  1),	  sadness	  (t	  <	  1),	  disgust	  (t(53)	  =	  1.60,	  p	  =	  0.11),	  anxiety	  (t	  <	  1),	  or	  elation	  (t	  <	  1).	  	  Nor	  
did	  any	  of	  these	  emotional	  reactions	  significantly	  predict	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  judgments	  of	  




































elation:	  t	  <	  1),	  though	  the	  relation	  to	  happiness	  was	  marginally	  significant	  (β	  =	  0.22,	  t(53)	  =	  
1.68,	  p	  =	  0.10).6	  	  This	  suggests	  that	  judgments	  of	  incest	  are	  not	  merely	  the	  product	  of	  
negative	  emotional	  reactions	  to	  it,	  and	  are	  related	  to	  intuitions	  with	  a	  real	  foundation.	  
	   Good	  and	  Bad	  Effects.	  	  Since	  incest	  on	  average	  was	  rated	  as	  very	  morally	  wrong	  (M	  
=	  7.84),	  and	  to	  compare	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  avoidance	  (prevention	  avoidance	  and	  promotion	  
avoidance),	  we	  reversed	  the	  ratings	  of	  good	  effects	  to	  give	  us	  a	  scale	  of	  bad	  effects	  versus	  
non-­‐good	  effects.	  	  Not	  surprisingly,	  predicted	  bad	  effects	  were	  significantly	  associated	  with	  
judgments	  of	  moral	  wrongness	  (β	  =	  0.28,	  t(53)	  =	  2.15,	  p	  =	  0.04).	  	  However,	  ratings	  of	  non-­‐
good	  effects	  had	  a	  much	  stronger	  association	  (β	  =	  0.61,	  t(53)	  =	  5.68,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  	  It	  should	  
be	  noted	  that	  these	  effects	  appear	  to	  be	  independent,	  because	  they	  both	  remain	  significant	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  It	  is	  perhaps	  interesting	  to	  note	  that	  the	  stronger	  participants	  negative	  judgment,	  the	  happier	  they	  felt	  in	  the	  
promotion	  condition	  (β	  =	  0.41,	  t(24)	  =	  2.19,	  p	  =	  0.04).	  It	  is	  perhaps	  possible	  that	  making	  intense	  moral	  
judgments	  (i.e.	  “closing	  the	  moral	  gap”	  between	  scenarios	  and	  one’s	  intuitive	  ideals)	  creates	  a	  sense	  of	  
success	  or	  happiness.	  	  Unfortunately,	  we	  did	  not	  measure	  an	  emotion	  corresponding	  to	  prevention	  success,	  so	  



























in	  a	  multiple	  regression	  (bad	  effects:	  β	  =	  0.24,	  t(52)	  =	  2.34,	  p	  =	  0.02;	  non-­‐good	  effects:	  β	  =	  
0.60,	  t(52)	  =	  5.75,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  	  This	  further	  bolsters	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  
types	  of	  avoidance	  (avoiding	  bad	  effects	  versus	  avoiding	  non-­‐good	  effects)	  is	  orthogonal	  to	  
avoidance	  itself.	  In	  addition,	  consistent	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  promotion-­‐related	  
negative	  judgments	  would	  be	  stronger	  than	  prevention-­‐related	  negative	  judgments	  (for	  
this	  case	  where	  negative	  consequences	  of	  the	  act	  are	  absent),	  the	  promotion-­‐related	  non-­‐
good	  effect	  was	  stronger	  than	  the	  prevention-­‐related	  bad	  effect.	  
	   We	  further	  examined	  the	  relationship	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  main	  ideal/ought	  
difference	  of	  the	  manipulation	  described	  above	  to	  determine	  whether	  controlling	  for	  
predicted	  non-­‐good	  or	  bad	  effects	  reduces	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  manipulation	  to	  non-­‐
significance.	  	  The	  manipulation’s	  relationship	  to	  ratings	  of	  wrongness	  of	  incest	  were,	  if	  
anything,	  strengthened	  by	  controlling	  for	  predicted	  bad	  effects	  in	  a	  multiple	  regression	  (β	  =	  
0.32,	  t(52)	  =	  2.56,	  p	  =	  0.02),	  suggesting	  independent	  effects.	  	  However,	  when	  controlling	  for	  
predicted	  non-­‐good	  effects,	  the	  relationship	  dropped	  to	  non-­‐significance	  (β	  =	  0.15,	  t(52)	  =	  
1.41).	  
	   This	  latter	  effect	  raised	  the	  intriguing	  possibility	  that	  the	  manipulation	  of	  promotion	  
or	  prevention	  focus	  through	  the	  induction	  priming	  was	  having	  an	  indirect	  effect	  on	  
judgments	  of	  incest	  via	  differential	  judgments	  of	  whether	  such	  an	  action	  would	  inhibit	  the	  
achievement	  of	  some	  good	  (the	  failure	  to	  “hit	  the	  target	  of”	  a	  virtue;	  see	  Swanton,	  2001).	  	  
We	  therefore	  conducted	  a	  bootstrapped	  mediation	  test	  (10,000	  repetitions),	  and	  found	  a	  
significant	  indirect	  effect	  of	  regulatory	  focus	  manipulation	  on	  judgments	  of	  moral	  
wrongness	  of	  incest	  through	  predictions	  of	  the	  non-­‐good	  effects	  of	  that	  action	  (bias-­‐
corrected	  95%	  CI	  =	  [-­‐1.045,	  -­‐0.003]).	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   These	  results,	  in	  terms	  of	  differentiating	  between	  the	  hypotheses	  listed	  in	  the	  
introduction,	  are	  strongly	  consistent	  with	  the	  “intuition”	  or	  “vice”	  hypothesis.	  Those	  
primed	  with	  ideals	  were	  more	  judgmental	  of	  harmless	  incest	  compared	  to	  those	  primed	  
with	  oughts,	  and	  this	  effect	  was	  independent	  of	  judgments	  of	  negative	  effects	  of	  the	  action	  
(i.e.	  consequentialist	  reasons	  for	  negatively	  judging	  incest)	  and	  of	  negative	  emotions	  
including	  disgust.	  	  This	  should	  not	  be	  surprising,	  since	  a	  recent	  review	  of	  the	  literature	  
argued	  that	  disgust	  acts	  merely	  as	  an	  intensifier	  of	  existing	  judgments	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  
source	  of	  those	  judgments	  (Pizarro,	  Inbar,	  &	  Helion,	  2011),	  and	  even	  while	  arguing	  for	  a	  
greater	  emphasis	  on	  intuitive	  judgments	  in	  moral	  psychology,	  Haidt	  (2001)	  cautioned	  
against	  wholly	  conflating	  moral	  intuitions	  with	  moral	  emotions.	  
	   These	  results	  strongly	  suggest	  that	  ideal	  virtues	  (and	  vices	  as	  ideal	  discrepancies)	  
do	  act	  as	  moral	  reference	  points	  in	  making	  moral	  judgments,	  and	  not	  every	  behavior	  is	  
understood	  as	  being	  judged	  on	  a	  scale	  of	  absolute	  deliberative	  duties	  and	  obligations.	  	  
However,	  though	  these	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  this	  hypothesis,	  there	  is	  a	  need	  for	  
additional	  evidence	  that	  more	  directly	  supports	  the	  more	  general	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  two	  
motivational	  systems	  are	  representative	  of	  the	  two	  types	  of	  moral	  systems.	  	  If	  this	  more	  
general	  hypothesis	  is	  correct,	  then	  three	  predictions	  should	  obtain.	  	  
	   First,	  prompting	  participants	  to	  rely	  on	  their	  intuitions	  or	  reasoning	  when	  making	  
their	  judgments	  should	  significantly	  influence	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  intensity	  of	  judgments.	  	  
If	  those	  processing	  in	  the	  promotion	  focus	  are	  judging	  through	  the	  application	  of	  tacitly	  
held	  ideals	  (a	  “fit”),	  forcing	  them	  to	  engage	  in	  deliberative	  reasoning	  (a	  “non-­‐fit;”	  see	  Avnet	  
&	  Higgins,	  2006)	  instead	  should	  reduce	  the	  intensity	  of	  their	  moral	  judgments	  (whereas	  
this	  should	  have	  relatively	  little	  effect	  on	  prevention	  focused	  participants	  if	  they	  are	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already	  engaged	  in	  deliberative	  reasoning	  and	  it	  is	  precisely	  their	  reasoning	  which	  is	  
leading	  to	  the	  less	  intense	  moral	  conclusion).	  	  Second,	  if	  the	  prevention	  focus	  is	  related	  to	  
processing	  using	  deliberative	  consequentialist	  reasons	  in	  their	  judgment,	  then	  the	  
introduction	  of	  potential	  negative	  consequences	  to	  the	  scenario	  should	  increase	  the	  
intensity	  of	  their	  negative	  judgments	  (particularly	  relative	  to	  those	  processing	  in	  a	  
promotion	  focus	  whose	  judgments	  should	  not	  be	  impacted	  by	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  
negative	  consequences	  as	  reasons).	  	  Finally,	  if	  the	  promotion	  focus	  is	  related	  to	  making	  
judgments	  based	  on	  tacitly	  held	  ideals	  and	  not	  just	  applying	  a	  baseless	  “gut”	  reaction	  to	  
aversive	  stimuli	  (e.g.,	  a	  disgust	  reaction),	  then	  the	  effect	  should	  disappear	  among	  those	  
who	  do	  not	  hold	  those	  ideals	  (whereas	  this	  should	  have	  relatively	  little	  effect	  on	  prevention	  
focused	  participants	  if	  they	  are	  not	  using	  ideals	  to	  begin	  with	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  their	  
judgments).	  These	  three	  hypotheses	  will	  be	  tested	  in	  Studies	  2a,	  2b,	  and	  2c,	  respectively.	  
	   Another	  possibility	  is	  that	  those	  processing	  in	  the	  promotion	  focus	  simply	  judge	  all	  
immoral	  behavior	  more	  severely	  than	  those	  processing	  in	  a	  prevention	  focus.	  	  We	  address	  
this	  possibility	  in	  Study	  3a.	  	  Finally,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  this	  promotion-­‐prevention	  effect	  is	  
particular	  to	  the	  case	  of	  non-­‐procreative	  incest,	  or	  is	  somehow	  tied	  to	  the	  particular	  
induction	  method	  in	  question,	  rather	  than	  theoretically	  tied	  to	  differences	  in	  regulatory	  
focus	  associated	  with	  these	  two	  systems	  of	  moral	  judgment.	  	  These	  possibilities	  are	  
addressed	  in	  Study	  3b.	  	  
Study	  2a:	  Intuition	  Versus	  Reasoning	  
	  
This	  study	  explored	  whether	  those	  processing	  in	  the	  promotion	  focus	  will	  have	  their	  
judgments	  significantly	  impacted	  by	  a	  prompt	  to	  use	  their	  reasoning	  (a	  “non-­‐fit”)	  rather	  
than	  their	  intuition	  (a	  “fit”)	  in	  making	  those	  judgments.	  	  As	  discussed	  earlier,	  intuitive	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processing	  in	  the	  ethics	  of	  virtue	  is	  implicitly	  tied	  to	  abstract	  ideals	  of	  moral	  perfection	  
(Haidt	  &	  Joseph,	  2004;	  2007).	  	  Thus,	  forcing	  promotion-­‐focused	  participants	  to	  use	  their	  
deliberative	  reasoning	  instead	  could	  potentially	  disrupt	  such	  processing	  and	  reduce	  moral	  
judgment	  intensity.	  In	  contrast,	  prompting	  prevention-­‐focused	  participants	  to	  use	  their	  
deliberative	  reasoning	  should	  have	  relatively	  little	  effect	  if	  they	  already	  use	  reasons	  to	  
make	  their	  judgments	  without	  needing	  to	  be	  prompted	  to	  do	  so	  (Avnet	  &	  Higgins,	  2006),	  
and	  this	  reasoning	  is	  leading	  to	  less	  intense	  moral	  judgments.	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
	   One	  hundred	  eighteen	  participants	  were	  recruited	  from	  Amazon’s	  Mechanical	  Turk	  
for	  the	  sum	  of	  one	  dollar.	  	  Participants	  consisted	  of	  45	  males	  and	  73	  females.	  	  Since	  females	  
judged	  incest	  as	  significantly	  more	  wrong	  (M	  =	  8.33)	  than	  males	  (M	  =	  7.13;	  t(116)	  =	  -­‐3.20,	  p	  
=	  0.002),	  sex	  differences	  were	  included	  as	  a	  covariate	  in	  all	  of	  the	  following	  analyses.	  
Participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  the	  conditions	  below.	  
Procedures	  
	   The	  procedure	  in	  this	  study	  was	  identical	  to	  Study	  1	  with	  the	  exception	  that	  half	  of	  
the	  participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  a	  “reasoning”	  condition	  and	  half	  to	  an	  
“intuition”	  condition.	  	  Following	  the	  regulatory	  focus	  induction,	  participants	  were	  
presented	  with	  the	  scenarios,	  but	  with	  a	  prompt	  preceding	  them	  telling	  them	  to	  use	  either	  
their	  reasoning	  or	  their	  intuition	  to	  make	  their	  judgments.	  	  The	  “reasoning”	  prompt	  was	  
worded	  as	  follows:	  
Please	  read	  the	  following	  scenarios	  and	  rate	  them	  on	  the	  scales	  provided.	  We	  
are	  interested	  in	  your	  beliefs	  about	  each	  of	  these	  behaviors,	  so	  please	  use	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your	  reasoning	  to	  make	  your	  judgments.	  
The	  “intuition”	  prompt	  was	  worded	  as	  follows:	  
Please	  read	  the	  following	  scenarios	  and	  rate	  them	  on	  the	  scales	  provided.	  We	  
are	  interested	  in	  your	  feelings	  about	  each	  of	  these	  behaviors,	  so	  please	  
use	  your	  intuition	  to	  make	  your	  judgments.	  
The	  scenarios	  presented	  were	  identical	  to	  those	  used	  in	  Study	  1.	  
Results	  
	   Manipulation	  Checks.	  Two	  raters	  blind	  to	  the	  experimental	  conditions	  rated	  the	  
content	  of	  the	  essays	  in	  a	  manner	  identical	  to	  that	  used	  in	  Study	  1.	  	  Interrater	  reliability	  
was	  very	  high	  with	  regard	  to	  how	  much	  the	  content	  reflected	  ideals	  (α	  =	  0.91)	  or	  oughts	  (α	  
=	  0.92),	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  the	  essays	  involved	  approaching	  something	  positive	  
(α	  =	  0.88)	  or	  avoiding	  something	  negative	  (α	  =	  0.83).	  	  Importantly,	  those	  induced	  into	  a	  
promotion	  focus	  (M(ideals)	  =	  4.82;	  M(oughts)	  =	  1.32)	  wrote	  essays	  rated	  as	  significantly	  
higher	  on	  ideal	  content	  (β	  =	  0.95,	  t(115)	  =	  34.76,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  and	  lower	  on	  ought	  content	  (β	  
=	  -­‐0.95,	  t(115)	  =	  -­‐31.77,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  than	  those	  induced	  into	  a	  prevention	  focus	  (M(ideals)	  =	  
1.44;	  M(oughts)	  =	  4.73).	  	  Unlike	  the	  previous	  study,	  those	  induced	  into	  a	  promotion	  
condition	  (M(approach)	  =	  4.85;	  M(avoidance)	  =	  1.25)	  also	  wrote	  essays	  rated	  as	  more	  
about	  approaching	  a	  positive	  (β	  =	  0.20,	  t(115)	  =	  2.18,	  p	  =	  0.03)	  and	  less	  about	  avoiding	  a	  
negative	  (β	  =	  -­‐0.25,	  t(115)	  =	  -­‐2.80,	  p	  =	  0.01)	  compared	  to	  those	  induced	  into	  a	  prevention	  
focus	  (M(approach)	  =	  4.60;	  M(avoidance)	  =	  1.65).	  	  Because	  of	  this,	  we	  controlled	  for	  
approach	  and	  avoidance	  ratings	  in	  the	  following	  analyses.	  
	   Intuition	  Versus	  Reasoning.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  vice	  hypothesis,	  among	  those	  
primed	  with	  promotion	  ideals,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  difference	  between	  judgments	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performed	  using	  intuition	  versus	  reasoning,	  with	  those	  in	  the	  intuition	  condition	  (M	  =	  8.55)	  
rating	  incest	  as	  more	  wrong	  than	  those	  in	  the	  reasoning	  condition	  (M	  =	  7;	  β	  =	  0.36,	  t(53)	  =	  
2.94,	  p	  =	  0.01).	  This	  was	  not	  the	  case	  for	  those	  primed	  with	  prevention	  oughts	  (t(59)	  <	  1).7	  
This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  proposal	  that	  finding	  incest	  wrong	  in	  a	  promotion	  ideal	  focus	  
(vs.	  a	  prevention	  ought	  focus)	  is	  more	  associated	  with	  intuition	  than	  with	  reasoning.	  	  As	  
one	  might	  expect,	  given	  these	  results,	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  interaction	  between	  the	  
regulatory	  focus	  induction	  and	  the	  judgment	  conditions	  (β	  =	  0.35,	  t(111)	  =	  2.24,	  p	  =	  0.03),	  
with	  those	  in	  a	  promotion	  state	  rating	  incest	  as	  more	  wrong	  when	  asked	  to	  use	  their	  
feelings	  or	  intuition,	  and	  those	  in	  a	  prevention	  state	  rating	  incest	  as	  more	  wrong	  when	  
asked	  to	  use	  their	  reasoning.8	  	  These	  results	  are	  pictured	  in	  Figure	  3.3.	  These	  results	  are	  
consistent	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  abstract,	  intuitive	  reasoning	  is	  less	  readily	  articulated	  than	  
more	  concrete	  reasoning	  (Cushman,	  Young,	  &	  Hauser,	  2006),	  and,	  these	  results	  suggest,	  
can	  be	  disrupted	  when	  reasoning	  is	  attempted.	  
	   Interestingly,	  with	  respect	  to	  measurements	  of	  variance,	  asking	  promotion-­‐focused	  
participants	  to	  make	  their	  judgments	  using	  reasoning	  rather	  than	  feelings	  makes	  them	  
have	  a	  more	  deontic	  pattern	  of	  judgment.	  A	  robust	  comparison	  of	  variances	  of	  promotion-­‐
induced	  participants	  showed	  that	  those	  in	  the	  deliberative	  (“reasoning”)	  condition	  (SD	  =	  
2.66)	  had	  significantly	  higher	  variance	  than	  those	  in	  the	  intuitive	  (“feelings”)	  condition	  (SD	  
=	  1.22;	  F(1,	  54)	  =	  20.51,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  	  In	  line	  with	  the	  mean	  differences	  above,	  there	  were	  no	  
differences	  between	  intuitive	  (SD	  =	  1.86)	  and	  deliberative	  (SD	  =	  2.02)	  conditions	  for	  those	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  These	  results	  were	  similar	  when	  not	  controlling	  for	  sex	  differences	  (promotion	  ideals:	  β	  =	  0.38,	  t(52)	  =	  2.96,	  
p	  =	  0.01,	  95%	  CI	  =	  [0.53,	  2.75];	  prevention	  oughts:	  t	  <	  1).	  




Figure	  3.3:	  Moral	  wrongness	  of	  incest	  over	  regulatory	  focus	  priming	  by	  reasoning	  versus	  
intuition	  (error	  bars	  represent	  +/-­‐	  1	  standard	  error	  relative	  to	  the	  mean).	  
	  
induced	  into	  a	  prevention	  focus	  in	  terms	  of	  variance	  (F(1,	  60)	  <	  1).	  	  A	  graph	  of	  the	  
variances	  across	  conditions	  is	  available	  in	  Figure	  4.4.	  
These	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  literature	  showing	  that	  promotion-­‐focused	  
individuals	  tend	  to	  rely	  on	  feelings	  in	  judgments,	  whereas	  prevention-­‐focused	  individuals	  
tend	  to	  rely	  more	  on	  reasons	  (Pham	  &	  Avnet,	  2004;	  Avnet	  &	  Higgins,	  2006).	  	  They	  are	  also	  
consistent	  with	  the	  theory	  linking	  the	  two	  reference	  points	  to	  the	  two	  self-­‐regulatory	  
systems	  in	  moral	  judgment.	  	  This	  latter	  point	  is	  especially	  important	  because	  it	  suggests	  
that	  prompting	  the	  use	  of	  	  “feelings”	  and	  “intuition”	  to	  make	  one’s	  judgment	  is	  not	  sufficient	  
to	  induce	  a	  process	  where	  an	  ideal	  reference	  point	  is	  used.	  Promotion-­‐focused	  participants	  
will	  use	  an	  ideal	  reference	  point	  in	  judging	  ‘vice,’	  even	  when	  they	  are	  not	  prompted	  to	  use	  
their	  “feelings”	  and	  “intuition.”	  But	  prevention-­‐focused	  participants	  will	  not	  do	  so	  even	  
when	  prompted	  to	  use	  their	  “feelings”	  and	  “intuition”	  because	  a	  prevention	  focus	  is	  about	  


































Figure	  3.4:	  The	  impact	  of	  regulatory	  focus	  and	  directions	  for	  how	  to	  judge	  the	  scenarios	  on	  
the	  variance	  of	  moral	  judgments	  of	  incest.	  
	  
with	  the	  promotion	  focus,	  and,	  in	  contrast,	  the	  greater	  degree	  of	  perseverance	  associated	  
with	  the	  prevention	  focus	  (Friedman	  &	  Förster,	  2001).	  This	  would	  explain	  why	  prevention	  
priming	  plus	  the	  intuitive	  (“feelings”)	  prompt	  did	  not	  increase	  severity	  of	  judgment	  (or	  
variance).	  	  In	  the	  next	  study,	  we	  examine	  what	  happens	  when	  there	  is	  the	  possibility	  of	  
negative	  consequences	  for	  the	  ‘incest’	  behavior.	  
Study	  2b:	  Negative	  Consequences	  Absent	  Versus	  Present	  
	  
	   If	  adding	  negative	  consequences	  as	  reasons	  makes	  everyone	  judge	  incest	  as	  more	  
wrong	  because	  everyone	  reasons	  consequentially,	  then	  we	  should	  see	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  
severity	  of	  the	  judgment	  in	  both	  prevention	  and	  promotion	  groups.	  	  However,	  if	  the	  
mechanism	  underlying	  negative	  judgments	  of	  ‘incest’	  in	  the	  promotion	  system	  involves	  
tacitly	  held	  ideals	  as	  a	  reference	  point	  rather	  than	  concrete	  consequences	  of	  the	  behavior,	  
then	  the	  introduction	  of	  negative	  consequences	  should	  intensify	  the	  negative	  judgments	  of	  































increase	  judgmental	  negativity	  significantly	  more	  for	  prevention-­‐primed	  participants	  than	  
promotion-­‐primed	  participants).	  	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
	   One	  hundred	  twenty-­‐one	  participants	  were	  recruited	  from	  Mechanical	  Turk	  for	  the	  
sum	  of	  one	  dollar.	  	  There	  were	  45	  males	  and	  76	  females.	  	  Female	  participants	  judged	  incest	  
as	  significantly	  more	  wrong	  (M	  =	  8.54)	  than	  male	  participants	  (M	  =	  7.44;	  t(119)	  =	  -­‐3.45,	  p	  =	  
0.001),	  so	  sex	  differences	  were	  included	  in	  all	  of	  the	  analyses	  below.	  	  Participants	  were	  
randomized	  into	  the	  four	  study	  conditions	  below.	  
Procedure	  
	   In	  this	  study,	  we	  used	  the	  Regulatory	  Focus	  Induction	  Instrument	  (as	  in	  Studies	  1	  &	  
2)	  in	  order	  to	  induce	  participants	  into	  either	  a	  promotion	  or	  a	  prevention	  state.	  Following	  
the	  induction,	  half	  of	  the	  participants,	  from	  random	  assignment,	  saw	  the	  same	  (no	  negative	  
consequences)	  scenarios	  as	  those	  presented	  in	  Studies	  1	  and	  2a	  in	  the	  same	  order.	  	  The	  
other	  half	  saw	  exactly	  the	  same	  scenarios	  except	  that	  the	  incest	  scenario	  was	  altered	  so	  as	  
to	  suggest	  the	  possibility	  of	  direct	  negative	  consequences	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  incest.	  	  The	  new	  
version	  of	  the	  scenario	  was	  worded	  as	  follows:	  
A	  brother	  and	  sister	  are	  alone	  in	  the	  house	  and	  decide	  to	  make	  love	  just	  once.	  
The	  sister	  is	  not	  taking	  birth	  control	  pills	  and	  the	  brother	  does	  not	  use	  a	  
condom.	  They	  both	  enjoy	  the	  act	  but	  decide	  not	  to	  do	  it	  again.	  They	  do	  not	  
promise	  each	  other	  to	  keep	  it	  a	  secret.	  
This	  version	  of	  the	  scenario	  allows	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  negative	  consequences	  in	  the	  form	  
of	  conception	  of	  a	  deformed	  infant	  or	  unhappiness	  of	  those	  who	  hear	  about	  the	  incest,	  
	  48	  
which	  are	  two	  of	  the	  major	  reasons	  participants	  present	  for	  objecting	  to	  the	  incest	  
mentioned	  by	  Haidt	  (2001)	  and	  Haidt,	  Bjorklund,	  and	  Murphy	  (2000).	  
Results	  
	   Manipulation	  Checks.	  In	  a	  manner	  identical	  to	  that	  used	  in	  previous	  studies,	  
participant	  essays	  were	  rated	  for	  their	  content	  by	  two	  raters	  blind	  to	  the	  experimental	  
condition.	  	  Interrater	  reliability	  was	  very	  high	  with	  regard	  to	  whether	  the	  essay	  content	  
was	  more	  about	  ideals	  (α	  =	  0.92)	  or	  oughts	  (α	  =	  0.94),	  and	  relatively	  good	  with	  regard	  to	  
whether	  the	  essay	  was	  more	  about	  approaching	  a	  positive	  (α	  =	  0.66)	  or	  avoiding	  a	  negative	  
(α	  =	  0.66).	  	  Those	  induced	  into	  a	  promotion	  state	  (M(ideals)	  =	  4.89;	  M(oughts)	  =	  1.17)	  
wrote	  essays	  significantly	  more	  about	  ideals	  (β	  =	  0.92,	  t(118)	  =	  25.69,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  and	  
significantly	  less	  about	  oughts	  (β	  =	  -­‐0.93,	  t(118)	  =	  -­‐27.85,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  compared	  to	  those	  
induced	  into	  a	  prevention	  state	  (M(ideals)	  =	  1.67;	  M(oughts)	  =	  4.61).	  	  As	  in	  Study	  1,	  unlike	  
in	  Study	  2a,	  however,	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  the	  groups	  with	  
respect	  to	  whether	  the	  essay	  content	  was	  more	  about	  approaching	  a	  positive	  (β	  =	  0.10,	  
t(118)	  =	  1.07,	  p	  =	  0.29)	  or	  avoiding	  a	  negative	  (t	  <	  1).	  
	   Negative	  Consequences	  Absent	  Versus	  Present.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  results	  from	  
the	  previous	  study,	  among	  those	  participants	  viewing	  the	  “no	  negative	  consequences”	  
version	  of	  the	  scenario	  used	  in	  Studies	  1	  and	  2a,	  those	  induced	  into	  a	  promotion	  ideal	  state	  
judged	  the	  behavior	  as	  more	  morally	  wrong	  compared	  to	  those	  induced	  into	  a	  prevention	  
ought	  state	  (β	  =	  0.28,	  t(43)	  =	  2.02,	  p	  =	  0.05).9	  	  Interestingly,	  this	  difference	  reversed	  among	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  This	  effect	  is	  only	  marginally	  significant	  when	  not	  controlling	  for	  sex	  differences	  (β	  =	  0.25,	  t(44)	  =	  1.77,	  p	  =	  
0.08),	  or	  when	  controlling	  for	  approach	  and	  avoidance	  essay	  content	  (β	  =	  0.25,	  t(41)	  =	  1.74,	  p	  =	  0.09).	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Figure	  3.5:	  Moral	  wrongness	  of	  incest	  over	  regulatory	  focus	  priming	  by	  the	  potential	  for	  
harmful	  consequences	  (error	  bars	  represent	  +/-­‐	  1	  standard	  error	  relative	  to	  the	  mean).	  
	  
those	  who	  viewed	  the	  new	  “consequences”	  scenario,	  though	  not	  significantly	  (t(72)	  <	  1).10	  	  
This	  was	  due	  to	  a	  significantly	  more	  severe	  judgment	  among	  prevention-­‐focused	  
participants	  for	  the	  “consequences”	  scenario	  (M	  =	  8.48)	  versus	  the	  “no	  consequences”	  
version	  (M	  =	  7.21;	  β	  =	  0.37,	  t(52)	  =	  2.99,	  p	  =	  0.004),	  as	  hypothesized.11	  	  Also	  consistent	  with	  
our	  prediction,	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  difference	  between	  the	  judgments	  in	  the	  
“consequences”	  versus	  “no	  consequences”	  scenarios	  among	  promotion-­‐focused	  
participants	  (t(63)	  <	  1).12	  	  This	  difference	  in	  differences	  was	  strong	  enough	  to	  yield	  a	  
significant	  interaction	  between	  the	  scenario	  type	  and	  the	  regulatory	  focus	  induction	  (β	  =	  -­‐
0.33,	  t(116)	  =	  -­‐2.02,	  p	  =	  0.05).13	  	  These	  results	  are	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3.5.	  	  This	  is	  
consistent	  with	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  processing	  related	  to	  the	  two	  moral	  systems	  laid	  out	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  This	  is	  also	  true	  when	  not	  controlling	  for	  sex	  differences	  (t	  <	  1).	  
11	  This	  effect	  is	  still	  significant	  when	  not	  controlling	  for	  sex	  differences	  (β	  =	  0.33,	  t(53)	  =	  2.57,	  p	  =	  0.01).	  
12	  Again,	  this	  is	  true	  even	  when	  not	  controlling	  for	  sex	  differences	  (t	  <	  1).	  
13	  This	  effect	  is	  only	  marginally	  significant	  when	  not	  controlling	  for	  sex	  differences	  (β	  =	  -­‐0.32,	  t(117)	  =	  -­‐1.86,	  p	  
=	  0.07).	  It	  remains	  significant	  when	  controlling	  for	  approach	  and	  avoidance	  content	  (β	  =	  -­‐0.33,	  t(114)	  =	  -­‐1.97,	  


































Figure	  3.6:	  The	  impact	  of	  regulatory	  focus	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  harmful	  consequences	  on	  
the	  variance	  of	  moral	  judgments	  of	  incest.	  
	  
above.	  
	   Variance	  differences	  between	  groups	  were	  also	  in	  line	  with	  results	  from	  previous	  
studies.	  	  In	  the	  no-­‐consequences	  condition,	  similar	  to	  Study	  1,	  those	  in	  the	  prevention	  
condition	  showed	  significantly	  higher	  variance	  (SD	  =	  2.34)	  than	  those	  in	  the	  promotion	  
condition	  (SD	  =	  1.53;	  F(1,	  44)	  =	  4.28,	  p	  =	  0.04).	  	  Also	  in	  line	  with	  the	  mean	  results	  reported	  
above,	  those	  in	  the	  prevention	  condition	  showed	  significantly	  higher	  levels	  of	  variance	  in	  
the	  no-­‐consequences	  condition	  (SD	  =	  2.34)	  compared	  to	  the	  consequences	  condition	  (SD	  =	  
1.42;	  F(1,	  53)	  =	  9.19,	  p	  =	  0.003).	  	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  a	  clearer	  
deontic	  negative	  value	  when	  negative	  consequences	  are	  possible	  than	  not	  possible.	  In	  
contrast,	  there	  was	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  no-­‐consequences	  (SD	  =	  1.53)	  and	  the	  
consequences	  (SD	  =	  1.66)	  conditions	  for	  those	  induced	  into	  a	  promotion	  focus	  (F(1,	  64)	  <	  
1).	  Finally,	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  variance	  differences	  between	  those	  in	  the	  promotion	  





























consequences	  condition	  (F(1,	  73)	  <	  1).	  A	  graph	  of	  the	  responses	  across	  conditions	  is	  
available	  in	  Figure	  3.6.	  
	   These	  results	  show	  that	  those	  processing	  in	  the	  promotion	  focus	  are	  unaffected	  by	  
the	  possibility	  of	  negative	  consequences	  relative	  to	  those	  in	  the	  prevention	  focus.	  	  Put	  into	  
virtue	  ethical	  terms,	  acts	  of	  incest	  are	  equally	  indicative	  of	  vice	  regardless	  of	  whether	  those	  
acts	  lead	  to	  negative	  consequences	  or	  not	  (Anscombe,	  2005).	  In	  contrast,	  the	  introduction	  
of	  potential	  negative	  consequences	  significantly	  increased	  wrongness	  intensity	  for	  those	  in	  
the	  prevention	  system.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  proposal	  that	  those	  in	  the	  prevention	  
system	  make	  their	  judgments	  based	  upon	  the	  information	  contained	  within	  the	  scenario,	  
being	  more	  sensitive	  to	  potential	  consequences	  of	  the	  act	  than	  in	  the	  overall	  character	  of	  
the	  actors.	  	  The	  final	  study	  in	  this	  series	  will	  assess	  whether	  those	  processing	  in	  the	  
promotion	  focus	  are	  more	  impacted	  by	  tacitly	  held	  moral	  ideals	  compared	  to	  those	  
processing	  in	  the	  prevention	  focus.	  
Study	  2c:	  Purity	  Ideals	  
	  
	   If	  the	  promotion	  focus	  is	  in	  fact	  associated	  with	  using	  moral	  virtues	  as	  an	  ideal	  
reference	  point	  in	  moral	  judgment,	  then	  the	  greater	  intensity	  of	  judgments	  relative	  to	  those	  
processing	  in	  the	  prevention	  focus	  should	  be	  present	  only	  when	  the	  ideal	  referent	  of	  which	  
these	  behaviors	  are	  discrepant	  is	  actually	  held	  by	  the	  individual	  making	  the	  judgment.	  	  
Furthermore,	  this	  effect	  would	  establish	  that	  the	  intuitions	  used	  in	  the	  promotion	  focus	  are	  
based	  on	  something	  specific	  and	  morally	  relevant	  (i.e.,	  an	  ideal	  referent),	  rather	  than	  just	  
some	  generalized	  “gut”	  reaction.	  	  Using	  moral	  foundations	  theory,	  this	  study	  explores	  
whether	  the	  difference	  found	  in	  previous	  studies	  is	  only	  present	  among	  those	  who	  place	  an	  
emphasis	  on	  ideals	  of	  sexual	  purity,	  measured	  here	  by	  the	  purity/sanctity	  foundation	  of	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moral	  foundations	  theory	  (Graham	  et	  al,	  2011).	  	  Moral	  foundations	  theory	  connects	  these	  
foundations	  to	  moral	  intuitions	  (Graham,	  Haidt,	  &	  Nosek,	  2009),	  which,	  as	  we	  have	  shown	  
above,	  should	  be	  relevant	  for	  the	  promotion	  focus	  but	  not	  the	  prevention	  focus.	  	  	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
	   We	  recruited	  63	  participants	  (28	  males	  and	  35	  females)	  from	  Amazon’s	  Mechanical	  
Turk	  for	  this	  study	  for	  the	  sum	  of	  $0.50.	  	  Since	  there	  were	  sex	  differences	  with	  respect	  to	  
the	  harm	  foundation	  (M(male)	  =	  3.67;	  M(female)	  =	  4.10;	  t(61)	  =	  -­‐2.20,	  p	  =	  0.03)	  and	  
marginally	  significant	  differences	  with	  respect	  to	  approach	  essay	  content	  (M(male)	  =	  4.5;	  
M(female)	  =	  4.89;	  t(61)	  =	  -­‐1.87),	  all	  of	  the	  following	  analyses	  controlled	  for	  sex	  differences.	  
Participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  the	  conditions	  described	  below.	  
Procedure	  
	   Prior	  to	  the	  regulatory	  focus	  induction,	  participants	  filled	  out	  the	  30-­‐item	  Moral	  
Foundations	  Questionnaire	  (MFQ;	  Graham	  et	  al,	  2011).	  	  This	  questionnaire	  consists	  of	  two	  
sets	  of	  15	  items	  asking	  first	  whether	  participants	  take	  certain	  factors	  into	  account	  when	  
making	  moral	  judgments,	  and	  then	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  agree	  or	  disagree	  with	  
particular	  moral	  statements.	  	  This	  questionnaire	  provides	  a	  score	  of	  endorsement	  in	  five	  
different	  foundations.	  Participants	  also	  filled	  out	  the	  Moral	  Motives	  Questionnaire	  (MMQ;	  
Janoff-­‐Bulman,	  Sheik,	  &	  Baldacci,	  2008)	  after	  the	  Moral	  Foundations	  Questionnaire.	  	  
	   Following	  these	  questionnaires,	  in	  a	  manner	  identical	  to	  that	  in	  Studies	  1,	  2a,	  and	  
2b,	  participants	  were	  induced	  into	  either	  a	  promotion	  or	  a	  prevention	  state	  using	  the	  
Regulatory	  Focus	  Induction	  Instrument	  described	  above.	  	  They	  were	  then	  presented	  with	  
the	  same	  moral	  scenarios	  as	  in	  the	  other	  studies	  in	  the	  same	  order.	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Results	  
	   Manipulation	  Checks.	  	  Essays	  were	  rated	  in	  the	  manner	  done	  in	  previous	  studies.	  	  
Interrater	  reliability	  was	  very	  high	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  the	  content	  reflected	  ideals	  (α	  =	  
0.91)	  or	  oughts	  (α	  =	  0.89),	  and	  whether	  the	  essay	  was	  about	  approaching	  something	  
positive	  (α	  =	  0.85).	  	  Reliability	  was	  relatively	  good	  for	  whether	  the	  essay	  was	  about	  
avoiding	  something	  negative	  (α	  =	  0.62).	  	  Essays	  written	  by	  those	  in	  the	  promotion	  
condition	  (M(ideals)	  =	  4.86;	  M(oughts)	  =	  1.02)	  were	  rated	  as	  significantly	  more	  about	  
ideals	  (β	  =	  0.89,	  t(60)	  =	  15.76,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  and	  significantly	  less	  about	  oughts	  (β	  =	  -­‐0.89,	  
t(60)	  =	  -­‐15.26,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  compared	  to	  those	  written	  by	  participants	  in	  the	  prevention	  
condition	  (M(ideals)	  =	  1.58;	  M(oughts)	  =	  4.40).	  	  As	  in	  Studies	  1	  and	  2b,	  the	  conditions	  did	  
not	  differ	  significantly	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  the	  essays	  were	  more	  about	  approaching	  a	  
positive	  (t	  <	  1)	  or	  avoiding	  a	  negative	  (t	  <	  1).	  
	   Morality	  Surveys.	  As	  expected,	  only	  the	  purity/sanctity	  foundation	  from	  the	  MFQ	  
was	  significantly	  related	  to	  judgments	  of	  incest	  (β	  =	  0.28,	  t(60)	  =	  2.31,	  p	  =	  0.02).	  	  This	  is	  
consistent	  with	  research	  that	  has	  described	  incest	  as	  a	  paradigmatic	  “purity”	  violation	  
(Horberg	  et	  al,	  2009;	  Young	  &	  Saxe,	  2010).	  None	  of	  the	  other	  foundations	  was	  significantly	  
related	  to	  judgments	  of	  incest	  (harm/care:	  β	  =	  0.21,	  t(60)	  =	  1.63,	  p	  =	  0.11;	  
fairness/reciprocity:	  t	  <	  1;	  ingroup/loyalty:	  t	  <	  1;	  authority/respect:	  t	  <	  1).	  These	  results	  
provide	  further	  evidence	  for	  the	  domain	  specificity	  of	  the	  MFQ.	  In	  contrast,	  none	  of	  the	  
moral	  motive	  areas	  from	  the	  MMQ	  was	  significantly	  related	  to	  judgments	  of	  incest	  (self-­‐
restraint:	  β	  =	  0.14,	  t(60)	  =	  1.14,	  p	  =	  0.26;	  self-­‐reliance:	  t	  <	  1;	  social	  justice:	  t	  <	  1;	  social	  
order:	  β	  =	  0.13,	  t(60)	  =	  1.01,	  p	  =	  0.32).	  	  Given	  these	  results,	  the	  analyses	  examining	  the	  
impact	  of	  regulatory	  focus	  below	  make	  exclusive	  use	  of	  the	  results	  from	  the	  purity	  
	  54	  
foundation.	  
	   Regulatory	  Focus.	  Consistent	  with	  our	  previous	  studies,	  those	  in	  the	  promotion	  
ideal	  condition	  viewed	  incest	  as	  more	  wrong	  (mean	  score	  =	  7.43)	  than	  those	  in	  the	  
prevention	  ought	  condition	  (mean	  score	  =	  7.12),	  though	  the	  overall	  effect	  in	  this	  study	  was	  
not	  significant.14	  	  However,	  this	  appears	  to	  be	  due	  to	  those	  participants	  that	  rated	  
themselves	  low	  in	  purity	  concerns.	  	  If	  purity	  concerns	  are	  divided	  by	  median	  split,	  the	  
previously	  found	  effect	  of	  promotion-­‐focused	  individuals	  judging	  incest	  as	  more	  wrong	  
than	  prevention-­‐focused	  individuals	  attains	  significance	  among	  those	  high	  in	  purity	  
concerns	  (β	  =	  0.34,	  t(30)	  =	  2.05,	  p	  =	  0.05).15	  	  There	  is	  no	  significant	  regulatory	  focus	  effect	  
among	  those	  low	  in	  purity	  (t(27)	  <	  1).16	  Looked	  at	  another	  way	  that	  relates	  to	  the	  central	  
purpose	  of	  Study	  2c,	  purity	  concerns	  significantly	  predict	  moral	  judgment	  intensity	  in	  the	  
promotion	  condition	  (β	  =	  0.60,	  t(27)	  =	  3.92,	  p	  =	  0.001),17	  but	  not	  in	  the	  prevention	  
condition	  (t(30)	  <	  1),18	  suggesting	  a	  difference	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  judgment	  consistent	  with	  
our	  hypotheses.	  	  As	  one	  might	  expect	  given	  these	  main	  effects,	  there	  is	  a	  significant	  
interaction	  between	  regulatory	  focus	  induction	  and	  purity	  concerns	  (β	  =	  0.65,	  t(58)	  =	  2.00,	  
p	  =	  0.05).19	  	  This	  effect	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3.7.	  
	   Regarding	  variance	  differences,	  similar	  to	  the	  results	  above,	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  It	  is	  worth	  noting	  here	  that	  the	  intensity	  of	  judgments	  of	  moral	  wrongness	  in	  this	  study	  were	  marginally	  
significantly	  lower	  than	  the	  mean	  from	  Study	  2a	  (t(62)	  =	  -­‐1.84,	  p	  =	  0.07)	  and	  significantly	  lower	  than	  the	  
mean	  from	  Study	  2b	  (t(62)	  =	  -­‐2.63,	  p	  =	  0.01),	  suggesting	  that	  filling	  out	  morality	  questionnaires	  prior	  to	  
making	  judgments	  (the	  only	  difference	  between	  this	  study	  and	  Studies	  2a	  and	  2b)	  may	  influence	  the	  intensity	  
of	  those	  judgments.	  
15	  This	  relation	  is	  only	  marginally	  significant	  when	  not	  controlling	  for	  sex	  differences	  (β	  =	  0.32,	  t(31)	  =	  1.88,	  p	  
=	  0.07),	  but	  remains	  significant	  when	  controlling	  for	  approach	  and	  avoidance	  content	  (β	  =	  0.36,	  t(28)	  =	  2.18,	  p	  
=	  0.04).	  
16	  This	  remained	  non-­‐significant	  when	  not	  controlling	  for	  sex	  differences	  (t	  <	  1).	  	  
17	  This	  is	  also	  significant	  when	  not	  controlling	  for	  sex	  differences	  (β	  =	  0.61,	  t(28)	  =	  4.03,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  
18	  Again,	  this	  remained	  non-­‐significant	  when	  not	  controlling	  for	  sex	  differences	  (t	  <	  1).	  
19	  This	  effect	  is	  only	  marginally	  significant	  when	  not	  controlling	  for	  sex	  differences	  (β	  =	  0.61,	  t(59)	  =	  1.90,	  p	  =	  
0.06)	  or	  when	  controlling	  for	  approach	  and	  avoidance	  content	  (β	  =	  0.65,	  t(56)	  =	  1.96,	  p	  =	  0.06).	  
	  55	  
	  
Figure	  3.7:	  Moral	  wrongness	  of	  incest	  over	  regulatory	  focus	  priming	  by	  endorsement	  of	  the	  
purity/sanctity	  moral	  foundation	  (error	  bars	  represent	  +/-­‐	  1	  standard	  error	  relative	  to	  the	  
mean).	  
	  
difference	  in	  variance	  between	  those	  induced	  into	  a	  prevention	  state	  (SD	  =	  2.83)	  and	  those	  
induced	  into	  a	  promotion	  state	  (SD	  =	  1.30)	  among	  those	  high	  in	  purity	  concerns	  (F(1,	  31)	  =	  
13.29,	  p	  =	  0.001).	  	  In	  contrast,	  there	  were	  no	  differences	  between	  conditions	  among	  those	  
low	  in	  purity	  concerns	  (F(1,	  28)	  <	  1).	  	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  rating	  
themselves	  as	  high	  in	  purity	  concerns	  have	  significantly	  lower	  variance	  (SD	  =	  1.30)	  
compared	  to	  those	  rating	  themselves	  as	  low	  in	  purity	  concerns	  (SD	  =	  2.71)	  when	  induced	  
into	  a	  promotion	  focus	  (F(1,	  28)	  =	  15.35,	  p	  =	  0.001).	  	  Among	  those	  induced	  into	  a	  
prevention	  focus,	  variance	  did	  not	  seem	  to	  vary	  regardless	  of	  whether	  they	  rated	  
themselves	  high	  (SD	  =	  2.83)	  or	  low	  (SD	  =	  2.85)	  in	  purity	  concerns	  (F(1,	  31)	  <	  1).	  	  The	  
variance	  of	  responses	  across	  conditions	  is	  available	  in	  graph	  form	  in	  Figure	  3.8.	  
	   Thus	  we	  see	  in	  this	  study	  that	  the	  differences	  arising	  from	  the	  different	  moral	  





































Figure	  3.8:	  The	  impact	  of	  regulatory	  focus	  and	  purity	  concerns	  on	  the	  variance	  of	  moral	  
judgments	  of	  incest.	  
	  
virtuous	  point	  of	  reference	  in	  question	  as	  morally	  relevant.	  	  Thus	  there	  were	  only	  
significant	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  reference	  points	  among	  those	  high	  in	  purity	  
foundation	  endorsement.	  	  Among	  those	  low	  in	  purity	  foundation	  endorsement,	  presumably	  
all	  judgment	  was	  made	  deliberatively	  with	  respect	  to	  an	  obligatory	  reference	  point.	  
	   Though	  the	  effects	  in	  the	  previous	  three	  studies	  belie	  the	  possibility	  that	  those	  in	  the	  
promotion	  focus	  always	  show	  more	  intense	  moral	  judgments	  than	  those	  processing	  in	  the	  
prevention	  focus,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  continue	  to	  establish	  boundary	  conditions.	  	  Another	  
such	  boundary	  condition	  is	  situations	  that	  involve	  both	  vice	  and	  transgression.	  These	  
situations	  should	  produce	  equally	  intense	  judgments	  in	  promotion	  and	  prevention.	  	  
Study	  3a:	  Boundary	  Conditions	  
	  
	   This	  study	  was	  designed	  to	  discover	  another	  boundary	  condition	  for	  the	  effects	  
found	  in	  the	  previous	  studies.	  Study	  2b	  has	  shown	  that	  when	  actor	  negative	  consequences	  
































action	  as	  equally	  wrong	  as	  those	  processing	  in	  a	  promotion	  focus.	  	  In	  this	  study,	  we	  extend	  
this	  finding	  to	  an	  entirely	  new	  scenario	  where	  actions	  violate	  both	  promotion	  and	  
prevention	  standards.	  This	  study	  can	  provide	  convergent	  evidence	  that	  the	  difference	  in	  
judgment	  intensity	  between	  promotion	  and	  prevention	  that	  was	  found	  in	  Study	  1	  is	  related	  
to	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  standards	  themselves	  and	  not	  simply	  a	  basic	  judgment	  effect	  
that	  generalizes	  across	  all	  scenarios.	  	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
	   Eighty-­‐six	  participants	  (32	  males,	  53	  females,	  1	  unspecified)	  were	  drawn	  from	  the	  
Columbia	  Business	  School’s	  Behavioral	  Research	  Lab	  participant	  pool	  to	  complete	  the	  
survey	  for	  a	  chance	  to	  win	  a	  raffle	  prize	  of	  $75.00.	  	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  sex	  
differences	  for	  any	  of	  the	  variables	  of	  interest	  in	  the	  study.	  	  Participants	  were	  randomly	  
assigned	  to	  one	  of	  the	  three	  conditions	  described	  below.	  
Procedure	  
	   The	  study	  design	  was	  identical	  to	  that	  used	  in	  Study	  1	  except	  that	  one	  third	  of	  
participants	  were	  also	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  a	  control	  condition.	  	  This	  condition,	  based	  off	  
the	  one	  used	  by	  Cornwell	  and	  Higgins	  (2013),	  involved	  writing	  an	  essay	  about	  behaviors	  or	  
activities	  that	  could	  be	  either	  promotion	  or	  prevention	  behaviors,	  worded	  as	  follows:	  
For	  this	  task,	  we	  would	  like	  you	  to	  think	  about	  how	  your	  current	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  
behaviors	  and	  activities	  are	  different	  now	  from	  what	  they	  were	  when	  you	  
were	  growing	  up.	  In	  other	  words,	  what	  sorts	  of	  things	  do	  you	  do	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐
day	  basis	  at	  this	  point	  in	  your	  life?	  What	  did	  you	  do	  regularly	  when	  you	  were	  
a	  child?	  In	  the	  space	  below,	  please	  write	  a	  brief	  essay	  describing	  how	  your	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behaviors	  and	  activities	  have	  changed	  from	  when	  you	  were	  a	  child	  to	  now.	  
Following	  the	  priming,	  in	  this	  study,	  scenarios	  were	  presented	  in	  random	  order	  to	  
participants,	  the	  incest	  scenario	  among	  them.	  	  Importantly,	  and	  most	  germane	  to	  the	  
specific	  aim	  of	  this	  study,	  we	  also	  included	  a	  cheating	  scenario	  (replacing	  the	  littering	  
scenario)	  where	  both	  deontic	  and	  aretaic	  failures	  were	  present	  in	  order	  to	  show	  that	  when	  
a	  case	  was	  relevant	  to	  both	  systems	  of	  judgment	  there	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  a	  difference	  
between	  promotion	  and	  prevention.	  The	  cheating	  scenario	  was	  worded	  as	  follows:	  
A	  student	  is	  taking	  an	  exam	  for	  which	  he	  did	  not	  study.	  He	  repeatedly	  cheats	  
by	  copying	  answers	  off	  of	  the	  girl	  sitting	  next	  to	  him,	  who	  he	  knows	  studied	  
for	  the	  exam	  thoroughly.	  He	  doesn’t	  score	  as	  well	  as	  she	  does,	  but	  he	  does	  
much	  better	  than	  he	  would	  have	  had	  he	  not	  cheated	  off	  her	  exam.	  
This	  scenario	  contains	  elements	  of	  both	  kinds	  of	  judgment.	  	  On	  the	  prevention	  deontic	  side,	  
cheating	  on	  an	  exam	  violates	  a	  rule	  that,	  when	  not	  upheld,	  undermines	  the	  entire	  
enterprise	  of	  test	  taking;	  that	  is,	  avoiding	  this	  behavior	  avoids	  a	  loss.	  	  On	  the	  promotion	  
aretaic	  side,	  cheating	  reveals	  a	  moral	  vice,	  showing	  contempt	  for	  virtues	  like	  honesty,	  
integrity,	  and	  industry,	  and	  supplanting	  them	  for	  self-­‐interest	  in	  the	  form	  of	  a	  good	  grade	  
that	  is	  more	  banal;	  that	  is,	  avoiding	  this	  behavior	  avoids	  a	  non-­‐gain.	  	  We	  should	  therefore	  
expect	  no	  difference	  between	  the	  promotion	  and	  prevention	  groups	  when	  judging	  this	  
scenario.	  
Results	  
	   Manipulation	  Checks.	  	  As	  in	  the	  previous	  studies,	  two	  raters	  blind	  to	  experimental	  
condition	  judged	  the	  content	  of	  the	  essays	  provided	  during	  motivational	  priming.	  	  
Interrater	  reliability	  was	  high	  with	  regard	  to	  ratings	  of	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  essays	  were	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about	  ideals	  (α	  =	  0.86)	  or	  oughts	  (α	  =	  0.74),	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  the	  essay	  was	  
written	  about	  approaching	  positives	  (α	  =	  0.88).	  	  It	  was	  also	  moderately	  good	  for	  whether	  
the	  essay	  was	  written	  about	  avoiding	  negatives	  (α	  =	  0.68).	  	  Those	  induced	  into	  a	  promotion	  
focus	  (M	  =	  4.59)	  were	  rated	  as	  writing	  essays	  with	  content	  significantly	  more	  reflective	  of	  
ideals	  compared	  to	  those	  in	  the	  prevention	  condition	  (M	  =	  1.79;	  t(54)	  =	  -­‐11.25,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  
and	  those	  in	  the	  control	  condition	  (M	  =	  1.67;	  t(55)	  =	  -­‐12.17,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  	  Similarly,	  those	  in	  
the	  prevention	  condition	  (M	  =	  4.37)	  wrote	  essays	  significantly	  more	  about	  oughts	  
compared	  to	  those	  in	  the	  promotion	  condition	  (M	  =	  1.57;	  t(54)	  =	  -­‐13.80,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  and	  
those	  in	  the	  control	  condition	  (M	  =	  2.58;	  t(57)	  =	  -­‐6.76,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  	  	  
	   With	  respect	  to	  avoiding	  negatives,	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  
the	  promotion	  and	  prevention	  conditions	  (t(54)	  =	  -­‐1.49,	  p	  =	  0.14),	  nor	  were	  there	  
differences	  between	  the	  promotion	  condition	  and	  control	  condition	  (t	  <	  1)	  or	  prevention	  
condition	  and	  the	  control	  condition	  (t(57)	  =	  -­‐1.08,	  p	  =	  0.28).	  With	  respect	  to	  approaching	  
positives,	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  between	  those	  induced	  into	  promotion	  
compared	  to	  those	  induced	  into	  prevention	  (t	  <	  1).	  Those	  induced	  into	  promotion	  wrote	  
essays	  marginally	  significantly	  more	  about	  approaching	  positives	  (M	  =	  4.67)	  than	  those	  in	  
the	  control	  condition	  (M	  =	  4.23;	  t(55)	  =	  -­‐1.67,	  p	  =	  0.10,	  95%	  CI(difference)	  =	  [-­‐0.95,	  0.09])	  
and	  those	  in	  the	  prevention	  condition	  wrote	  essays	  significantly	  more	  about	  approaching	  
positives	  (M	  =	  4.76)	  compared	  to	  those	  in	  the	  control	  condition	  (M	  =	  4.23;	  t(58)	  =	  -­‐2.04,	  p	  =	  
0.05).	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  we	  control	  for	  approach	  content	  in	  all	  the	  following	  analyses.	  	  
	   Incest	  Judgments.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  results	  of	  our	  previous	  studies,	  a	  regression	  
treating	  the	  motivational	  induction	  as	  a	  categorical	  variable	  found	  that	  those	  who	  were	  
induced	  into	  a	  promotion	  focus	  found	  incest	  marginally	  significantly	  more	  wrong	  than	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those	  induced	  into	  a	  prevention	  focus	  (β	  =	  0.21,	  t(82)	  =	  1.70,	  p	  =	  0.09).20	  	  The	  difference,	  
though	  present,	  was	  not	  as	  strong	  as	  in	  previous	  studies,	  presumably	  due	  to	  the	  effects	  
seen	  in	  Study	  2c.	  	  That	  is,	  college	  students	  as	  a	  group	  are	  more	  liberal	  than	  the	  general	  
population	  (even	  that	  portion	  of	  the	  population	  found	  on	  Mechanical	  Turk)	  and	  thus	  may	  
have	  lower	  levels	  of	  purity	  concerns	  as	  well	  (Graham,	  Haidt,	  &	  Nosek,	  2009).	  	  Since	  the	  
effect	  is	  weakened	  when	  purity	  concerns	  are	  not	  high,	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  effect	  would	  
be	  somewhat	  smaller	  among	  college	  students.	  
	   Though	  the	  mean	  differences	  were	  less	  pronounced	  in	  this	  study,	  importantly,	  the	  
variance	  differences	  were	  strongly	  consistent	  with	  previous	  studies.	  We	  tested	  whether	  the	  
variance	  differences	  between	  conditions	  replicated	  from	  previous	  studies,	  and	  using	  the	  
same	  technique	  used	  in	  previous	  studies,	  we	  did	  find	  significant	  differences	  among	  the	  
groups	  (F(2,	  83)	  =	  3.59,	  p	  =	  0.03).	  Examining	  the	  standard	  deviation	  in	  each	  condition	  
shows	  a	  step-­‐wise	  reduction	  in	  variance	  from	  the	  prevention	  condition	  (SD	  =	  2.96),	  
through	  the	  control	  condition	  (SD	  =	  2.13),	  down	  to	  the	  promotion	  condition	  (SD	  =	  1.65).	  	  
Inspecting	  each	  contrast	  revealed	  that,	  similar	  to	  the	  mean	  differences	  above,	  this	  
difference	  is	  apparently	  driven	  by	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  promotion	  and	  prevention	  
conditions	  (F(1,	  54)	  =	  6.86,	  p	  =	  0.01).	  	  These	  effects	  are	  most	  clearly	  seen	  by	  examining	  a	  
graph	  of	  the	  variance	  of	  responses,	  which	  is	  shown	  in	  Figure	  3.9.	  	  These	  results	  are	  
consistent	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  supported	  by	  previous	  studies	  that	  the	  mean	  differences	  are	  
driven	  by	  a	  significantly	  different	  manner	  of	  making	  moral	  judgments	  where	  the	  deontic	  
value	  processing	  of	  prevention	  considers	  a	  judgment	  of	  “not	  wrong	  at	  all”	  when	  negative	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  This	  effect	  was	  still	  marginally	  significant	  when	  not	  controlling	  for	  approach	  content	  (β	  =	  0.21,	  t(83)	  =	  1.66,	  
p	  =	  0.10).	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Figure	  3.9:	  The	  impact	  of	  motivational	  induction	  on	  the	  variance	  of	  responses.	  
	  
consequences	  are	  absent.	  
	   Cheating	  Judgments.	  Unlike	  the	  judgments	  of	  incest,	  a	  regression	  found,	  as	  
predicted,	  no	  differences	  in	  judgment	  intensity	  between	  the	  promotion	  and	  prevention	  
groups	  (t	  <	  1).21	  	  This	  is	  apparently	  due	  to	  those	  in	  the	  prevention	  condition	  judging	  
cheating	  more	  harshly	  than	  incest	  because	  the	  cheating	  scenario	  has	  negative	  
consequences	  and	  the	  incest	  scenario	  does	  not.	  	  Paired	  t-­‐tests	  comparing	  within-­‐subjects	  
moral	  judgments	  in	  the	  cheating	  scenario	  to	  those	  in	  the	  incest	  scenario	  found	  significant	  
differences	  only	  for	  those	  induced	  into	  a	  prevention	  focus	  (t(28)	  =	  2.63,	  p	  =	  0.01),	  but	  not	  
for	  those	  induced	  into	  a	  promotion	  focus	  (t(26)	  =	  1.20,	  p	  =	  0.24),	  nor	  those	  in	  the	  control	  
condition	  (t	  <	  1).	  	  These	  comparisons	  are	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3.10.	  Also	  in	  contrast	  to	  the	  
incest	  judgments,	  there	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  in	  the	  variance	  between	  the	  groups	  
for	  the	  cheating	  scenario	  (F(2,	  83)	  =	  1.29,	  p	  =	  0.28).	  	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  






























Figure	  3.10:	  The	  impact	  of	  motivational	  induction	  on	  judgments	  of	  moral	  wrongness	  of	  
incest	  and	  cheating	  (error	  bars	  represent	  +/-­‐	  1	  standard	  error	  relative	  to	  the	  mean).	  
	  
prevention	  processing	  of	  moral	  judgments	  is	  uniquely	  interested	  in	  their	  deontic	  value,	  
rather	  than	  their	  aretaic	  value,	  since	  the	  cheating	  scenario,	  unlike	  the	  incest	  scenario,	  
contained	  a	  deontic	  wrong	  that	  eliminated	  a	  judgment	  of	  “not	  wrong	  at	  all,”	  thereby	  
reducing	  the	  variance	  in	  judgments	  relative	  to	  judgments	  of	  incest.	  	  
	   These	  results	  show	  that	  the	  effects	  found	  in	  the	  previous	  studies	  were	  not	  due	  to	  
those	  processing	  in	  a	  promotion	  focus	  simply	  providing	  more	  intense	  negative	  judgments	  
in	  general.	  	  Rather	  the	  judgments	  show	  differences	  when	  the	  two	  different	  reference	  points	  
cause	  those	  doing	  the	  judging	  to	  reach	  two	  different	  moral	  conclusions.	  	  In	  a	  situation	  
where	  behavior	  is	  discrepant	  from	  both	  kinds	  standards,	  there	  is	  no	  difference	  between	  
conditions.	  	  This	  is	  important	  to	  note,	  since,	  even	  between	  philosophers	  of	  completely	  
different	  schools,	  there	  is	  more	  agreement	  in	  the	  content	  of	  morality	  than	  not	  (MacIntyre,	  
1981).	  	  However,	  this	  study	  also	  raises	  a	  potentially	  problematic	  possibility:	  perhaps	  the	  
































we	  address	  this	  potential	  issue	  by	  extending	  the	  effect	  to	  an	  additional	  intuition-­‐related	  
scenario.	  
Study	  3b:	  Extensions	  
	  
This	  study	  will	  determine	  whether	  the	  effect	  of	  promotion	  making	  more	  severe	  
negative	  judgments	  than	  prevention	  generalizes	  beyond	  the	  prototypical	  incest	  scenario	  to	  
another	  scenario	  involving	  intuitive	  moral	  judgments;	  specifically,	  whether	  or	  not	  it	  is	  
moral	  to	  eat	  one’s	  dog	  (Haidt,	  Koller,	  &	  Dias,	  1993).	  This	  study	  will	  also	  include	  an	  
approach/avoidance	  induction	  to	  show	  that	  the	  important	  distinction	  is,	  in	  fact,	  the	  ideal	  
(promotion)/ought	  (prevention)	  distinction.	  Finally,	  this	  study	  will	  induce	  the	  regulatory	  
focus	  induction	  in	  a	  different	  manner	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  effect	  is	  not	  restricted	  to	  a	  
particular	  type	  of	  focus	  induction.	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
	   One	  hundred	  seventeen	  participants	  were	  recruited	  from	  Amazon’s	  Mechanical	  
Turk	  online	  panel	  for	  the	  sum	  of	  50	  cents.	  	  Participants	  consisted	  of	  65	  males	  and	  52	  
females.	  	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  sex	  differences	  for	  any	  of	  the	  measures	  involved	  in	  the	  
study.	  	  Participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  the	  four	  conditions	  described	  below.	  
Procedures	  
	   In	  this	  study,	  participants	  were	  randomized	  into	  one	  of	  four	  conditions—prevention	  
approach,	  prevention	  avoidance,	  promotion	  approach,	  and	  promotion	  avoidance—using	  a	  
well-­‐established	  method	  (Cesario,	  Grant,	  &	  Higgins,	  2004).	  	  The	  method	  induces	  one	  of	  the	  
above	  states	  by	  asking	  participants	  to	  list	  either	  a	  goal	  that	  they	  “ought”	  to	  do	  (prevention)	  
or	  a	  goal	  that	  they	  “ideally”	  would	  like	  to	  do	  (promotion).	  	  They	  were	  then	  prompted	  to	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describe	  a	  tactic	  to	  either	  “avoid	  anything	  that	  could	  go	  wrong”	  (avoidance)	  or	  “make	  sure	  
that	  everything	  goes	  right”	  (approach)	  in	  order	  that	  the	  goal	  be	  realized.	  If	  the	  distinction	  
between	  promotion	  and	  prevention	  is	  reducible	  to	  approach	  versus	  avoidance,	  then	  the	  
two	  manipulations	  should	  have	  parallel	  effects.	  Following	  the	  induction,	  participants	  were	  
presented	  with	  the	  same	  scenarios	  and	  questions	  in	  the	  same	  order	  as	  those	  presented	  in	  
the	  previous	  studies	  (including	  the	  incest	  scenario),	  except	  that	  one	  of	  the	  scenarios	  (the	  
littering	  scenario)	  was	  replaced	  with	  the	  familiar	  dog-­‐eating	  scenario	  from	  Haidt,	  Koller,	  &	  
Dias	  (1993).	  	  It	  was	  worded	  as	  follows:	  
A	  family	  has	  had	  a	  dog	  for	  almost	  twelve	  years	  and	  has	  become	  very	  attached	  
to	  it.	  One	  day	  the	  dog	  is	  playing	  in	  the	  street	  and	  gets	  hit	  by	  a	  truck	  and	  is	  
killed.	  The	  family	  decides	  to	  bring	  home	  the	  body,	  cook	  it,	  and	  eat	  it.	  They	  
bury	  the	  remains	  in	  the	  backyard.	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  deontic	  judgment,	  there	  are	  no	  obvious	  negative	  consequences	  of	  this	  
behavior	  nor	  are	  any	  universal	  necessary	  laws	  broken.	  	  However,	  one	  may	  judge	  the	  use	  of	  
a	  pet	  for	  food	  to	  be	  supplanting	  higher	  ideals	  (e.g.,	  love,	  respect)	  for	  baser	  ones	  (e.g.	  
satisfaction	  of	  hunger),	  and	  thus	  judge	  it	  to	  be	  wrong	  in	  an	  aretaic	  manner.	  	  	  
Results	  
	   Manipulation	  Checks.	  	  In	  a	  manner	  similar	  to	  previous	  studies,	  two	  raters	  blind	  to	  
experimental	  condition	  judged	  the	  essays	  provided	  by	  participants.	  In	  this	  study,	  the	  goal	  
was	  judged	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  it	  represented	  an	  ideal	  or	  an	  ought,	  and	  the	  tactic	  was	  
judged	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  it	  was	  an	  approach	  or	  avoidance	  tactic.	  	  Interrater	  
reliability	  was	  high	  for	  all	  judgments	  including	  ideals	  (α	  =	  0.87),	  oughts	  (α	  =	  0.88),	  
approach	  (α	  =	  0.72),	  and	  avoidance	  (α	  =	  0.75).	  	  Consistent	  with	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  study,	  those	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induced	  into	  promotion	  (M(ideals)	  =	  4.39;	  M(oughts)	  =	  1.62)	  chose	  goals	  rated	  significantly	  
more	  as	  ideals	  (t(115)	  =	  -­‐10.56,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  and	  significantly	  less	  as	  oughts	  (t(115)	  =	  10.68,	  
p	  <	  0.001)	  compared	  to	  those	  induced	  into	  prevention	  (M(ideals)	  =	  2.11;	  M(oughts)	  =	  3.94).	  	  
There	  were	  no	  differences	  with	  respect	  to	  approach	  (t	  <	  1)	  or	  avoidance	  (t	  <	  1)	  dependent	  
upon	  whether	  participants	  were	  induced	  into	  the	  ideal	  or	  ought	  condition.	  Conversely,	  
those	  who	  were	  induced	  into	  the	  approach	  condition	  (M(approach)	  =	  4.44;	  M(avoidance)	  =	  
1.74)	  wrote	  strategies	  rated	  as	  significantly	  higher	  in	  approach	  (t(115)	  =	  -­‐4.77,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  
and	  lower	  in	  avoidance	  (t(115)	  =	  4.31,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  compared	  to	  those	  induced	  into	  the	  
avoidance	  condition	  (M(approach)	  =	  3.46;	  M(avoidance)	  =	  2.71).	  	  There	  were	  no	  
differences	  based	  on	  whether	  an	  approach	  strategy	  or	  an	  avoidance	  strategy	  was	  used	  
either	  for	  ratings	  of	  ideals	  (t	  <	  1)	  or	  oughts	  (t	  <	  1).	  
	   Ideals/Oughts;	  Approach/Avoidance.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  results	  of	  the	  previous	  
studies,	  those	  asked	  to	  develop	  a	  strategy	  with	  respect	  to	  an	  ideal	  goal	  judged	  incest	  as	  
more	  wrong	  (M	  =	  8.26)	  than	  those	  asked	  to	  develop	  a	  strategy	  with	  respect	  to	  an	  ought	  
goal	  (M	  =	  7.45;	  β	  =	  0.20,	  t(115)	  =	  2.20,	  p	  =	  0.03).22	  	  In	  contrast,	  there	  was	  no	  effect	  of	  
approach	  versus	  avoidance	  on	  moral	  judgment	  intensity	  (t	  <	  1).23	  Similarly,	  those	  primed	  
with	  ideals	  judged	  the	  dog-­‐eating	  family	  as	  significantly	  more	  wrong	  (M	  =	  7.74)	  than	  those	  	  
primed	  with	  oughts	  (M	  =	  6.77;	  β	  =	  0.21,	  t(115)	  =	  2.34,	  p	  =	  0.02)	  with	  no	  impact	  of	  the	  
approach	  and	  avoidance	  distinction	  (t	  <	  1).24	  These	  effects	  are	  illustrated	  in	  Figures	  3.11	  
(incest)	  and	  3.12	  (dog-­‐eating).	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  This	  was	  true	  even	  controlling	  for	  approach	  and	  avoidance	  content	  (β	  =	  0.20,	  t(114)	  =	  2.22,	  p	  =	  0.03).	  
23	  This	  effect	  remains	  non-­‐significant	  when	  controlling	  for	  ideal	  or	  ought	  content	  (t	  <	  1).	  
24	  Again,	  these	  effects	  remained	  for	  ideal	  vs.	  ought	  controlling	  for	  approach/avoidance	  (β	  =	  0.22,	  t(114)	  =	  2.40,	  
p	  =	  0.02)	  and	  for	  approach	  vs.	  avoidance	  controlling	  for	  ideal/ought	  (t	  <	  1).	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Figure	  3.11:	  Moral	  wrongness	  of	  incest	  over	  regulatory	  focus	  priming	  by	  approach	  versus	  
avoidance	  priming	  (error	  bars	  represent	  +/-­‐	  1	  standard	  error	  relative	  to	  the	  mean).	  
	  
	  
	   We	  were	  also	  interested	  in	  whether	  the	  variance	  effect	  found	  in	  Study	  5	  was	  also	  
found	  in	  this	  study	  that	  used	  a	  different	  manipulation	  of	  focus.	  Indeed,	  we	  did	  find	  using	  a	  
robust	  variance	  comparison	  test	  that	  the	  variance	  for	  the	  prevention-­‐ought	  condition	  was	  
significantly	  greater	  than	  the	  variance	  for	  the	  promotion-­‐ideal	  condition	  for	  both	  the	  incest	  
scenario	  (ideal:	  SD	  =	  1.42;	  ought:	  SD	  =	  2.54;	  F(1,115)	  =	  8.72,	  p	  =	  0.004)	  and	  the	  dog-­‐eating	  
scenario	  (ideal:	  SD	  =	  2.04;	  ought:	  SD	  =	  2.43;	  F(1,115)	  =	  4.44,	  p	  =	  0.04).	  	  This	  again	  is	  
consistent	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  ideal/ought	  distinction	  on	  the	  severity	  of	  
judgment	  reflects	  differences	  in	  the	  manner	  of	  judgment	  associated	  with	  the	  judgment’s	  
referent.	  
3.4	   The	  Role	  of	  Virtue	  in	  Moral	  Judgment	  
	  
	   The	  results	  of	  these	  studies	  show	  that,	  consistent	  with	  the	  theoretical	  research	  of	  
social-­‐intuitionists,	  judgments	  against	  certain	  behaviors	  persist	  even	  when	  these	  behaviors	  





































Figure	  3.12:	  Moral	  wrongness	  of	  family	  dog-­‐eating	  over	  regulatory	  focus	  priming	  by	  
approach	  versus	  avoidance	  priming	  (error	  bars	  represent	  +/-­‐	  1	  standard	  error	  relative	  to	  
the	  mean).	  
	  
simply	  a	  function	  of	  particular	  emotions	  like	  disgust	  (an	  agitation-­‐related	  negative	  
emotion),	  otherwise	  such	  behaviors	  would	  be	  seen	  as	  more	  wrong	  when	  processing	  in	  the	  
prevention	  system	  rather	  than	  the	  promotion	  system	  (Higgins,	  2001).	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  does	  
not	  appear	  to	  be	  entirely	  based	  upon	  extremely	  unlikely	  negative	  consequences,	  because	  
the	  judgments	  in	  the	  promotion	  focus	  are	  unaffected	  by	  the	  introduction	  of	  actual	  negative	  
consequences	  into	  the	  scenario,	  and	  instead	  is	  related	  to	  holding	  relevant	  moral	  ideals	  and	  
being	  able	  to	  access	  them	  intuitively.	  Finally,	  the	  increased	  severity	  of	  negative	  judgments	  
for	  prevention-­‐focused	  participants	  when	  negative	  consequences	  are	  present	  (vs.	  absent)	  
in	  the	  scenario	  is	  consistent	  with	  their	  judgments	  being	  based	  on	  deliberative	  reasoning.	  
	   These	  studies	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  there	  is	  an	  alternative	  reference	  
point	  against	  which	  people	  judge	  behaviors	  beyond	  simple	  matters	  of	  basic	  duty	  and	  




































it	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  they	  would	  have	  a	  “+1”	  or	  “ideal”	  character	  to	  them.	  	  The	  most	  
familiar	  concept	  in	  the	  ethical	  philosophy	  and	  moral	  psychology	  literature	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  
a	  virtue	  or	  a	  virtuous	  character,	  against	  which	  a	  multitude	  of	  behaviors	  may	  feel	  wrong	  
even	  if	  they	  don’t	  pass	  a	  more	  “rational”	  (i.e.,	  consequential	  reasons)	  standard	  of	  duty	  and	  
obligation	  (e.g.	  a	  rule	  like	  the	  categorical	  imperative	  or	  a	  rule	  like	  the	  duty	  to	  bring	  about	  
the	  greatest	  total	  happiness).	  	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  theoretical	  work	  of	  moral	  
psychologists	  (Haidt	  &	  Joseph,	  2004;	  2007;	  Pizarro	  &	  Tannenbaum,	  2011),	  and	  provides	  
additional	  context	  to	  recent	  research	  on	  moral	  judgments	  (e.g.	  Inbar,	  Pizarro,	  &	  Cushman,	  
2011).	  
3.5	   Implications	  for	  Future	  Research	  
	  
	   We	  see	  here	  that	  the	  differences	  dividing	  moral	  psychologists	  for	  the	  past	  two	  
decades	  may,	  in	  part,	  have	  a	  motivational	  root.	  	  Judgments	  based	  on	  intuition	  do	  have	  a	  
functional	  foundation,	  but	  this	  is	  not	  generally	  accessed	  through	  deliberative	  reasoning.	  	  
Thus	  they	  should	  not	  simply	  be	  dismissed	  as	  overgeneralized	  emotional	  reactions	  to	  
aversive	  stimuli	  (Pinker,	  2002),	  nor	  should	  they	  be	  seen	  as	  necessarily	  problematic	  and	  
necessitating	  overriding	  by	  deliberative	  faculties	  (Green,	  2007).	  	  Instead	  they	  should	  be	  
seen	  as	  occupying	  an	  important	  place	  alongside	  the	  more	  universalized	  and	  analytical	  
moral	  judgments.	  	  	  
These	  standards	  should	  not	  necessarily	  be	  in	  conflict	  with	  one	  another,	  though	  at	  
times	  it	  may	  become	  necessary	  to	  choose	  between	  them.	  	  However,	  it	  has	  also	  been	  argued	  
that	  the	  two	  types	  of	  goals	  may	  actually	  in	  many	  ways	  be	  mutually	  dependent	  upon	  one	  
another,	  with	  the	  deontic	  judgments	  goals	  a	  basic	  foundation	  from	  which	  the	  aretaic	  goals	  
can	  be	  pursued	  (Timmerman,	  2005),	  and	  the	  aretaic	  goals	  providing	  a	  sense	  of	  ultimate	  
	  69	  
purpose	  or	  “spirit”	  behind	  the	  law-­‐like	  deontic	  goals	  (MacIntyre,	  1981).	  	  Without	  the	  
stability	  provided	  by	  prevention	  standards,	  promotion	  standards	  cannot	  be	  effectively	  
pursued.	  	  Without	  the	  inspiration	  of	  the	  ideal	  standards,	  the	  ought	  standards	  can	  begin	  to	  
feel	  stale	  and	  pointless.	  
	   This	  research	  also	  provides	  support	  for	  a	  renewed	  interest	  in	  virtue	  ethics	  as	  a	  
source	  of	  potential	  understanding	  regarding	  the	  way	  our	  moral	  judgments	  work.	  	  As	  
mentioned	  earlier	  in	  the	  chapter,	  philosophers	  since	  Rawls	  have	  been	  drawing	  lines	  
between	  the	  Good	  and	  the	  Right,	  often	  giving	  priority	  to	  the	  Right	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  social	  
peace	  (e.g.	  Rawls,	  1971;	  1988).	  	  However,	  others	  within	  the	  field	  of	  philosophy	  have	  argued	  
for	  the	  conceptual	  independence	  of	  the	  two	  types	  of	  moral	  standards	  (Trianosky,	  1986).	  
Indeed,	  contemporary	  explorations	  of	  one	  often	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly	  rely	  on	  the	  other	  in	  
providing	  a	  comprehensive	  understanding	  of	  how	  morality	  is	  structured	  (see,	  for	  example,	  
the	  argument	  against	  torture	  in	  Waldron,	  2005).	  	  Recent	  work	  in	  ethics,	  still	  underway,	  has	  
also	  been	  examining	  precisely	  how	  virtue	  ethics	  can	  provide	  standards	  of	  judgment	  
(Swanton,	  2001).	  	  All	  of	  this	  research	  should	  be	  of	  considerable	  interest	  to	  moral	  
psychologists.	  	  
	   In	  terms	  of	  other	  theories	  of	  psychology,	  this	  research	  has	  quite	  a	  number	  of	  
implications.	  	  Different	  reference	  points	  mean	  different	  ways	  of	  applying	  moral	  foundations	  
(Graham	  et	  al,	  2011),	  as	  well	  as	  possible	  differences	  in	  the	  relative	  emphasis	  on	  avoiding	  
moral	  wrongs	  or	  approaching	  moral	  rights	  (Janoff-­‐Bulman,	  Sheikh,	  &	  Hepp,	  2009).	  	  There	  is	  
also	  research	  on	  moral	  judgment	  showing	  differences	  between	  actions	  causing	  “impurity”	  
and	  those	  causing	  “harm”	  (Young	  &	  Saxe,	  2010).	  	  Perhaps	  ideals	  of	  perfection	  are	  related	  to	  
the	  former	  type	  of	  judgment,	  whereas	  obligations	  associated	  with	  social	  peace	  are	  related	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to	  the	  latter	  type.	  	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  understanding	  moral	  judgments	  as	  judgments	  of	  an	  
action’s	  relation	  to	  particular	  standards	  or	  reference	  points,	  and	  then	  further	  recognizing	  
that	  two	  distinct	  kinds	  of	  standards	  exist,	  has	  the	  potential	  to	  systematize	  many	  of	  the	  
unexplained	  phenomena	  arising	  within	  moral	  psychology	  as	  a	  field	  ever	  since	  the	  social	  
intuitionist	  approach	  was	  first	  proposed	  (Haidt,	  2001).	  
	   Morality,	  however,	  is	  not	  simply	  about	  defining	  the	  terms	  in	  which	  we	  perceive	  and	  
evaluate	  the	  world.	  It	  is	  also	  about	  how	  we	  engage	  with	  it.	  	  Moral	  standards	  don’t	  simply	  
provide	  reference	  points	  for	  our	  judgments	  of	  ourselves	  and	  others,	  they	  also	  provide	  
guides	  for	  behavior	  and	  decision	  making.	  	  In	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  review	  research	  showing	  
how	  this	  regulatory	  focus	  lens	  of	  seeing	  the	  distinction	  between	  duty	  and	  virtue	  can	  lead	  to	  
advances	  in	  understanding	  moral	  decision	  making	  and	  moral	  behavior	  as	  well.	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Chapter	  4:	  Moral	  Decisions	  -­‐	  Virtue	  as	  Self-­‐Guide	  
	  
	   The	  previous	  chapter	  introduced	  the	  idea	  that	  perceptions	  of	  value	  can	  be	  related	  to	  
two	  different	  kinds	  of	  standards,	  oughts	  and	  ideals,	  with	  the	  latter	  being	  theoretically	  
associated	  with	  theories	  of	  virtue	  and	  showing	  patterns	  consistent	  with	  theories	  of	  virtue	  
in	  the	  philosophy	  literature.	  	  This	  is	  only	  one	  area	  of	  moral	  psychology,	  though	  one	  that	  has	  
received	  considerable	  attention	  by	  psychologists	  throughout	  the	  study	  of	  morality.	  	  
Another	  important	  area,	  one	  less	  comprehensively	  studied,	  but	  still	  examined	  throughout	  
psychology’s	  history	  (e.g.	  Hartshorne	  &	  May,	  1928;	  Darley	  &	  Batson,	  1973;	  Rushton,	  
Chrisjohn,	  &	  Fekken,	  1981),	  is	  the	  area	  of	  moral	  behavior.	  	  Essentially,	  assuming	  that	  
human	  beings	  are,	  like	  other	  animals,	  motivated	  by	  self-­‐interest,	  what	  compels	  or	  
encourages	  them	  to	  act	  in	  line	  with	  moral	  values	  and	  standards?	  	  In	  a	  phrase:	  why	  be	  good?	  	  
	   This	  chapter	  will	  be	  devoted	  to	  understanding	  how	  moral	  values	  translate	  into	  
moral	  behavior	  through	  self-­‐control.	  	  It	  is	  in	  this	  area	  where	  the	  modern	  view,	  derived	  from	  
a	  Freudian	  model	  of	  motivation—that	  morality	  is	  essentially	  in	  conflict	  with	  happiness—is	  
most	  apparent.	  	  This	  view	  is	  that	  people	  will	  behave	  in	  a	  self-­‐interested	  manner	  unless	  they	  
are	  otherwise	  impeded	  by	  social	  pressure,	  the	  threat	  of	  punishment,	  or	  internalized	  moral	  
norms	  (Freud,	  1933/1990).	  	  “Morality”	  in	  this	  sense,	  is	  an	  impediment	  to	  happiness,	  or	  at	  
least	  one’s	  own	  happiness.	  
	   How	  do	  these	  standards	  arise	  and	  obtain	  moral	  force?	  	  Most	  psychologists	  trace	  
their	  origins	  to	  some	  kind	  of	  evolutionary	  root,	  whether	  that	  root	  be	  kin	  selection,	  group	  
selection,	  or	  some	  version	  of	  tit-­‐for-­‐tat	  reciprocity	  (e.g.	  Smith,	  1974;	  Wilson	  &	  Sober,	  1994).	  	  
These	  evolutionary	  mechanisms	  are	  posited	  to	  be	  responsible	  for	  selecting	  for	  particular	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genes	  that	  produce	  certain	  emotional	  reactions	  to	  a	  variety	  of	  stimuli	  that	  either	  inhibit	  or	  
force	  the	  animal	  to	  engage	  in	  particular	  actions	  (Dawkins,	  1976).	  	  In	  this	  sense,	  morality	  is,	  
at	  best,	  free	  from	  deliberative	  decision	  making,	  in	  the	  sense	  described	  by	  theories	  that	  view	  
moral	  justification	  as	  just-­‐so	  stories	  confabulated	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  intuitive	  unconscious	  
motives	  (Haidt,	  2001),	  or	  at	  worst,	  opposed	  to	  deliberative	  decision	  making,	  consistent	  
with	  theories	  that	  view	  moral	  emotions	  as	  outdated	  mechanisms	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  
overridden	  by	  a	  rationalist	  (typically	  utilitarian	  or	  consequentialist)	  ethic	  (Greene,	  2013).	  
These	  researchers	  often	  point	  to	  the	  power	  of	  moral	  emotions	  to	  motivate	  moral	  behavior	  
(Batson	  et	  al	  1983;	  Ciadini,	  1991),	  and,	  at	  times,	  the	  comparatively	  impotent	  power	  of	  
moral	  reasoning	  to	  do	  so	  (Colby	  &	  Damon,	  1992;	  Hart	  &	  Fegley,	  1995;	  Thoma	  et	  al,	  1999).	  	  	  
What	  these	  theories	  have	  in	  common	  is	  their	  separation	  of	  deliberative	  decision	  
making	  and	  the	  motivation	  to	  engage	  in	  moral	  behavior.	  	  They	  tend	  to	  see	  moral	  emotions	  
as	  operating	  primarily	  as	  constraints	  on	  otherwise	  rational	  behavior	  (Greene,	  2007),	  rather	  
than	  seeing	  them	  as	  reflecting	  goals	  that	  give	  meaning	  to	  decision	  making.	  	  Once	  again	  
moral	  standards	  are	  at	  best	  orthogonal	  to,	  and	  at	  worst	  opposed	  to,	  the	  pursuit	  of	  
happiness	  (even,	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  happiness	  of	  others;	  cf.	  Baron,	  1994).	  
A	  motivational	  understanding	  of	  morality	  takes	  a	  different	  view.	  	  Under	  this	  view,	  
moral	  emotions	  are	  not	  the	  driver	  of	  moral	  action	  so	  much	  as	  they	  are	  the	  feedback	  
resulting	  from	  perceived	  distance	  between	  one’s	  actual	  self	  and	  one’s	  moral	  self-­‐guides	  
(Higgins,	  1987),	  whether	  those	  guides	  be	  ideal-­‐	  or	  ought-­‐self	  guides	  (associated	  with	  the	  
promotion	  and	  prevention	  focus,	  respectively;	  see	  Higgins,	  1998).	  	  Furthermore,	  moral	  
action	  is	  activity	  carried	  out	  in	  order	  to	  either	  maintain	  congruency	  between	  one’s	  actual	  
self	  and	  self-­‐guides	  or	  attain	  congruency.	  	  As	  above,	  this	  would	  mean	  that	  moral	  goals	  can	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enter	  decision	  making	  in	  two	  ways:	  as	  either	  duties	  that	  demand	  fulfillment	  (maintaining	  
congruency	  between	  the	  actual-­‐	  and	  ought-­‐self),	  or	  virtues	  that	  inspire	  striving	  (attaining	  
congruency	  between	  the	  actual-­‐	  and	  ideal-­‐self).	  	  The	  relationship	  of	  these	  goals	  to	  emotions	  
is	  more	  complex	  than	  simply	  emotion	  versus	  cognition	  often	  proposed	  by	  other	  models:	  
duties	  may	  indeed	  be	  experienced	  as	  inhibiting	  or	  encouraging	  action	  irrespective	  of	  one’s	  
own	  self-­‐interest	  or	  happiness,	  but	  attaining	  virtue	  as	  an	  actual	  self-­‐ideal	  standard	  
congruency	  produces	  happiness	  (Higgins,	  1987).	  	  Furthermore,	  they	  are	  both	  emotional,	  or,	  
at	  least,	  related	  to	  emotions;	  they	  simply	  relate	  to	  different	  emotions	  (see	  Higgins,	  2001).	  	  	  
Such	  a	  perspective	  depends	  on	  the	  motivating	  power	  of	  these	  moral	  standards,	  and	  
the	  realization	  that	  one’s	  actions	  affect	  the	  relationship	  between	  one’s	  actual	  self	  and	  these	  
respective	  self-­‐guides.	  	  An	  important	  premise	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  that	  the	  relation	  between	  
this	  present	  actual	  self	  state	  and	  the	  self-­‐guide	  end-­‐states	  can	  change	  as	  a	  result	  of	  action	  or	  
inaction,	  and	  this	  change	  will	  bring	  about	  differing	  emotional	  feedback	  depending	  on	  the	  
way	  it	  has	  changed.	  	  Furthermore,	  this	  view	  suggests	  that	  such	  moral	  goals	  are	  not	  
necessarily	  unconscious,	  and	  that	  they	  can	  be	  factors	  brought	  to	  bear	  during	  the	  course	  of	  
reasoning	  about	  an	  action’s	  effects	  on	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  various	  regulatory	  selves,	  
albeit	  in	  different	  ways	  dependent	  upon	  which	  self-­‐guide	  is	  active.	  	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  
recent	  research	  that	  prior	  cognition	  can	  influence	  one’s	  intuitions	  about	  moral	  judgment	  
(Van	  Bavel	  et	  al,	  2012).	  	  Finally,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  differently	  valued	  end-­‐states	  
(dutiful	  oughts	  and	  virtuous	  ideals)	  and	  the	  means	  by	  which	  they	  are	  achieved	  (how	  the	  
change	  comes	  about	  through	  action—vigilant	  control	  or	  eager	  control)	  can	  work	  together	  
to	  produce	  regulatory	  fit	  and	  strengthen	  engagement	  (Higgins,	  2000;	  2005a),	  which	  in	  this	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case	  would	  involve	  increases	  in	  the	  moral	  behavior	  in	  question.	  	  In	  the	  following	  sections,	  I	  
will	  consider	  the	  theoretical	  foundation	  for	  this	  approach.	  	  
4.1	   Happiness	  and	  Multiple	  Goals	  
	  
	   Interestingly,	  a	  way	  in	  which	  both	  deontological	  and	  consequentialist	  views	  of	  
morality	  agree	  is	  in	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  decision	  process	  itself,	  which	  sees	  decision	  
outcomes	  as	  expressing	  maximal	  preferences,	  commonly	  known	  as	  expected	  utility	  theory.	  	  
Deontologists	  and	  consequentialists	  have	  different	  approaches	  to	  how	  decisions	  are	  to	  be	  
carried	  out	  in	  these	  cases	  (either	  in	  spite	  of	  these	  considerations	  or	  consistent	  with	  them,	  
respectively),	  but	  they	  share	  a	  model	  of	  in	  what	  a	  decision	  ultimately	  consists.	  This	  theory	  
of	  decision	  making	  has	  had	  its	  share	  of	  challenges	  (indeed,	  the	  entire	  field	  of	  behavioral	  
economics	  is	  in	  many	  ways	  devoted	  to	  producing	  theories	  surrounding	  all	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  
which	  expected	  utility	  theory	  fails	  to	  accurately	  describe	  human	  decision	  making),	  though	  
it	  has	  largely	  survived	  in	  one	  form	  or	  another,	  albeit	  with	  significant	  revisions	  (e.g.	  
Prospect	  Theory,	  see	  Kahneman	  &	  Tversky,	  1979).	  
	   A	  major	  difficulty	  with	  collapsing	  morality	  into	  a	  means	  of	  aggregate	  utility	  
maximization	  is	  that	  one’s	  ethical	  choices	  do	  not	  exist	  within	  a	  temporal	  vacuum.	  	  They	  
take	  place	  across	  time,	  with	  each	  moral	  decision	  being	  in	  some	  ways	  related	  to	  and	  in	  some	  
ways	  independent	  of	  each	  other	  moral	  decision.	  	  They	  also	  take	  place	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  life,	  
meaning	  that	  each	  decision	  has	  an	  impact	  on	  one’s	  moral	  status	  relative	  to	  some	  
constructed	  narrative	  about	  oneself	  and	  one’s	  life	  (Smith,	  2007).	  	  They	  also	  take	  place	  in	  
the	  context	  of	  a	  reality	  that	  is	  socially	  constructed	  (Berger	  &	  Luckmann,	  1966),	  with	  goals	  
that	  are	  viewed	  as	  objectively	  motivating	  because	  they	  are	  shared	  with	  those	  in	  whom	  one	  
trusts	  (Hardin	  &	  Higgins,	  1996).	  	  Happiness	  itself	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  social	  construction,	  and	  not	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so	  easily	  divorced	  from	  notions	  of	  a	  “good	  life,”	  which,	  in	  turn	  must	  find	  its	  source	  in	  social	  
construction	  (Durkheim,	  1912/2008).	  	  Faced	  with	  such	  basic	  facts,	  how	  can	  one	  ethic	  seek	  
to	  create	  universal	  rules	  by	  which	  the	  greatest	  total	  happiness	  is	  to	  be	  attained?	  
	   I	  believe	  the	  reason	  such	  approaches	  have	  had	  success	  in	  the	  past	  century	  is	  because	  
there	  is	  a	  remarkable	  amount	  of	  convergence	  across	  cultures	  and	  circumstances	  with	  
respect	  to	  the	  question	  regarding	  what	  one’s	  happiness	  depends	  on—up	  to	  a	  point.	  	  When	  
one	  is	  speaking	  about	  alleviating	  gross	  injustice,	  securing	  social	  peace,	  or	  feeding	  the	  
hungry,	  there	  is	  near	  unanimity	  with	  respect	  to	  whether	  or	  not	  persons	  deserve	  or	  benefit	  
from	  such	  things	  (though,	  sadly,	  there	  may	  still	  be	  disagreement	  about	  who	  counts	  as	  a	  
“person”	  in	  such	  circumstances).	  	  Thus,	  rules	  that	  behave	  as	  constraints	  on	  decision	  making	  
ensuring	  that	  one’s	  decisions	  avoid	  harm	  or	  support	  basic	  rights	  for	  others	  is	  a	  comfortable	  
fit	  with	  a	  decision	  theory	  that	  abstracts	  deciding	  individuals	  out	  of	  their	  time	  and	  
circumstance.	  	  The	  difficulties	  arise	  when	  one	  desires	  to	  strive	  for	  something	  higher,	  which	  
would	  be	  associated	  with	  virtues,	  not	  just	  rights	  and	  obligations.	  
	   A	  theory	  of	  decision	  making,	  if	  it	  is	  ever	  to	  leave	  behind	  the	  view	  that	  morality	  
functions	  entirely	  as	  a	  constraint	  on	  plan	  selection,	  is	  going	  to	  need	  to	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  
basic	  model	  of	  expected	  utility	  theory	  in	  which	  all	  goals	  are	  essentially	  interchangeable.	  	  It	  
is	  also	  going	  to	  need	  to	  incorporate	  notions	  like	  exemplary	  traits,	  virtues,	  and	  excellences	  
that	  may	  be	  motivating	  for	  their	  own	  sake,	  not	  subject	  to	  a	  common	  currency	  with	  other	  
goals,	  and	  yet	  not	  behaving	  as	  constraints	  on	  decision	  making	  but	  instead	  adding	  to	  the	  
available	  plans	  of	  action	  from	  which	  an	  individual	  may	  select	  (within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
model	  presented	  in	  Krantz	  &	  Kunreuther,	  2007;	  see	  Cornwell	  &	  Krantz,	  2014).	  	  Such	  a	  view	  
would	  also	  have	  to	  see	  decisions	  as	  occurring	  within	  a	  particular	  context,	  and	  the	  goals	  in	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such	  a	  decision	  process	  as	  drawing	  upon	  available	  social	  categories,	  and,	  essentially,	  
involving	  an	  ongoing	  relation	  to	  particular	  goals.	  
	   This	  last	  point	  is	  crucially	  important,	  particularly	  for	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  chapter.	  	  
Moral	  decisions	  are	  not	  simply	  single,	  isolated	  decisions	  about	  what	  it	  is	  right	  or	  good	  to	  do	  
in	  this	  particular	  circumstance	  divorced	  from	  all	  other	  circumstances	  (though	  researchers	  
often	  inadvertently	  treat	  them	  as	  such).	  	  Instead,	  moral	  decisions	  are	  instances	  of	  judgment	  
involving	  the	  selection	  of	  particular	  paths	  or	  routes	  to	  take	  (or	  avoid)	  in	  the	  ongoing	  
pursuit	  or	  maintenance	  of	  particular	  goals.	  	  The	  options	  are	  not	  always	  obvious	  until	  the	  
goals	  themselves	  are	  clarified,	  and,	  for	  this	  reason,	  human	  ethical	  goals	  are	  goals	  that	  
involve	  ongoing	  management	  and	  control—control	  enacted	  through	  the	  making	  of	  a	  
decision.	  
4.2	   Insights	  from	  Philosophy	  
	  
	   Irrespective	  of	  the	  particular	  moral	  rules	  and	  ideals	  of	  different	  philosophical	  
schools	  and	  religious	  traditions,	  they	  hold	  in	  common	  the	  notion	  that	  one’s	  relation	  to	  
these	  ethical	  notions	  unfolds	  over	  time.	  	  That	  is,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  these	  traditions	  
emphasize	  idealism,	  duty,	  or	  some	  combination	  of	  the	  two,	  they	  all	  have	  as	  a	  premise	  that	  
one’s	  actions	  have	  the	  potential	  to	  make	  a	  contribution	  to	  the	  moral	  self.	  	  Thus,	  moral	  
decisions	  and	  behavior	  are	  seen	  as	  being	  in	  relation	  to	  some	  moral	  goal.	  
	   Returning	  to	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  Right	  and	  the	  Good	  discussed	  in	  the	  
previous	  chapter,	  we	  can	  see	  how	  each	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  unfolding	  across	  time,	  thus	  
demanding	  ongoing	  control,	  by	  considering	  the	  thought	  of	  their	  prototypical	  philosopher:	  
Kant	  and	  Aristotle,	  respectively.	  For	  Kant	  (1785/1993),	  a	  good	  will	  (the	  only	  thing,	  he	  
argues,	  that	  is	  good	  without	  qualification)	  requires	  ongoing	  maintenance.	  	  It	  requires	  the	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inhibition	  of	  immoral	  actions	  or	  the	  pursuit	  of	  immoral	  desires.	  	  It	  also	  requires	  (albeit	  
imperfectly)	  the	  enactment	  of	  certain	  general	  actions.	  	  This	  is	  crucial,	  particularly	  in	  the	  
imperfect	  duty	  case,	  because	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  one’s	  duties	  are	  fulfilled	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  
reflection	  both	  on	  the	  present	  situation	  (in	  which	  one	  brings	  one’s	  duties	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  
particular	  behaviors	  demanding	  activation	  or	  inhibition),	  what	  one’s	  duties	  are	  perceived	  
to	  be,	  and	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  you	  feel	  you’ve	  fulfilled	  those	  duties.	  	  For	  example,	  the	  
obligation	  to	  use	  one’s	  gifts	  for	  the	  greater	  good	  that	  Kant	  identifies	  as	  an	  “imperfect	  duty”	  
would	  involve	  bringing	  to	  bear	  past	  behaviors	  on	  any	  individual	  case	  to	  know	  whether	  or	  
not	  this	  duty	  has	  already	  been	  fulfilled	  or	  whether	  action	  is	  obligatory	  to	  fulfill	  it.	  
	   With	  Aristotle	  (trans.	  2009)	  this	  ongoing	  relationship	  is	  also	  apparent.	  	  Virtues,	  by	  
their	  very	  nature	  as	  inspirational	  examples	  of	  moral	  perfection,	  are	  not	  entirely	  attainable.	  	  
However,	  one	  can	  view	  one’s	  behaviors	  as	  being	  in	  line	  with	  progressing	  towards	  those	  
virtues	  and	  thus	  find	  encouragement	  in	  acting	  them	  out,	  or	  one	  could	  similarly	  see	  one’s	  
behaviors	  as	  impeding	  or	  stagnating	  this	  progress	  and	  thus	  avoid	  them.	  	  Critically,	  since	  
these	  behaviors	  can	  never	  perfectly	  bring	  an	  individual	  to	  the	  virtuous	  end-­‐state	  (or	  
perfectly	  avoid	  a	  vicious	  end-­‐state),	  one	  must	  see	  his	  or	  her	  behaviors	  as	  progressing	  
toward	  or	  away	  from	  these	  states	  in	  a	  continual	  way.	  	  
4.3	   Morality	  and	  Becoming	  
	   Human	  beings	  have	  been	  viewed	  as	  notable	  in	  the	  animal	  kingdom	  for	  being	  “moral”	  
animals	  (Smith,	  2007).	  	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  how	  a	  comprehensive	  and	  robust	  ethics	  can	  
arise	  in	  humans,	  it	  may	  be	  worth	  looking	  at	  an	  aspect	  of	  our	  cognition	  that	  is	  unique	  to	  
humans:	  namely,	  the	  sense	  of	  becoming	  (Higgins,	  2005b).	  	  “Mental	  time	  travel”	  was	  posited	  
as	  a	  unique	  feature	  of	  human	  cognition	  (Tulving,	  2002);	  essentially	  our	  ability	  to	  envision	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pasts	  and	  futures	  that	  are	  not	  currently	  available	  to	  the	  senses	  and	  bring	  them	  to	  bear	  upon	  
our	  current	  experience,	  judgments,	  and	  decision	  making.	  	  This	  will	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  
enormously	  important	  for	  our	  moral	  decision	  making	  as	  well.	  
	   This	  is	  crucial	  for	  the	  field	  of	  ethics,	  because	  ethics,	  as	  argued	  above,	  is	  something	  
that	  inherently	  unfolds	  across	  time.	  	  Moral	  standards	  are	  goals	  that	  require	  ongoing	  pursuit	  
or	  maintenance—ongoing	  control.	  	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  for	  virtue-­‐seeking,	  where	  
the	  ultimate	  goal	  is	  abstract,	  and	  thus,	  demanding	  of	  pursuit	  rather	  than	  integral	  fulfillment	  
(Taylor,	  2007).	  	  Another	  way	  to	  put	  this	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  movement	  or	  orientation	  towards	  
the	  goal	  (in	  this	  case,	  a	  virtuous	  character)	  that	  is	  instantiated	  in	  behavior	  is	  what	  is	  
motivating,	  rather	  than	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  behavior	  will	  achieve	  the	  goal	  itself.	  	  Virtues	  (and	  
vices)	  motivate	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  direction	  that	  the	  behavior	  in	  question	  carries	  the	  one	  
who	  performs	  it,	  by	  revealing	  certain	  motives	  that	  are	  either	  consistent	  with	  an	  ideal	  
character	  or	  inconsistent	  with	  it	  (Anscombe,	  2005).	  	  The	  “becoming”	  nature	  of	  this	  way	  of	  
approaching	  ethics	  is	  apparent	  in	  that	  one’s	  orientation	  can	  always	  be	  reevaluated	  with	  
respect	  to	  an	  exemplar	  of	  ideal	  character—not	  so	  much	  “where	  do	  I	  stand?”	  as	  “how	  am	  I	  
doing?”	  
	   Though	  this	  is	  most	  obvious	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  virtue-­‐seeking,	  it	  is	  also	  visible	  with	  
respect	  to	  duty-­‐fulfillment.	  	  Though	  duties	  involve	  integral	  fulfillment	  (i.e.	  they	  are	  either	  
fulfilled	  or	  they	  are	  not	  fulfilled;	  moral	  status	  is	  not	  achieved	  through	  orientation	  or	  
progression	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  ideals)	  they	  can	  still	  unfold	  across	  time.	  	  A	  duty	  may	  
involve	  constant	  maintenance	  (resistance	  to	  certain	  temptations)	  or	  a	  general	  principle	  of	  
action	  (giving	  to	  charity	  once	  in	  a	  while).	  	  For	  example,	  a	  person	  who	  tutors	  less	  fortunate	  
children	  out	  of	  a	  sense	  of	  duty	  may	  then	  feel	  as	  though	  she	  is	  not	  obligated	  to	  participate	  in	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a	  local	  soup	  kitchen	  every	  week,	  not	  because	  she	  does	  not	  have	  a	  duty	  to	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  
the	  poor,	  but	  because	  she	  considers	  that	  duty	  fulfilled.	  	  The	  “becoming”	  nature	  of	  duties	  lies	  
instead	  in	  the	  requirement	  that	  they	  be	  accompanied	  by	  vigilance,	  since	  one’s	  moral	  nature	  
in	  this	  scheme	  is	  always	  open	  to	  loss,	  and	  thus	  ongoing	  maintenance	  is	  required.	  	  One	  may	  
even	  go	  “above	  and	  beyond”	  the	  call	  of	  duty	  in	  this	  case,	  not	  in	  order	  that	  one	  develops	  a	  
virtue,	  but	  instead	  to	  create	  a	  safety	  “buffer”	  between	  one’s	  self	  and	  discrepancies	  with	  
one’s	  ought-­‐self.	  
	   Emotion	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  here.	  	  Emotions	  provide	  internal	  feedback	  about	  one’s	  
current	  position	  and	  orientation	  with	  respect	  to	  one’s	  goals	  (Higgins,	  2001).	  	  The	  threat	  of	  
non-­‐fulfillment	  of	  duties	  is	  the	  experience	  of	  guilt—an	  emotion	  that	  signals	  that	  one’s	  
actual	  self	  and	  ought-­‐self	  have	  a	  discrepancy	  (Higgins,	  1987).	  	  These	  emotions	  motivate	  
one	  to	  action,	  either	  through	  extra	  vigilant	  resistance	  to	  further	  temptation,	  or	  to	  a	  search	  
for	  a	  means	  by	  which	  to	  restore	  one’s	  moral	  status	  quo.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  experience	  
of	  having	  fulfilled	  one’s	  duties	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  peace	  or	  quiescence—emotions	  that	  signal	  that	  
there	  is	  nothing	  further	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  done	  and	  that	  continued	  resistance	  to	  immoral	  
action	  is	  not	  as	  paramount	  (Higgins,	  1987).	  	  As	  alluded	  to	  above,	  someone	  motivated	  by	  
duty-­‐fulfillment	  may	  do	  “extra”	  deeds	  to	  feel	  a	  greater	  sense	  of	  moral	  security	  or	  peace,	  but	  
one’s	  moral	  status	  doesn’t	  achieve	  any	  attendant	  improvement.	  	  In	  either	  case,	  these	  
emotions	  call	  for	  vigilance	  as	  a	  means	  of	  maintaining	  these	  moral	  standards.	  
	   With	  respect	  to	  virtue-­‐seeking,	  the	  deprivation	  of	  virtue	  in	  one’s	  actions	  creates	  a	  
sense	  of	  disappointment	  in	  oneself—an	  emotion	  that	  signals	  that	  one’s	  actual	  self	  and	  
ideal-­‐self	  have	  a	  discrepancy	  (Higgins,	  1987).	  	  Such	  an	  experience	  could	  demotivate	  one’s	  
desire	  to	  orient	  oneself	  away	  from	  certain	  virtues	  that	  one	  feels	  are	  a	  hopeless	  enterprise,	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or,	  alternatively,	  just	  the	  threat	  of	  such	  a	  state	  may	  itself	  be	  motivating—virtues	  and	  ideals	  
bring	  a	  sense	  of	  meaning	  or	  purpose	  with	  them;	  if	  these	  virtues	  and	  ideals	  are	  not	  pursued,	  
life	  may	  be	  drained	  of	  all	  meaning.	  	  Philosophers	  have	  hypothesized	  that	  this	  threat	  of	  a	  
flattened	  moral	  horizon	  is	  actually	  far	  more	  prevalent	  in	  the	  modern	  West	  relative	  to	  an	  
older	  notion	  of	  a	  threat	  of	  spiritual	  danger	  for	  immoral	  action	  (Taylor,	  1989).	  	  On	  the	  
positive	  side,	  progression	  towards	  virtues,	  or	  actions	  or	  inhibitions	  that	  reveal	  one’s	  
motives	  as	  ideally	  organized,	  provide	  a	  set	  of	  attendant	  motivating	  positive	  emotions—the	  
state	  that	  once	  was	  commonly	  understood	  as	  “happiness,”	  but	  in	  the	  case	  of	  morality,	  
maybe	  understood	  as	  feeling	  “virtuous”	  (Higgins,	  1987).	  	  This	  sense	  of	  progress	  could	  
motivate	  an	  individual	  to	  pursue	  these	  goals	  even	  further.	  	  In	  either	  case,	  these	  emotions	  
call	  for	  eagerness	  as	  a	  means	  of	  striving	  towards	  these	  moral	  standards.	  
	   An	  important	  theoretical	  take-­‐away	  point	  is	  that	  these	  emotions	  signal	  where	  one	  
stands	  with	  respect	  to	  one’s	  moral	  self,	  and	  thus	  provide	  a	  sense	  of	  the	  means	  by	  which	  one	  
may	  orient	  oneself	  toward	  their	  achievement.	  	  Put	  another	  way,	  emotions	  provide	  
individuals	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  author	  their	  moral	  destinies—give	  them	  the	  means	  by	  
which	  they	  can	  control	  or	  manage	  what	  happens	  to	  their	  moral	  status.	  	  Interestingly	  this	  
notion	  of	  autonomy	  or	  self-­‐control	  is	  central	  to	  moral	  theories	  whether	  they	  come	  from	  the	  
virtue-­‐seeking	  schools	  of	  the	  Good	  (see	  the	  arguments	  regarding	  “voluntary”	  decisions	  in	  
Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009)	  or	  the	  duty-­‐fulfillment	  schools	  of	  the	  Right	  (see	  the	  multitude	  of	  
references	  to	  autonomy	  in	  Kant,	  1785/1993),	  or	  whether	  they	  are	  found	  in	  religious	  ethics,	  
which	  often	  embrace	  forms	  of	  both	  (Niebuhr,	  1963/1999).	  	  
4.4	   Regulatory	  Self-­‐Guides	  and	  Regulatory	  Fit	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   This	  conceptualization	  of	  ethical	  behaviors	  as	  being	  a	  way	  of	  controlling	  one’s	  actual	  
self	  relative	  to	  one’s	  ideal	  and	  ought	  selves	  brings	  in	  another	  notion	  that	  will	  be	  a	  central	  
theory	  to	  understanding	  what	  follows	  here	  and	  in	  the	  next	  chapter:	  the	  notion	  of	  regulatory	  
fit	  (Higgins,	  2000;	  2005a).	  	  Regulatory	  fit	  is	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  convergence	  or	  “fit”	  
between	  one’s	  goals	  and	  the	  manner	  by	  which	  one	  goes	  about	  fulfilling	  them;	  something	  
that	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  affect	  moral	  judgments	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  self	  (Camacho,	  Higgins,	  
&	  Luger,	  2003).	  	  Since	  the	  effects	  of	  regulatory	  fit	  are	  not	  limited	  to	  judgments,	  we	  should	  
expect	  that	  they	  should	  apply	  to	  intentions	  and	  behaviors	  as	  well	  (Motyka	  et	  al,	  in	  press).	  	  
Since	  both	  the	  construal	  of	  moral	  standards	  as	  having	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  value	  (see	  the	  
previous	  chapter)	  and	  the	  capacity	  of	  each	  individual	  to	  take	  control	  over	  one’s	  own	  moral	  
destiny	  (see	  above)	  are	  elements	  of	  moral	  action	  and	  decision	  making,	  it	  stands	  to	  reason	  
that	  when	  these	  moral	  standards	  are	  paired	  with	  the	  appropriate	  means	  by	  which	  to	  carry	  
them	  out,	  they	  will	  be	  experienced	  as	  additionally	  motivating	  (Higgins,	  2006)	  and	  be	  more	  
likely	  to	  be	  carried	  out.	  
	   In	  the	  following	  studies,	  we	  test	  this	  basic	  proposal	  about	  the	  convergence	  of	  value	  
and	  control	  motivations	  (Higgins,	  2012).	  	  In	  the	  process,	  we	  test	  another	  central	  theory	  of	  
this	  chapter:	  that	  virtue	  motivates	  behavior	  in	  a	  different	  manner	  compared	  to	  duty.	  	  If	  
duties	  and	  virtues	  do	  indeed	  represent	  two	  kinds	  of	  moral	  reference	  points,	  as	  posited	  in	  
the	  previous	  chapter,	  then	  when	  means	  associated	  with	  those	  reference	  point’s	  motivation	  
(promotion	  in	  the	  case	  of	  virtue	  or	  prevention	  in	  the	  case	  of	  duty)	  are	  combined	  with	  those	  
categorizations,	  the	  match	  between	  value	  and	  control	  should	  produce	  more	  moral	  behavior	  
consistent	  with	  principles	  of	  regulatory	  fit	  (Higgins,	  2000;	  2005).	  	  This	  will	  be	  tested	  in	  
three	  different	  ways.	  	  First,	  framing	  of	  a	  moral	  behavior	  as	  either	  a	  dutiful	  obligation	  or	  a	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virtuous	  ideal	  to	  reveal	  whether	  this	  produces	  more	  charitable	  giving	  when	  interacted	  with	  
participant	  regulatory	  focus.	  	  Second,	  assessing	  of	  emotions	  following	  either	  an	  immoral	  or	  
moral	  action	  to	  see	  if	  they	  fit	  with	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  different	  emotional	  associations	  
with	  one’s	  ideal	  or	  ought	  self.	  	  And	  third,	  priming	  different	  kinds	  of	  moral	  framing	  in	  order	  
to	  see	  if	  this	  produces	  classic	  fit	  effects	  in	  determining	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  volunteer	  one’s	  
time	  when	  given	  the	  opportunity.	  
Study	  1:	  Charitable	  Behavior	  from	  Fit	  
	  
This	  study	  will	  determine	  whether	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  interacts	  with	  framing	  a	  
charity	  appeal	  that	  fits	  promotion	  or	  prevention.	  	  Within	  the	  charity	  appeals	  themselves,	  
participants	  received	  framing	  related	  to	  either	  virtue-­‐related	  concerns	  or	  duty-­‐related	  
concerns	  to	  determine	  whether	  there	  is	  an	  interaction	  between	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  
predominance	  and	  charity	  appeal	  framing.	  	  	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
One	  hundred	  two	  participants	  recruited	  through	  the	  Columbia	  University	  
Behavioral	  Research	  Lab	  completed	  this	  study.	  	  They	  were	  compensated	  five	  dollars	  for	  
their	  participation.	  	  The	  participants	  consisted	  of	  38	  males	  and	  64	  females.	  	  There	  were	  no	  
significant	  differences	  according	  to	  sex	  for	  any	  of	  the	  variables	  discussed	  in	  the	  analysis.	  
Procedure	  
Participants	  were	  asked	  to	  fill	  out	  the	  11-­‐item	  Regulatory	  Focus	  Questionnaire	  in	  
order	  to	  determine	  their	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  in	  terms	  of	  promotion	  pride	  and	  
prevention	  pride	  (Higgins	  et	  al,	  2001).	  	  The	  scale	  consists	  of	  11	  questions	  aimed	  at	  
determining	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  an	  individual	  perceives	  himself	  or	  herself	  as	  effective	  or	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ineffective	  at	  obtaining	  promotion	  or	  prevention	  goals.	  	  Though	  these	  scales	  are	  generally	  
orthogonal,	  they	  can	  also	  work	  against	  one	  another	  when	  dealing	  with	  motivational	  
matches	  and	  mismatches	  (Shah,	  Higgins,	  &	  Friedman,	  1998).	  	  For	  this	  reason,	  our	  research	  
called	  for	  a	  determination	  of	  promotion	  and	  prevention	  predominance	  (i.e.	  the	  degree	  to	  
which	  one	  shows	  stronger	  promotion	  pride	  or	  stronger	  prevention	  pride).	  	  To	  this	  end,	  we	  
subtracted	  the	  computed	  prevention	  scores	  from	  the	  promotion	  scores	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  
whether	  an	  individual	  was	  predominantly	  promotion	  focused	  or	  prevention	  focused.	  	  A	  
positive	  score	  indicates	  a	  promotion	  focus	  predominance	  while	  a	  negative	  score	  indicates	  a	  
prevention	  focus	  predominance.	  	  Again,	  although	  promotion	  and	  prevention	  are	  generally	  
orthogonal	  constructs,	  in	  this	  design	  they	  will	  be	  working	  against	  one	  another,	  so	  we	  are	  
primarily	  interested	  in	  which	  focus	  is	  dominant,	  rather	  than	  the	  overall	  strength	  of	  chronic	  
regulatory	  focus.	  
Participants	  were	  also	  experimentally	  induced	  into	  a	  promotion	  or	  prevention	  state	  
using	  the	  Regulatory	  Focus	  Induction	  Instrument	  introduced	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  
(Freitas	  &	  Higgins,	  2002).	  Because	  participants	  contextually	  induced	  into	  a	  promotion	  
focus	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  construe	  charitable	  giving	  in	  terms	  of	  gains	  and	  non-­‐gains,	  
while	  those	  induced	  into	  a	  prevention	  focus	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  construe	  charitable	  
giving	  in	  terms	  of	  non-­‐losses	  and	  losses,	  this	  contextual	  induction	  could	  also	  interact	  with	  
predominant	  regulatory	  focus	  to	  affect	  the	  amount	  of	  charity	  giving.	  
Following	  the	  regulatory	  focus	  induction,	  participants	  were	  asked	  to	  complete	  a	  
filler	  task	  solving	  anagrams	  that	  they	  were	  led	  to	  believe	  was	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  study.	  	  The	  
purpose	  of	  this	  task	  was	  to	  give	  participants	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  study	  was	  complete	  when	  
they	  later	  make	  the	  choice	  to	  donate	  or	  not	  to	  donate.	  	  They	  received	  either	  high	  or	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moderate	  performance	  feedback	  for	  their	  performance	  (randomly	  assigned)	  in	  order	  to	  
contribute	  to	  the	  perceived	  reality	  of	  this	  portion	  of	  the	  study.	  	  This	  feedback	  had	  no	  
significant	  effects	  on	  any	  of	  the	  variables	  discussed	  below,	  and	  did	  not	  moderate	  any	  of	  the	  
relationships	  among	  the	  variables.	  	  Nevertheless,	  we	  control	  for	  the	  random	  assignment	  in	  
all	  of	  our	  analyses.	  
Following	  the	  feedback,	  they	  were	  asked	  a	  series	  of	  follow-­‐up	  questions	  about	  mood	  
and	  motivation,	  consistent	  with	  the	  cover	  story	  that	  this	  was	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  the	  task.	  	  
After	  these	  questionnaires	  were	  complete,	  participants	  were	  paid	  for	  their	  participation,	  
signed	  a	  form	  stating	  that	  they	  had	  received	  their	  payment,	  and	  were	  led	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  
study	  was	  complete.	  	  The	  experimenter	  then	  presented	  the	  participants	  with	  a	  half	  sheet	  of	  
paper	  containing	  an	  appeal	  to	  donate	  any	  or	  all	  of	  their	  study	  earnings	  (totaling	  $5.00	  given	  
in	  single	  bills)	  to	  Habitat	  for	  Humanity.	  	  	  
The	  appeals	  were	  worded	  exactly	  the	  same,	  except	  for	  the	  final	  sentence.	  	  One	  
wording	  was	  intended	  to	  appeal	  to	  a	  participant’s	  sense	  of	  duty,	  the	  other	  was	  intended	  to	  
appeal	  to	  a	  participant’s	  sense	  of	  virtue.	  	  These	  phrases	  were	  drawn	  from	  the	  two	  versions	  
of	  ethical	  practice	  presented	  in	  MacIntyre’s	  (1981)	  work—the	  two	  conceptualizations	  of	  
morality	  in	  which	  we	  were	  interested—and	  were	  randomly	  assigned.	  	  The	  Duty-­‐Fulfillment	  
Appeal	  concluded	  with	  the	  following	  sentence:	  
We	  ask	  that	  you	  consider	  our	  duty	  to	  the	  less	  fortunate	  as	  you	  make	  your	  
decision.	  
The	  Virtue-­‐Seeking	  Appeal	  concluded	  with	  this	  sentence:	  




Participants	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  donate	  a	  portion	  of	  their	  earnings	  in	  denominations	  of	  
one	  dollar,	  or	  donate	  nothing	  at	  all	  if	  they	  chose.	  	  The	  goal	  of	  this	  procedure	  was	  to	  ensure	  
that	  every	  participant	  had	  exactly	  the	  same	  amount	  of	  money	  to	  donate	  and	  the	  same	  sense	  
that	  the	  money	  available	  for	  donation	  was	  earned.	  	  Following	  the	  donations,	  participants	  
were	  debriefed	  concerning	  the	  actual	  purpose	  of	  the	  study,	  and	  their	  donations	  were	  
passed	  along	  to	  Habitat	  for	  Humanity.	  
	   Since	  the	  majority	  of	  participants	  (56%)	  chose	  not	  to	  donate,	  and	  an	  additional	  34%	  
donated	  1	  dollar,	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  high	  variability	  of	  other	  responses	  introducing	  a	  
considerable	  amount	  of	  error	  into	  our	  model,	  we	  collapsed	  donations	  into	  three	  categories:	  
no	  donation	  (coded	  as	  “0”),	  small	  donation	  (1	  dollar;	  coded	  as	  “1”),	  and	  large	  donation	  (>1	  
dollar;	  coded	  as	  “2”).	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
	   First,	  there	  did	  appear	  to	  be	  an	  interaction	  between	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  
predominance	  and	  contextual	  focus	  priming	  regarding	  the	  amounts	  participants	  were	  
willing	  to	  give.	  	  There	  was	  a	  marginally	  significant	  interaction	  between	  chronic	  promotion	  
or	  prevention	  predominance	  and	  situationally	  induced	  regulatory	  focus,	  with	  participants	  
who	  had	  greater	  predominant	  promotion	  giving	  more	  when	  contextually	  induced	  into	  a	  
promotion	  state,	  and	  participants	  who	  had	  greater	  predominant	  prevention	  giving	  more	  
when	  contextually	  induced	  into	  a	  prevention	  state	  (β	  	  =	  0.37,	  t(96)	  =	  1.75,	  p	  =	  0.08).	  These	  
results	  are	  pictured	  in	  Figure	  4.1.	  
	   More	  importantly,	  there	  was	  also	  evidence	  of	  a	  fit	  between	  the	  two	  chronic	  
motivational	  systems	  and	  the	  two	  forms	  of	  motivational	  appeal	  that	  were	  drawn	  from	  the	  




Figure	  4.1:	  Amount	  given	  predicted	  by	  priming	  and	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  
predominance.	  
	  
Virtue-­‐Seeking	  Appeal	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  chronic	  prevention	  regulatory	  focus	  and	  
the	  Duty-­‐Fulfillment	  Appeal	  on	  the	  other.	  Specifically,	  participants	  who	  had	  greater	  
predominant	  promotion	  gave	  more	  in	  the	  Virtue-­‐Seeking	  condition	  compared	  to	  the	  Duty-­‐
Fulfillment	  condition,	  and	  participants	  who	  had	  greater	  predominant	  prevention	  gave	  
more	  in	  the	  Duty-­‐Fulfillment	  condition	  compared	  to	  the	  Virtue-­‐Seeking	  condition	  (β	  =	  0.30,	  
t(96)	  =	  2.02,	  p	  =	  0.05).	  	  This	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  4.2.	  
These	  results	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  matching	  an	  individual’s	  
chronic	  orientation	  toward	  value	  (promotion	  predominant;	  prevention	  predominant)	  with	  
his	  or	  her	  preferred	  means	  of	  going	  about	  achieving	  moral	  goals	  (virtue	  seeking;	  duty	  
fulfillment)	  creates	  a	  “fit”	  that	  increases	  charitable	  giving.	  	  A	  limitation	  of	  this	  study	  is	  that	  
the	  charitable	  giving	  took	  place	  in	  view	  of	  the	  experimenter.	  To	  address	  the	  possibility	  that	  































Study	  2:	  Emotions	  from	  Charitable	  Decisions	  
	  
In	  this	  study,	  we	  attempted	  to	  replicate	  the	  basic	  effect	  from	  the	  previous	  study	  
(regulatory	  focus	  priming	  x	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  predominance	  interaction)	  and	  extend	  
it	  by	  showing	  that	  the	  decision	  to	  either	  give	  or	  not	  give	  has	  different	  emotional	  
consequences	  for	  the	  person	  dependent	  upon	  his	  or	  her	  regulatory	  focus	  predominance.	  	  
We	  examined	  whether	  promotion-­‐predominant	  individuals	  show	  greater	  differences	  along	  
a	  virtuous	  feelings	  dimension	  (an	  emotion	  associated	  with	  moral	  gain	  vs.	  non-­‐gain)	  
whereas	  prevention-­‐predominant	  individuals	  show	  greater	  differences	  along	  a	  guilt	  
feelings	  dimension	  (an	  emotion	  associated	  with	  moral	  loss	  vs.	  non-­‐loss).	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
	   Ninety-­‐nine	  participants	  were	  recruited	  from	  the	  Columbia	  University	  Behavioral	  























There	  were	  no	  significant	  differences	  according	  to	  sex	  for	  any	  of	  the	  variables	  used	  in	  the	  
following	  analyses.	  	  Twenty-­‐six	  participants	  (9	  males	  and	  17	  females)	  were	  excluded	  from	  
the	  analyses	  because	  they	  answered	  “yes”	  to	  the	  question	  probing	  prior	  rules	  regarding	  
charitable	  giving	  detailed	  below.	  	  This	  left	  a	  sample	  of	  73	  participants	  (23	  males	  and	  50	  
females).	  
Procedure	  
	   The	  procedure	  in	  Study	  2	  was	  identical	  to	  that	  in	  Study	  1	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  
donation	  part	  of	  the	  study.	  	  First,	  since	  the	  interaction	  between	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  
predominance	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  the	  regulatory	  focus	  induction	  and	  the	  appeal	  wording	  
on	  the	  other	  were	  redundant,	  we	  altered	  the	  procedure	  such	  that	  the	  appeal	  wording	  
manipulation	  was	  replaced	  with	  a	  follow-­‐up	  questionnaire	  occurring	  after	  the	  donation	  
detailed	  below.	  	  All	  participants	  in	  this	  study	  received	  identical	  donation	  appeals.	  	  As	  in	  
Study	  1,	  following	  the	  RFQ,	  participants	  were	  induced	  into	  either	  a	  promotion	  state	  or	  
prevention	  state	  using	  the	  method	  described	  above.	  
Rather	  than	  presenting	  the	  donation	  appeal	  to	  participants	  directly,	  those	  taking	  the	  
study	  were	  instead	  given	  an	  envelope	  containing	  the	  appeal,	  which	  itself	  had	  written	  on	  it	  
instructions	  to	  place	  their	  donation	  in	  the	  envelope	  then	  place	  the	  envelope	  with	  its	  
contents	  into	  a	  basket	  placed	  by	  the	  door	  as	  they	  leave	  the	  room.	  	  The	  instructions	  
contained	  an	  inconspicuous	  “subject	  number”	  (placed	  into	  the	  last	  digits	  of	  a	  lab	  phone	  
number)	  of	  which	  the	  participants	  were	  unaware	  in	  order	  to	  match	  their	  donation	  amounts	  
to	  the	  variables	  of	  interest	  while	  maintaining	  real	  and	  perceived	  anonymity.	  	  After	  
participants	  placed	  their	  envelopes	  into	  the	  basket,	  the	  experimenter	  presented	  them	  with	  
a	  follow-­‐up	  questionnaire	  asking	  about	  their	  donation	  experience.	  	  Again,	  this	  survey	  was	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only	  connected	  to	  their	  subject	  number	  via	  the	  same	  phone	  number	  contained	  in	  the	  
appeal.	  	  	  
Among	  the	  questions	  on	  the	  follow-­‐up	  questionnaire	  were:	  “To	  what	  extent	  did	  your	  
decision	  make	  you	  feel	  guilty?”	  and	  “To	  what	  extent	  did	  your	  decision	  make	  you	  feel	  
virtuous?”	  (both	  rated	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  -­‐	  “Not	  at	  all”	  to	  9	  -­‐	  “A	  great	  deal”).	  	  These	  questions	  
were	  directed	  at	  specifically	  moral	  psychological	  experiences.	  	  The	  first,	  guilt	  feelings,	  
would	  constitute	  the	  experience	  of	  falling	  short	  of	  a	  moral	  obligation	  standard	  or	  not	  falling	  
short	  (i.e.	  failing	  or	  succeeding	  in	  maintaining	  an	  ought	  duty),	  and	  so	  should	  be	  more	  
associated	  with	  the	  prevention	  focus.	  	  This	  feeling	  has	  also	  been	  associated	  with	  failure	  to	  
do	  the	  right	  thing	  (Sheikh	  &	  Janoff-­‐Bulman,	  2010).	  	  The	  second,	  virtue	  feelings,	  would	  
constitute	  the	  experience	  of	  matching	  or	  not	  matching	  a	  moral	  ideal	  standard	  (i.e.,	  
succeeding	  or	  failing	  in	  progressing	  toward	  an	  ideal	  virtue),	  and	  so	  should	  be	  more	  
associated	  with	  the	  promotion	  focus.	  Put	  another	  way,	  guilt	  feelings	  would	  constitute	  the	  
experience	  of	  moral	  loss,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  guilt	  feelings	  the	  experience	  of	  non-­‐loss.	  	  In	  
contrast,	  virtue	  feelings	  would	  constitute	  the	  experience	  of	  moral	  gain,	  and	  the	  lack	  of	  
virtue	  feelings	  the	  experience	  of	  non-­‐gain.	  
The	  questionnaire	  also	  asked	  if	  the	  participants	  have	  any	  habitual	  a	  priori	  
conventions	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  decisions	  about	  giving	  (equivalent	  to	  always	  doubling	  the	  tax	  
when	  tipping	  in	  a	  restaurant).	  	  Since	  these	  participants	  would	  presumably	  not	  engage	  in	  or	  
experience	  the	  self-­‐regulatory	  feedback	  in	  the	  form	  of	  emotions	  of	  interest	  for	  this	  study,	  
we	  excluded	  any	  participant	  that	  answered	  “yes”	  to	  this	  question	  from	  our	  analysis.	  	  Giving	  








	   As	  with	  the	  previous	  study,	  a	  linear	  regression	  showed	  an	  interaction	  effect	  for	  
amount	  given	  between	  predominant	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  and	  appeal	  framing	  (β	  =	  0.36,	  
t(68)	  =	  2.10,	  p	  =	  0.04).	  This	  replication	  of	  Study	  1	  with	  private	  giving	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  
4.3.	  	  Study	  2	  also	  examined	  for	  the	  first	  time	  participants	  perceived	  sense	  of	  virtue	  and	  
perceived	  sense	  of	  guilt	  regarding	  giving	  or	  not	  giving.	  Given	  that	  research	  has	  linked	  
emotional	  experiences	  to	  congruency	  and	  discrepancy	  between	  one’s	  actual	  and	  ideal-­‐	  and	  
ought-­‐self	  guides	  (Higgins,	  1987),	  we	  anticipated	  emotional	  differences	  to	  emerge	  based	  
upon	  differences	  in	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  pride	  predominance.	  Based	  on	  this	  model,	  we	  
should	  expect	  that	  the	  largest	  differences	  in	  feelings	  of	  virtue	  between	  those	  who	  give	  and	  
those	  who	  fail	  to	  give	  should	  be	  those	  who	  see	  themselves	  as	  effective	  in	  doing	  those	  things	  
one	  ideally	  should	  do;	  that	  is,	  those	  who	  are	  predominant	  in	  chronic	  promotion.	  	  























Figure	  4.4:	  Presence	  of	  guilt	  feelings	  predicted	  by	  giving	  and	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  
predominance.	  
	  
should	  feel	  a	  sense	  of	  virtue	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  give	  (vs.	  give).	  Similarly,	  we	  should	  expect	  that	  the	  
largest	  differences	  in	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  between	  those	  who	  give	  and	  those	  who	  fail	  to	  give	  
should	  be	  those	  who	  see	  themselves	  as	  effective	  at	  doing	  things	  one	  ought	  to	  do;	  that	  is,	  
those	  who	  are	  predominant	  in	  chronic	  prevention.	  Specifically,	  the	  more	  participants	  are	  
predominantly	  chronic	  prevention,	  the	  more	  they	  should	  feel	  guilty	  if	  they	  fail	  to	  give	  (vs.	  
give).	  
In	  order	  to	  test	  for	  differences	  in	  reported	  feelings	  of	  low	  virtuousness	  (moral	  non-­‐
gain)	  or	  guilt	  (moral	  loss)	  as	  a	  function	  of	  participants’	  promotion	  or	  prevention	  
predominance	  interacting	  with	  whether	  they	  did	  or	  did	  not	  give	  a	  donation,	  we	  separated	  
our	  sample	  into	  those	  who	  were	  promotion	  predominant	  (i.e.,	  have	  a	  positive	  difference	  
score;	  N	  =	  42)	  and	  those	  who	  were	  prevention	  predominant	  (i.e.,	  have	  a	  negative	  difference	  
score;	  N	  =	  32).	  	  We	  found	  that	  among	  those	  who	  were	  prevention	  predominant,	  not	  giving	  



























Figure	  4.5:	  Presence	  of	  virtuous	  feelings	  predicted	  by	  giving	  and	  chronic	  regulatory	  focus	  
predominance.	  
	  
feelings	  of	  virtue	  (β	  =	  0.62,	  t(29)	  =	  4.21,	  p	  <	  0.001),	  whereas	  the	  association	  was	  not	  
significant	  among	  those	  predominant	  in	  promotion	  (β	  =	  0.19,	  t(38)	  =	  1.09,	  p	  =	  0.29).	  In	  
contrast,	  among	  predominant	  promotion	  participants,	  not	  giving	  (vs.	  giving)	  was	  
significantly	  associated	  with	  lesser	  feelings	  of	  virtue,	  controlling	  for	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  (β	  =	  -­‐
0.39,	  t(38)	  =	  -­‐2.56,	  p	  =	  0.02),	  whereas	  this	  association	  was	  non-­‐significant	  among	  those	  
who	  were	  prevention	  predominant	  (t	  <	  1).	  These	  effects	  are	  illustrated	  in	  Figures	  4.4	  and	  
4.5.	  	  
	   These	  results,	  in	  addition	  to	  replicating	  the	  basic	  interaction	  effect	  found	  in	  the	  
previous	  study,	  serve	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  morality-­‐related	  feelings	  are	  related	  to	  the	  way	  
one	  chronically	  pursues	  one’s	  moral	  goals	  (through	  either	  duty-­‐fulfillment	  or	  virtue-­‐

























Study	  3:	  Fit	  Effects	  On	  Volunteering	  Time	  
	  
	   The	  final	  study	  in	  this	  chapter	  extends	  the	  previous	  studies	  in	  several	  ways.	  
Regulatory	  focus	  was	  experimentally	  induced	  in	  a	  different	  way,	  and	  the	  dependent	  
variable	  was	  altered	  to	  a	  different	  way	  of	  being	  generous—being	  generous	  with	  one’s	  time	  
(volunteering)	  rather	  than	  one’s	  money	  (charitable	  donation).	  In	  addition,	  and	  most	  
importantly,	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  regulatory	  fit	  effect	  on	  moral	  decisions	  was	  examined.	  
Previous	  research	  has	  found	  that	  there	  is	  an	  asymmetry	  between	  the	  promotion	  and	  
prevention	  systems	  regarding	  whether	  it	  is	  positive	  or	  negative	  outcomes,	  including	  
success	  versus	  failure	  feedback,	  that	  strengthens	  motivation	  and	  subsequent	  action	  more	  
(e.g.,	  Idson	  &	  Higgins,	  2000;	  Idson,	  Liberman,	  &	  Higgins,	  2004;	  Van	  Dijk	  &	  Kluger,	  2004,	  
2011).	  For	  the	  promotion	  system,	  motivation	  and	  action	  is	  stronger	  when	  positive	  (vs.	  
negative)	  outcomes	  occur	  or	  are	  anticipated,	  including	  success	  versus	  failure	  performance	  
feedback,	  because	  positive	  outcomes	  sustain	  the	  eagerness	  that	  is	  a	  fit	  for	  the	  promotion	  
system.	  In	  contrast,	  for	  the	  prevention	  system,	  motivation	  and	  action	  is	  stronger	  when	  
negative	  (vs.	  positive)	  outcomes	  occur	  or	  are	  anticipated,	  including	  success	  versus	  failure	  
performance	  feedback,	  because	  negative	  outcomes	  sustain	  the	  vigilance	  that	  is	  a	  fit	  for	  the	  
prevention	  system.	  In	  this	  study,	  regulatory	  focus	  was	  experimentally	  induced	  and	  then	  
task	  performance	  feedback	  was	  given	  that	  could	  be	  perceived	  as	  ‘success’	  feedback	  or	  
‘failure’	  feedback.	  It	  was	  predicted	  that	  for	  participants	  induced	  into	  a	  promotion	  state,	  
motivation	  would	  be	  strengthened	  more	  when	  the	  feedback	  was	  perceived	  as	  a	  ‘success’	  
than	  a	  ‘failure,’	  which	  in	  turn	  would	  translate	  into	  more	  volunteering	  of	  one’s	  time,	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whereas	  the	  opposite	  effect	  of	  perceived	  feedback	  would	  occur	  for	  participants	  induced	  
into	  a	  prevention	  state.	  
Participants	  
	   One	  hundred	  thirty	  participants	  (53	  male,	  76	  female,	  one	  unspecified)	  were	  
recruited	  from	  the	  Columbia	  Behavioral	  Research	  lab.	  	  There	  were	  no	  sex	  differences	  for	  
any	  of	  the	  variables	  examined	  in	  this	  study.	  	  All	  participants	  were	  randomized	  to	  one	  of	  the	  
two	  experimental	  conditions	  below.	  	  As	  in	  the	  previous	  study,	  we	  queried	  participants	  
about	  rules	  regarding	  volunteering,	  and	  excluded	  participants	  who	  indicated	  that	  they	  did	  
have	  such	  rules.	  	  Twenty-­‐nine	  participants	  (9	  males	  and	  20	  females)	  were	  excluded	  for	  this	  
reason,	  leaving	  a	  sample	  of	  44	  males	  and	  56	  females.	  
Procedure	  
	   Before	  completing	  any	  of	  the	  other	  tasks	  in	  the	  study,	  participants	  first	  completed	  a	  
moral	  recall	  task.	  	  This	  task	  was	  modeled	  on	  the	  content	  of	  the	  Regulatory	  Focus	  
Questionnaire,	  since	  the	  strongest	  predictor	  of	  moral	  behavior	  in	  the	  previous	  two	  studies	  
was	  regulatory	  focus	  pride	  predominance.	  	  Therefore,	  we	  designed	  two	  recall	  tasks	  aimed	  
at	  either	  simultaneously	  lowering	  one’s	  promotion	  emphasis	  while	  increasing	  one’s	  
prevention	  emphasis	  or	  lowering	  one’s	  prevention	  emphasis	  while	  increasing	  one’s	  
promotion	  emphasis.	  The	  task	  asked	  participants	  to	  “recall	  a	  time”	  when	  they	  either	  gave	  
up	  a	  gain	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  for	  the	  needs	  and	  security	  of	  another	  person	  (lowering	  
promotion	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  prevention)	  or	  incurred	  a	  loss	  for	  the	  advancement	  and	  growth	  
of	  another	  person	  (lowering	  prevention	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  promotion).	  	  Such	  a	  task	  was	  
designed	  to	  induce	  regulatory	  focus	  pride	  predominance	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  past	  moral	  
action	  accordance	  with	  the	  previous	  studies.	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   Following	  the	  induction	  task,	  participants	  completed	  the	  anagram	  task	  from	  the	  
previous	  studies,	  except	  that	  in	  this	  case	  they	  all	  received	  identical	  false	  feedback.	  	  All	  
participants	  were	  told	  they	  fell	  into	  the	  72nd	  percentile,	  which	  was	  slightly	  above	  the	  
standard	  provided	  for	  an	  “A”	  in	  a	  college-­‐level	  English	  course.	  	  Such	  feedback	  could	  be	  
interpreted	  a	  number	  of	  different	  ways	  depending	  on	  the	  participant,	  so	  we	  followed	  the	  
feedback	  with	  a	  series	  of	  follow-­‐up	  questions,	  with	  one	  in	  particular	  probing	  participants’	  
sense	  of	  success	  or	  failure	  in	  the	  task	  (1	  =	  “completely	  a	  failure”	  and	  9	  =	  “completely	  a	  
success”).	  	  This	  would	  constitute	  the	  feedback	  variable,	  which	  should	  produce	  different	  
subsequent	  moral	  decision	  making	  dependent	  upon	  the	  regulatory	  focus	  system	  that	  was	  
experimentally	  induced	  by	  the	  “recall	  a	  time”	  manipulation	  (promotion	  emphasis	  or	  
prevention	  emphasis).	  
	   After	  this	  follow-­‐up	  questionnaire,	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  a	  request	  to	  
help	  the	  lab	  by	  volunteering	  to	  participate	  in	  future	  studies.	  	  They	  were	  told	  that	  future	  
study	  sessions	  were	  each	  15	  minutes,	  that	  they	  could	  be	  scheduled	  during	  a	  time	  
convenient	  for	  the	  participant,	  and	  to	  indicate	  how	  many	  slots	  for	  which	  they	  would	  be	  
willing	  to	  volunteer.	  
	   Finally,	  before	  receiving	  their	  debriefing,	  participants	  were	  provided	  with	  one	  final	  
follow-­‐up	  questionnaire	  to	  probe	  their	  sense	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  reasoning	  about	  whether	  
or	  not	  to	  volunteer	  (without	  pay).	  	  Importantly,	  we	  included	  a	  question	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  
manipulation	  check,	  asking	  whether	  they	  perceived	  volunteering	  for	  research	  as	  being	  
more	  about	  doing	  one’s	  duty	  or	  about	  being	  a	  virtuous	  person	  (1	  =	  “more	  about	  duty”	  and	  9	  
=	  “more	  about	  virtue”).	  	  As	  in	  the	  previous	  study,	  we	  also	  asked	  participants	  to	  indicate	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whether	  they	  had	  any	  prior	  rules	  about	  how	  to	  make	  these	  decisions,	  and	  excluded	  those	  
who	  indicated	  that	  they	  did	  from	  our	  analysis	  as	  noted	  above.	  	  
Results	  
	   	  As	  expected,	  those	  participants	  who	  received	  the	  “recall	  a	  time”	  promotion	  
emphasis	  perceived	  volunteering	  as	  more	  about	  being	  a	  virtuous	  person	  (M=	  5.76)	  
compared	  to	  those	  who	  received	  a	  “recall	  a	  time”	  prevention	  emphasis	  who	  saw	  
volunteering	  as	  being	  more	  about	  doing	  one’s	  duty	  (M=	  4.83;	  t(94)	  =	  -­‐2.05,	  p	  =	  0.04).	  	  This	  
further	  confirms	  the	  association	  between	  the	  prevention	  focus	  and	  an	  ethics	  of	  Right	  or	  
duty,	  and	  the	  promotion	  focus	  and	  an	  ethics	  of	  Good	  or	  virtue.	  	  Also	  as	  expected,	  for	  the	  
amount	  of	  volunteering	  time	  offered,	  analyzed	  with	  a	  logistic	  regression,	  there	  was	  a	  
significant	  interaction	  between	  the	  “recall	  a	  time”	  manipulation	  and	  perceiving	  the	  
feedback	  performance	  as	  a	  success	  versus	  a	  failure	  (OR	  =	  1.97,	  z	  =	  2.13,	  p	  =	  0.03),	  with	  
those	  participants	  who	  received	  the	  “recall	  a	  time”	  promotion	  emphasis	  volunteering	  more	  
time	  when	  they	  perceived	  the	  anagram	  performance	  feedback	  as	  ‘success’	  feedback	  than	  	  
‘failure’	  feedback,	  and	  those	  participants	  who	  received	  the	  “recall	  a	  time”	  prevention	  
emphasis	  volunteering	  more	  time	  when	  they	  perceived	  the	  anagram	  performance	  feedback	  
as	  ‘failure’	  feedback	  than	  ‘success’	  feedback.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  all	  
participants	  received	  identical	  feedback;	  the	  only	  difference	  was	  in	  their	  perception	  of	  it	  as	  
‘success’	  feedback	  versus	  ‘failure’	  feedback.	  	  Importantly,	  there	  were	  no	  differences	  in	  
perceptions	  of	  success	  or	  failure	  according	  to	  promotion	  or	  prevention	  emphasis	  in	  the	  





Figure	  4.6:	  The	  number	  of	  time	  slots	  volunteered	  as	  a	  function	  of	  “recall	  a	  time”	  promotion	  
emphasis	  or	  prevention	  emphasis	  and	  perceiving	  the	  anagram	  performance	  feedback	  as	  
success	  or	  failure.	  	  
	  
	   If	  the	  number	  of	  hours	  volunteered	  was	  analyzed	  using	  a	  Poisson	  regression	  (used	  
for	  assessing	  differences	  in	  counts)	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  interaction	  produced	  differences	  in	  
the	  number	  of	  slots	  participants	  were	  willing	  to	  volunteer	  for,	  we	  found	  significant	  
differences	  in	  line	  with	  the	  basic	  volunteering	  differences	  above.	  	  Those	  who	  received	  a	  
“recall	  a	  time”	  promotion	  emphasis	  volunteered	  more	  hours	  when	  receiving	  perceived	  
success	  (vs.	  failure)	  feedback,	  whereas	  those	  who	  received	  a	  “recall	  a	  time”	  promotion	  
emphasis	  volunteered	  more	  hours	  when	  receiving	  perceived	  failure	  (vs.	  success)	  feedback	  
(IRR	  =	  1.31,	  z	  =	  2.92,	  p	  =	  0.004).	  	  This	  effect	  is	  visualized	  in	  Figure	  4.6.	  
This	  research	  further	  confirms	  the	  association	  of	  the	  two	  regulatory	  focus	  systems	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relevant	  feedback	  for	  engaging	  or	  failing	  to	  engage	  in	  moral	  behavior	  depending	  upon	  how	  
that	  behavior	  was	  construed	  (either	  as	  duty-­‐fulfillment	  or	  virtue-­‐seeking).	  	  It	  also	  shows	  
effects	  in	  line	  with	  the	  previous	  two	  studies	  using	  a	  different	  method	  of	  inducing	  regulatory	  
focus	  and	  a	  different	  dependent	  measure	  of	  positive	  moral	  behavior.	  Importantly,	  this	  
confirms	  that	  the	  different	  kinds	  of	  feedback	  can	  influence	  subsequent	  decision	  making	  
dependent	  upon	  whether	  an	  individual	  is	  processing	  in	  a	  manner	  congruent	  with	  
promotion	  predominance	  or	  prevention	  predominance,	  consistent	  with	  work	  on	  regulatory	  
fit	  (Higgins,	  2000;	  2005a).	  	  This	  is	  of	  interest	  given	  the	  results	  from	  Study	  2	  in	  which	  the	  
emotional	  feedback	  from	  decision	  making	  differed	  based	  on	  ethical	  choices.	  	  This	  research	  
suggests	  that	  the	  feedback	  may	  have	  a	  different	  impact	  on	  subsequent	  decisions	  based	  
upon	  one’s	  predominant	  regulatory	  focus—a	  possibility	  that	  will	  be	  fleshed	  out	  in	  more	  
detail	  below.	  
4.5	   The	  Role	  of	  Virtue	  in	  Moral	  Decisions	  
	  
	   The	  above	  research	  supports	  both	  hypotheses:	  (1)	  that	  the	  desire	  for	  virtue	  
represents	  a	  motivating	  self-­‐guide	  that	  is	  distinct	  from	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  duty;	  and	  (2)	  that	  
when	  there	  is	  a	  regulatory	  fit	  between	  individuals’	  promotion	  virtue	  emphasis	  or	  
individuals’	  prevention	  duty	  emphasis	  and	  aspects	  of	  the	  current	  situation,	  such	  as	  eager	  
versus	  vigilant	  means	  of	  ethical	  becoming	  (eager	  for	  promotion	  virtue	  and	  vigilant	  for	  
prevention	  duty)	  or	  perceiving	  task	  performance	  as	  a	  ‘success’	  or	  ‘failure’	  (‘success’	  for	  
promotion	  virtue	  and	  ‘failure’	  for	  prevention	  duty),	  then	  greater	  moral	  behavior	  will	  occur.	  
	   In	  all	  three	  studies,	  whether	  the	  dependent	  measure	  was	  the	  moral	  behavior	  itself	  
or	  the	  emotions	  experienced	  as	  a	  result	  of	  acting	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  moral	  
standards,	  the	  results	  support	  there	  being	  two	  kinds	  of	  motivations	  for	  moral	  behavior	  and	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decisions,	  and	  that	  these	  two	  systems	  are	  functionally	  independent	  of	  one	  another.	  	  This	  
should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  for	  the	  system	  of	  moral	  duty,	  with	  its	  attendant	  feelings	  of	  guilt	  
as	  a	  relevant	  self-­‐regulatory	  emotion,	  but	  the	  system	  of	  ethical	  virtue	  merits	  additional	  
research.	  
	   Another	  important	  result	  of	  the	  above	  research	  is	  the	  establishment	  of	  regulatory	  fit	  
as	  important	  not	  only	  to	  moral	  judgment	  (Camacho,	  Higgins,	  &	  Luger,	  2003),	  but	  also	  to	  
moral	  behavior	  itself.	  	  While	  regulatory	  fit	  research	  has	  expanded	  beyond	  mere	  judgments	  
or	  even	  intentions	  to	  the	  likelihood	  of	  engaging	  in	  actual	  behavior,	  this	  represents	  the	  first	  
time	  regulatory	  fit	  has	  been	  examined	  in	  the	  context	  of	  moral	  behavior.	  	  Acknowledging	  the	  
two	  distinct	  kinds	  of	  moral	  self-­‐guides	  should	  serve	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  future	  research	  
exploring	  this	  phenomenon.	  
4.6	   Implications	  for	  Future	  Research	  
	  
	   These	  two	  regulatory	  self-­‐guides	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  research	  in	  the	  
fields	  of	  decision	  making	  and	  behavior.	  	  First,	  there	  are	  important	  implications	  here	  for	  the	  
role	  of	  moral	  emotions	  in	  decision	  making	  and	  behavior.	  	  As	  noted	  above,	  researchers	  have	  
shown	  that	  moral	  behavior	  tends	  to	  be	  more	  strongly	  motivated	  by	  affect	  rather	  than	  
reasoning.	  	  Those	  interested	  in	  raising	  moral	  children	  then	  would	  want	  to	  know	  which	  
emotions	  they	  ought	  to	  aim	  to	  have	  their	  children	  experience	  in	  order	  to	  motivate	  them	  to	  
engage	  in	  the	  most	  frequent	  moral	  behavior.	  	  As	  one	  might	  expect	  given	  the	  above	  results,	  
researchers	  have	  found	  that	  different	  emotions	  have	  different	  results.	  	  For	  example,	  
showing	  disappointment	  has	  very	  different	  results	  compared	  to	  showing	  anger	  (Eisenberg,	  
2000).	  	  Just	  as	  different	  kinds	  of	  punishments	  will	  be	  experienced	  differently	  depending	  
upon	  one’s	  regulatory	  focus	  (Camacho,	  Higgins,	  &	  Luger,	  2003),	  different	  kinds	  of	  emotions	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(both	  positive	  and	  negative)	  will	  be	  experienced	  differently	  dependent	  upon	  one’s	  
regulatory	  focus.	  
This	  research	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  another	  area	  as	  well.	  	  An	  entire	  
subfield	  of	  moral	  psychology,	  that	  examining	  “moral	  licensing”—the	  phenomenon	  that	  
occurs	  when	  a	  past	  moral	  action	  “licenses”	  one	  to	  behave	  selfishly	  in	  a	  present	  context	  
(Sachdeva,	  Iliev,	  &	  Medin,	  2009)—has	  generally	  conceived	  of	  morality	  as	  unitary	  in	  
structure,	  theorizing	  that	  individuals	  perceive	  themselves	  along	  a	  continuum	  running	  from	  
immoral	  to	  moral.	  	  	  This	  is	  true	  even	  in	  research	  examining	  how	  moral	  motivation	  may	  be	  
influenced	  by	  other	  non-­‐moral	  psychological	  factors,	  such	  as	  construal	  level	  (Conway	  &	  
Peetz,	  2012).	  	  
	   The	  present	  research	  may	  help	  to	  better	  understand	  this	  phenomenon	  (as	  well	  as	  
understand	  why,	  in	  many	  circumstances,	  moral	  licensing	  does	  not	  occur,	  e.g.	  Zhang,	  
Cornwell,	  &	  Higgins,	  2014).	  	  If,	  rather	  than	  having	  a	  unitary	  sense	  of	  moral	  self-­‐hood,	  
individuals	  have	  two	  ways	  of	  being	  moral	  or	  immoral	  that	  are	  orthogonal	  to	  one	  another,	  
moral	  licensing	  effects	  in	  any	  given	  situation	  could	  depend	  critically	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  
situation	  and	  the	  type	  of	  the	  moral	  or	  immoral	  behavior	  recalled	  previously.	  	  The	  research	  
on	  regulatory	  focus	  theory	  and	  regulatory	  fit,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  philosophical	  understandings	  
of	  differences	  between	  duty	  and	  virtue	  as	  motivations	  for	  moral	  action,	  could	  potentially	  be	  
very	  instructive	  here.	  	  Perhaps	  this	  conceptualization	  can	  make	  meaningful	  contributions	  
to	  this	  nascent	  field	  of	  research	  and	  improve	  our	  ability	  to	  predict	  decision	  making	  and	  
behavior	  more	  accurately.	  
	   One	  way	  in	  which	  the	  present	  research	  is	  limited	  in	  accounting	  for	  moral	  behavior	  
generally	  is	  that	  it	  was	  restricted	  to	  regulatory	  fit	  in	  the	  moment.	  	  Indeed,	  this	  is	  also	  true	  of	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virtually	  all	  research	  on	  regulatory	  fit.	  However,	  theoretically,	  the	  relevant	  self-­‐regulatory	  
systems	  associated	  with	  fit	  can	  be	  measured	  chronically	  as	  well	  as	  being	  situationally	  
induced	  (Higgins	  et	  al,	  2000;	  Kruglanski	  et	  al,	  2000),	  so	  it	  stands	  to	  reason	  that	  the	  same	  
would	  be	  true	  about	  their	  mutual	  support	  when	  they	  converge	  to	  produce	  fit.	  	  That	  is,	  in	  
addition	  to	  being	  able	  to	  momentarily	  induce	  regulatory	  fit,	  it	  should	  be	  possible	  to	  
measure	  a	  kind	  of	  chronic	  regulatory	  fit	  among	  those	  for	  whom	  the	  three	  different	  kinds	  of	  
motivations	  work	  together	  effectively	  (see	  Higgins,	  2012	  or	  Franks	  &	  Higgins,	  2012	  for	  a	  
discussion	  of	  this	  possibility).	  	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  for	  morality,	  which,	  as	  noted	  
above,	  is	  something	  that	  unfolds	  across	  time	  given	  the	  importance	  of	  “becoming”	  in	  human	  
consciousness	  (Higgins,	  2005b).	  In	  the	  final	  experimental	  section,	  I	  will	  discuss	  this	  
phenomenon	  through	  the	  examination	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  virtue	  in	  the	  context	  of	  moral	  
character—the	  experience	  of	  “the	  good	  life.”	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Chapter	  5:	  Moral	  Character	  -­‐	  Virtue	  as	  Integrity	  
	  
	   In	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  I	  noted	  the	  role	  of	  the	  emotions	  and	  regulatory	  fit	  in	  
bringing	  about	  moral	  action	  in	  particular	  situations.	  	  However,	  these	  examples	  explored	  in	  
only	  a	  very	  limited	  way	  how	  fit	  could	  have	  downstream	  effects	  for	  subsequent	  moral	  
actions.	  It	  stands	  to	  reason,	  however,	  that	  one	  could	  experience	  “fit”	  in	  a	  chronic	  way	  as	  
well—as	  the	  sense	  that	  one’s	  beliefs,	  actions,	  and	  values	  all	  “flow”	  and	  provide	  one	  with	  a	  
sense	  of	  “fit”	  with	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  one	  lives	  (see	  also	  Higgins,	  2012).	  	  Thus,	  one	  is	  
able	  not	  only	  to	  “feel	  right”	  about	  a	  particular	  behavior,	  belief,	  or	  intention,	  but	  also	  to	  “feel	  
right”	  about	  one’s	  life	  as	  a	  whole.	  	  It	  is	  this	  “feeling	  right”	  that	  I	  want	  to	  argue	  is	  the	  
experience	  of	  the	  “good	  life”	  in	  both	  senses:	  “good”	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  well	  (well-­‐being	  or	  
“happiness”)	  and	  “good”	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  being	  good	  (morality).	  	  This	  experience	  represents	  
how	  one	  can	  move	  from	  a	  moral	  decision	  or	  moral	  behavior	  to	  the	  more	  general	  concept	  of	  
a	  moral	  character.	  
	   The	  issue	  of	  moral	  character	  raises	  a	  very	  central	  question:	  what	  makes	  a	  life	  good?	  	  
Setting	  aside	  superfluous	  things	  like	  high	  birth	  and	  wealth,	  for	  example,	  the	  Buddha	  argued	  
that	  there	  are	  two	  elements	  necessary	  for	  a	  noble	  life:	  wisdom	  and	  ethics	  (Walshe,	  1995).	  	  
“Wisdom”	  in	  this	  sense	  is	  analogous	  to	  how	  the	  ancient	  Greeks	  understood	  the	  virtue	  of	  
prudence	  (“good	  sense”),	  or	  the	  ability	  to	  see	  situations	  as	  they	  really	  are,	  and	  effectively	  
plan	  how	  to	  act	  in	  a	  particular	  way	  to	  get	  from	  means	  to	  end	  (Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009).	  	  
“Ethics,”	  as	  it	  was	  understood	  by	  thinkers	  from	  this	  era,	  involves	  control	  over	  oneself	  in	  
order	  that	  the	  plan	  determined	  by	  prudence	  may	  be	  carried	  out	  effectively	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
temptations	  to	  selfishness	  (countered	  by	  justice),	  fear	  (countered	  by	  courage),	  or	  desire	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(countered	  by	  temperance).	  	  These	  four	  virtues,	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “cardinal”	  virtues,	  
make	  up	  the	  means	  by	  which	  an	  individual	  establishes	  what	  is	  real	  (truth)	  and	  manages	  
what	  happens	  (control);	  often	  separated	  into	  “intellectual”	  and	  “moral”	  virtues,	  
respectively	  (Aquinas,	  1981/1274).	  	  These	  strengths	  of	  character	  combine	  to	  produce	  a	  life	  
experienced	  as	  worthwhile	  (value),	  or,	  in	  Aristotle’s	  (trans.	  2009)	  parlance:	  eudaimonia	  
(“happiness”	  or	  “flourishing”).	  
	   I	  will	  argue	  that	  a	  theory	  of	  the	  organization	  of	  motives	  provides	  a	  lens	  through	  
which	  to	  examine	  this	  relational	  harmony.	  	  Active	  virtue,	  as	  the	  ancients	  understood	  it,	  
should	  be	  synonymous	  with	  the	  good	  life	  (Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009).	  	  That	  is,	  happiness,	  
rightly	  understood,	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  acquisition	  of	  one’s	  desires,	  but	  the	  proper	  
organization	  of	  motives	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  world	  (Porter,	  1993).	  	  This	  section	  will	  be	  
devoted	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  scale	  that	  I	  will	  argue	  is	  related	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  this	  
concept	  of	  virtue	  within	  a	  person’s	  character—the	  experience	  of	  “the	  good	  life.”	  	  	  
5.1	   Review	  of	  Existing	  Literature	  
	  
	   There	  are	  two	  basic	  views	  of	  “the	  good	  life”	  in	  the	  psychology	  literature.	  	  The	  first	  is	  
the	  more	  widespread:	  that	  “happiness”	  or	  the	  “goodness”	  of	  a	  life	  is	  bound	  up	  in	  the	  degree	  
to	  which	  one	  subjectively	  values	  it.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  “good	  life”	  is	  the	  one	  with	  which	  
one	  has	  had	  one’s	  desires	  satisfied	  (Diener	  et	  al,	  1985).	  	  This	  “subjective	  satisfaction”	  view	  
of	  happiness,	  as	  noted	  in	  the	  introduction,	  has	  had	  a	  major	  influence	  on	  the	  study	  of	  
motivation	  (which,	  until	  recently,	  has	  focused	  almost	  exclusively	  on	  approaching	  pleasure	  
and	  avoiding	  pain)	  and	  the	  structuring	  of	  society	  (which	  tends	  to	  be	  built	  around	  this	  
hedonic	  principle).	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   However,	  an	  alternative	  view	  has	  arisen	  in	  recent	  years	  to	  challenge	  the	  
comprehensiveness	  of	  this	  popular	  approach.	  	  This	  view	  sees	  happiness	  as	  instantiated	  in	  
the	  acquisition	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  character	  strengths	  or	  psychological	  resources,	  the	  effective	  
application	  of	  which	  bring	  about	  a	  happy	  and	  meaningful	  life	  (Diener	  et	  al,	  2009).	  	  This	  
notion	  that	  happiness	  is	  not	  simply	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  one’s	  desires,	  but	  also	  the	  condition	  
of	  one’s	  character,	  has	  a	  long	  pedigree	  in	  philosophy	  (e.g.	  Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009;	  Geatch,	  
1977)	  and	  in	  popular	  intuitions	  (King	  &	  Napa,	  1998;	  Phillips,	  Misenheimer,	  &	  Knobe,	  
2011),	  but	  has	  only	  recently	  been	  explored	  in	  the	  context	  of	  psychology	  (Peterson	  &	  
Seligman,	  2004).	  	  This	  shift	  was	  due	  to	  an	  embracing	  of	  what	  has	  been	  termed	  “positive”	  
psychology—the	  psychology	  not	  just	  of	  desire	  satisfaction	  (i.e.	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  
satisfactory	  state),	  but	  of	  human	  flourishing	  (i.e.	  the	  attainment	  of	  some	  ideal).	  	  The	  
foregoing	  chapters	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  application	  of	  this	  “virtue”	  point	  of	  view	  to	  the	  areas	  
of	  moral	  judgment	  and	  moral	  decision	  making,	  as	  well	  as	  how	  these	  ethical	  desires	  
influence	  such	  activities.	  However,	  this	  discussion	  of	  happiness	  requires	  additional	  fleshing	  
out.	  
	   While	  this	  view	  of	  happiness	  as	  consisting	  in	  the	  acquisition	  of	  character	  strengths	  
is	  in	  many	  ways	  an	  improvement	  over	  the	  idea	  of	  happiness	  as	  simply	  a	  matter	  of	  
subjective	  satisfaction,	  it	  still	  does	  not	  represent	  the	  whole	  picture.	  	  Each	  of	  the	  character	  
strengths	  is	  considered	  functionally	  independent	  of	  each	  of	  the	  others,	  which	  would	  imply	  
that	  a	  “good	  character”	  is	  one	  in	  which	  the	  greatest	  number	  of	  strengths	  were	  amassed	  to	  
their	  greatest	  intensity.	  	  Additionally,	  one	  can	  even	  imagine	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  may	  
conflict	  with	  one	  another,	  which	  is	  probably	  why	  Peterson	  and	  Seligman	  (2004)	  adopt	  a	  
“signature	  strength”	  approach,	  in	  which	  they	  recommend	  individuals	  focus	  mostly	  on	  their	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greatest	  strength.	  	  However,	  if	  ancient	  and	  classical	  philosophers	  (see	  Porter,	  1993),	  and	  
even	  some	  psychologists	  (Higgins,	  2012;	  Schwartz	  &	  Sharpe,	  2006),	  are	  to	  be	  believed,	  the	  
harmonious	  interrelationship	  of	  strengths	  should	  matter	  as	  well.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  must	  not	  
be	  entirely	  forgotten	  that	  the	  subjective	  sense	  of	  satisfaction	  in	  meeting	  one’s	  goals	  is	  also	  
an	  important	  part	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  have	  a	  good	  life	  given	  that	  these	  strengths	  enable	  the	  
attainment	  of	  the	  goods	  of	  life.	  Thus,	  any	  comprehensive	  account	  should	  include	  both	  
elements.	  
	   Before	  exploring	  what	  such	  a	  model	  would	  look	  like	  and	  how	  it	  builds	  on	  a	  synthesis	  
of	  these	  two	  perspectives	  in	  line	  with	  the	  motivational	  framework	  laid	  out	  above,	  the	  
essence	  of	  what	  I	  mean	  by	  “character”	  and	  “virtue”	  needs	  to	  be	  explicitly	  formulated.	  	  After	  
all,	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  recent	  evidence	  that	  “character	  talk”	  has	  considerable	  utility	  for	  how	  we	  
understand	  ourselves	  and	  one	  another	  (Pizarro	  &	  Tannenbaum,	  2011;	  Goodwin,	  Piazza,	  &	  
Rozin,	  2014),	  as	  social	  psychologists,	  we	  consider	  the	  situation	  to	  be	  an	  important	  
determinant	  of	  behavior	  and	  not	  simply	  a	  person’s	  internal	  “traits,”	  especially	  given	  the	  
predictive	  limitations	  of	  a	  purely	  “trait”	  perspective	  (e.g.,	  Harsthorne	  &	  May,	  1928;	  Mischel,	  
1968).	  	  
5.2	   Situations,	  Persons,	  and	  Virtues	  
	  
	   First,	  it	  must	  be	  stated	  at	  the	  outset	  that	  the	  reason	  virtues	  have	  been	  so	  difficult	  to	  
spot	  is	  because	  they	  don’t	  “exist.”	  	  That	  is,	  virtues	  don’t	  exist	  in	  the	  abstract	  “within”	  a	  
person	  apart	  from	  the	  situations	  in	  which	  they	  are	  enacted.	  	  Virtues,	  in	  contrast,	  exist	  only	  
within	  the	  context	  of	  particular	  situations.	  	  Virtues	  are	  not	  the	  “average”	  amount	  of	  how	  
much	  a	  particular	  individual	  does	  this	  or	  that	  thing	  across	  situations,	  but	  instead	  habits	  of	  
character	  or	  patterns	  of	  activation	  in	  response	  to	  particular	  kinds	  of	  contexts.	  	  This	  is	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perfectly	  in	  line	  with	  recent	  personality	  theory	  that	  sees	  real	  consistency	  as	  an	  expression	  
of	  certain	  kinds	  of	  individuals’	  traits	  contextualized	  within	  situations	  (Shoda,	  Mischel,	  &	  
Wright,	  1994).	  	  Another	  way	  to	  this	  is	  that	  virtues	  are	  patterns	  rather	  than	  traits.	  
“Virtue”	  then,	  in	  this	  classic	  sense,	  is	  closer	  to	  modern	  notions	  of	  “self-­‐control”	  or	  
“self-­‐possession”	  than	  it	  is	  to	  contemporary	  notions	  of	  morality	  per	  se.	  	  In	  order	  to	  further	  
develop	  this	  point,	  it	  is	  worth	  working	  through	  an	  example	  that	  might	  be	  proposed	  by	  a	  
contemporary	  Aristotelian	  to	  illustrate	  this	  idea.	  	  Suppose	  an	  individual	  were	  presented	  
with	  the	  opportunity	  to	  use	  a	  pleasurable	  but	  addictive	  and	  illegal	  substance.	  	  The	  
individual	  has	  two	  choices:	  she	  can	  either	  take	  the	  substance,	  or	  she	  can	  refuse	  to	  take	  the	  
substance.	  	  If	  she	  decided	  not	  to	  take	  the	  substance,	  the	  reasoning	  may	  look	  something	  like	  
this:	  
1. Illegal	  and	  addictive	  substances	  are	  to	  be	  avoided.	  
2. This	  is	  an	  illegal	  and	  potentially	  addictive	  substance.	  
3. Therefore,	  I	  will	  refuse	  to	  use	  the	  substance.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  should	  she	  decide	  to	  take	  the	  substance,	  her	  reasoning	  may	  look	  like	  
this:	  
1. Everything	  that	  is	  pleasurable	  is	  to	  be	  enjoyed.	  
2. Using	  this	  substance	  produces	  pleasure.	  
3. Therefore,	  I	  will	  use	  the	  substance.	  
A	  virtue	  theorist	  would	  not	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  explicit	  reasoning	  necessarily	  occurs	  in	  the	  
mind	  of	  the	  decider,	  only	  that	  both	  of	  her	  decisions	  are	  rationally	  intelligible	  (the	  reasoning	  
may,	  of	  course,	  be	  post-­‐hoc	  rationalization	  of	  behavior,	  but	  it	  is	  still	  reasonable).	  	  However,	  
it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  virtue	  theorists	  claim	  that	  decisions	  to	  behave	  one	  way	  or	  the	  
	  107	  
other	  in	  situations	  like	  this	  are	  not	  simply	  decisions	  between	  two	  actions,	  they	  are	  
decisions	  between	  two	  entirely	  different	  patterns	  of	  thinking.	  	  Furthermore,	  they	  argue	  that	  
repeatedly	  making	  such	  a	  decision	  between	  these	  ways	  of	  thinking	  can	  have	  lasting	  
effects.25	  
	   What	  are	  these	  effects?	  	  For	  a	  virtue	  theorist,	  individuals	  can	  belong	  to	  one	  of	  four	  
ethical	  stages:	  they	  can	  be	  virtuous,	  controlled,	  uncontrolled,	  or	  vicious	  (Aquinas,	  
1274/1981).	  	  It	  is	  posited	  that	  controlled	  and	  uncontrolled	  individuals	  represent	  an	  ethical	  
“starting	  point.”	  	  At	  this	  juncture,	  both	  decision	  paths	  are	  open	  to	  the	  individual,	  and	  both	  
patterns	  of	  reasoning	  have	  an	  allure.	  	  Yet	  in	  the	  heat	  of	  the	  moment,	  certain	  courses	  of	  
action	  may	  appear	  more	  attractive	  than	  they	  are	  otherwise.	  	  This	  is	  where	  the	  controlled	  
versus	  uncontrolled	  distinction	  comes	  in.	  	  If	  the	  person	  chooses	  the	  course	  of	  action	  that	  
she	  would	  have	  chosen	  while	  uninfluenced	  by	  experiences	  induced	  by	  the	  situational	  
circumstances,	  then	  she	  is	  a	  controlled	  person	  in	  that	  situation.	  	  If	  she	  chooses	  the	  course	  of	  
action	  that	  she	  would	  prefer	  not	  to	  take	  because	  she	  is	  influenced	  by	  some	  “outside”	  
influence	  (including	  the	  internal	  passions	  in	  response	  to	  those	  influences	  like	  fear	  or	  
desire)	  then	  she	  is	  an	  uncontrolled	  person	  in	  that	  situation.	  
	   The	  virtuous	  and	  vicious	  stages	  are	  a	  step	  beyond	  that	  in	  either	  direction.	  	  The	  
virtuous	  person	  is	  the	  one	  who	  always	  chooses	  as	  she	  would	  if	  she	  were	  uninfluenced	  by	  
passions	  induced	  by	  the	  situation,	  and	  is	  not	  influenced	  by	  the	  allure	  of	  the	  opposing	  choice	  
(i.e.,	  a	  person	  who	  consistently	  shows	  the	  same	  moral	  pattern	  of	  action	  within	  a	  given	  
situation).	  	  The	  vicious	  person	  is	  the	  one	  who	  no	  longer	  even	  tries	  to	  overcome	  the	  
passions	  that	  influence	  her	  in	  the	  situation,	  and	  so	  always	  chooses	  the	  course	  of	  action	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  And	  this	  does	  indeed	  appear	  to	  be	  the	  intuition	  of	  observers	  who	  are	  aware	  of	  this	  repeated	  decision	  
making	  across	  situations—see	  Higgins	  &	  Winter	  (1993).	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determined	  by	  those	  passions.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  according	  to	  virtue	  theory,	  the	  
virtuous	  person	  is	  not	  an	  emotionless	  robot,	  only	  that	  her	  emotions	  are	  ordered	  in	  such	  a	  
way	  that	  she	  automatically	  makes	  the	  choices	  she	  would	  make	  were	  she	  given	  the	  time	  to	  
reason	  through	  them	  without	  being	  driven	  off	  her	  desired	  course	  by	  passions	  induced	  by	  
the	  immediate	  circumstances	  of	  the	  environment.	  	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  notion	  that	  in	  
a	  virtuous	  person,	  the	  different	  aspects	  of	  one’s	  motivation	  (which	  includes	  emotional	  
experiences,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter)	  work	  together	  rather	  than	  at	  odds	  with	  
one	  another.	  	  	  
Virtue	  ethicists	  believe	  that	  the	  achievement	  of	  virtue	  comes	  through	  “practice,”	  that	  
is,	  making	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  decision	  repeatedly	  in	  a	  particular	  kind	  of	  situation	  to	  the	  
end	  that	  those	  decisions	  are	  more	  readily	  made	  compared	  to	  their	  alternatives.	  	  It	  is	  
important	  to	  note	  that	  to	  this	  point,	  nothing	  has	  been	  said	  about	  the	  moral	  content	  of	  virtue	  
theory	  (i.e.,	  what	  are	  the	  “right”	  or	  “wrong”	  behaviors),	  only	  about	  the	  process	  of	  achieving	  
virtue.	  
I	  mentioned	  in	  an	  earlier	  section	  that	  I	  believe	  contemporary	  psychology	  can	  be	  
used	  to	  understand	  this	  process.	  A	  psychologist	  looking	  over	  the	  scenario	  outlined	  earlier	  
would	  likely	  notice	  the	  similarity	  between	  the	  two	  courses	  of	  action,	  and	  the	  psychological	  
notion	  of	  a	  script.	  	  Researchers	  (Sullivan,	  1953;	  Berne,	  1964;	  Shank	  &	  Abelson,	  1977)	  have	  
theorized	  the	  importance	  of	  scripts	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  human	  goals,	  planning,	  and	  
behavior.	  	  A	  behavioral	  script	  embodies	  the	  knowledge	  of	  contingent	  stereotyped	  event	  
sequences.	  	  These	  scripts	  guide	  human	  behavior	  in	  a	  number	  of	  different	  circumstances,	  
and	  any	  account	  of	  human	  activity	  across	  time	  and	  circumstance	  should	  include	  them.	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Another	  relevant	  psychological	  concept	  is	  the	  theory	  of	  affordances.	  	  This	  theory,	  
proposed	  by	  Gibson	  (1977),	  suggests	  that	  when	  animals	  perceive	  objects,	  they	  (and	  we)	  do	  
not	  simply	  perceive	  their	  physical	  characteristics.	  	  We	  also	  perceive	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  
those	  objects	  can	  be	  meaningful	  to	  us,	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  can	  be	  
useful	  to	  us.	  This	  allows	  for	  the	  streamlining	  our	  interactions	  with	  the	  surrounding	  
environment	  by	  making	  an	  animal’s	  perception	  preparatory	  of	  its	  interactions	  with	  its	  
surroundings.	  
The	  final	  important	  psychological	  concept	  relevant	  to	  this	  discussion	  is	  the	  concept	  
of	  accessibility.	  	  In	  the	  model	  proposed	  by	  Higgins	  (1996),	  the	  concept	  of	  accessibility	  refers	  
to	  three	  things.	  	  It	  refers	  to	  whether	  a	  particular	  concept	  is	  available	  in	  stored	  memory,	  its	  
level	  of	  excitation,	  and,	  regarding	  its	  use,	  its	  applicability	  to	  the	  current	  situation.	  	  This	  
theory	  can	  help	  explain	  whether	  and	  how	  quickly	  a	  particular	  concept	  will	  be	  used	  by	  a	  
particular	  person	  in	  any	  particular	  situation.	  	  For	  our	  purposes,	  accessibility	  can	  be	  
understood	  as	  the	  strength	  and	  connectivity	  of	  various	  scripts	  to	  different	  object	  
affordances.	  
These	  three	  theories	  can	  be	  used	  to	  construct	  a	  psychological	  representation	  of	  the	  
process	  described	  by	  virtue	  theory.	  	  Individuals	  in	  an	  ambiguous	  situation	  retrieve	  
information	  (affordances)	  from	  the	  elements	  that	  they	  perceive,	  which	  are	  connected	  to	  
possible	  ways	  of	  interacting	  with	  them	  (scripts)	  that	  differ	  in	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  they	  
impress	  themselves	  upon	  her	  as	  appropriate	  (accessibility).	  	  The	  process	  of	  becoming	  
“virtuous”	  is	  the	  process	  of	  reorganizing	  one’s	  internal	  psychological	  and	  motivational	  
system	  in	  such	  a	  way	  that	  the	  “right”	  behavioral	  scripts	  become	  chronically	  accessible	  
whenever	  the	  individual	  is	  exposed	  to	  particular	  affordances.	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Put	  into	  motivational	  terms,	  a	  virtuous	  person	  recognizes	  the	  environment	  (truth),	  
identifies	  the	  goals	  such	  an	  environment	  affords	  (value),	  and	  acts	  in	  accordance	  with	  those	  
goals	  (control).	  	  This	  process	  becomes	  automatized	  as	  the	  different	  motivations	  begin	  to	  
work	  together	  in	  concert.	  	  One	  automatically	  and	  accurately	  recognizes	  morally	  relevant	  
situations	  (affordances;	  truth	  +	  value),	  acts	  in	  ways	  appropriate	  for	  bringing	  about	  those	  
moral	  goals	  (scripts;	  value	  +	  control),	  and	  adjusts	  one’s	  technique	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  
particular	  demands	  of	  the	  situation	  (accessibility;	  truth	  +	  control).	  	  Thus	  the	  virtuous	  
person	  is	  the	  one	  who	  ought	  to	  have	  the	  most	  motivational	  integrity—the	  one	  for	  whom	  
truth,	  control,	  and	  value	  motivations	  work	  together	  effectively.	  
5.3	   Motivational	  Integrity	  and	  the	  Virtuous	  Soul	  
	  
	   How	  might	  this	  concept	  be	  evaluated	  empirically?	  	  What	  precisely	  can	  be	  measured	  
in	  order	  to	  measure	  “virtue”	  given	  that	  this	  understanding	  of	  virtues	  and	  character	  is	  
adopted?	  	  The	  difficulty	  with	  understanding	  virtues	  as	  persons-­‐in-­‐situation	  patterns	  is	  that	  
the	  inevitable	  conclusion	  is	  that	  there	  are	  at	  least	  as	  many	  virtues	  as	  there	  are	  situations.	  	  
Aristotle	  names	  dozens	  of	  virtues	  himself	  (Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009);	  no	  doubt	  there	  are	  others	  
that	  arise	  in	  other	  cultural	  contexts,	  including	  the	  core	  24	  explored	  by	  Peterson	  and	  
Seligman	  (2004).	  	  How	  then,	  can	  this	  experience	  be	  empirically	  studied?	  
The	  answer	  lies	  through	  returning	  to	  the	  discussion	  of	  happiness	  above,	  and	  
through	  integrating	  the	  two	  dominant	  views	  of	  happiness	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  virtue.	  	  Unlike	  in	  
modern	  parlance	  (particularly	  in	  the	  attempts	  to	  reduce	  all	  goals	  to	  taking	  part	  in	  a	  
‘happiness	  currency’	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  John	  Stuart	  Mill,	  1863/2007),	  in	  virtue	  theory	  the	  
relationships	  among	  the	  various	  goals	  and	  the	  virtues	  enabling	  them	  cannot	  be	  expressed	  
in	  terms	  of	  an	  additive	  equation.	  	  Instead,	  these	  virtues	  constitute	  the	  internal	  organization	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of	  a	  person	  responding	  to	  the	  environment	  as	  an	  integrated	  whole	  (Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009).	  	  
The	  lack	  of	  eudaimonia	  (“happiness”	  or	  “flourishing”)	  is	  understood	  as	  vice—a	  defect	  in	  
this	  organization.	  	  Vices	  in	  this	  way	  of	  thinking	  represent	  internal	  discord	  between	  the	  
various	  elements	  of	  the	  soul	  (the	  “soul”	  in	  ancient	  and	  classical	  thought—in	  Latin,	  the	  
anima—was	  understood	  to	  be	  the	  motivating	  principle	  of	  living	  things	  or	  how	  the	  parts	  of	  
the	  body	  work	  together	  toward	  the	  achievement	  of	  a	  goal,	  rather	  than	  the	  rational	  “ghost	  in	  
the	  machine”	  that	  controls	  the	  body’s	  actions	  of	  Cartesian	  myth-­‐making).	  The	  soul’s	  
internal	  harmony	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  virtues	  working	  together	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  
what	  both	  enabled	  and	  constituted	  the	  good	  life	  (Aristotle,	  trans.	  2009).	  	  	  
	   This	  particular	  point	  regarding	  internal	  integrity	  was	  made	  explicit	  almost	  1500	  
years	  later	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  Thomas	  Aquinas,	  who	  put	  forward	  a	  strong	  theory	  of	  the	  
“unity	  of	  the	  virtues.”	  	  Aquinas	  contended	  that	  in	  order	  for	  an	  action	  or	  life	  to	  be	  virtuous,	  
all	  of	  the	  virtues	  must	  be	  working	  together	  in	  the	  production	  of	  that	  action	  or	  the	  living	  of	  
that	  life	  (Aquinas,	  1274/1981).	  	  While	  often	  regarded	  as	  absurd	  by	  many	  modern	  
philosophers	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  (Geatch,	  1977;	  Appiah,	  2008),	  this	  doctrine	  has	  been	  
recently	  resurrected	  by	  more	  contemporary	  philosophers	  with	  greater	  sophistication	  
(Porter,	  1993).	  	  	  
The	  reason	  for	  the	  initial	  rejection	  of	  Aquinas’	  contention	  was	  largely	  due	  to	  others’	  
seeing	  “virtues”	  as	  additive	  traits	  rather	  than	  patterns,	  which,	  when	  combined,	  would	  
equate	  to	  a	  person’s	  “character.”	  	  Thus	  a	  person	  could	  be,	  for	  example,	  be	  courageous	  while	  
lacking	  compassion.	  However,	  adopting	  a	  more	  context-­‐based	  view	  (Mischel	  &	  Shoda,	  
1995)	  highlights	  obvious	  situations	  in	  which	  a	  truly	  courageous	  action	  necessitates	  being	  
compassionate	  or	  real	  compassion	  necessitates	  courage.	  	  A	  more	  complex	  view	  of	  human	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beings,	  understood	  as	  being	  in	  continuous	  dynamical	  relation	  to	  their	  environments,	  would	  
predict	  that	  an	  individual’s	  flourishing,	  her	  eudaimonia,	  would	  be	  a	  function	  of	  not	  only	  the	  
presence	  of	  a	  particular	  character	  strength	  or	  virtue,	  but	  also	  a	  function	  of	  how	  well	  that	  
virtue	  relates	  to	  other	  virtues.	  	  Thus,	  the	  individuals	  with	  the	  greatest	  well-­‐being	  would	  be	  
those	  who	  not	  only	  have	  the	  various	  character	  strengths	  and	  virtues	  to	  the	  highest	  degree,	  
but	  also	  those	  for	  whom	  those	  virtues	  and	  strengths	  are	  harmoniously	  integrated.	  
	   The	  two	  approaches	  to	  the	  experience	  of	  happiness	  discussed	  above	  each	  get	  part	  of	  
the	  experience.	  	  The	  subjective	  well-­‐being	  approach	  emphasizes	  the	  value	  that	  one	  places	  
on	  one’s	  life	  relative	  to	  one’s	  desires	  or	  needs	  (Diener	  et	  al,	  1985).	  	  The	  character	  strength	  
approach	  emphasizes	  the	  way	  one	  goes	  about	  approaching	  life,	  noting	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  
one	  is	  able	  to	  figure	  out	  the	  truth	  about	  the	  world,	  and	  control	  oneself	  in	  accordance	  with	  
that	  truth	  (Peterson	  &	  Seligman,	  2004).	  	  It	  is	  proposed	  here	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  effective	  
organization	  of	  value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  that	  we	  can	  see	  the	  way	  in	  which	  virtue	  makes	  its	  
way	  in	  the	  world:	  the	  effective	  understanding	  (truth)	  and	  managing	  actions	  upon	  the	  world	  
(control)	  produces	  desired	  outcomes	  (value),	  triggering	  emotional	  feedback	  that	  is	  
interpreted	  in	  such	  a	  way	  so	  as	  to	  develop	  habits	  that	  “fit”	  the	  environment	  
appropriately—the	  experience	  of	  eudaimonia.	  
5.4	   Effectiveness	  of	  Motive	  Organization	  
	  
As	  noted	  above,	  virtue	  theorists	  often	  divide	  the	  “soul”	  (again,	  understood	  as	  the	  
principles	  of	  animation—i.e.	  “motivation”—rather	  than	  a	  willful,	  conscious	  “ghost	  in	  the	  
machine”)	  into	  a	  tripartite	  structure,	  though	  the	  precise	  naming	  of	  that	  structure	  has	  
varied:	  (1)	  the	  intellect	  or	  reason,	  which	  aims	  at	  understanding,	  (2)	  the	  will	  or	  desire,	  
which	  aims	  at	  action	  and	  volition,	  and	  (3)	  the	  affections	  or	  passions,	  which	  aim	  at	  valued	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(and	  away	  from	  devalued)	  outcomes.	  	  The	  good	  life	  since	  Plato	  (Plato,	  trans.	  1992)	  has	  
been	  identified	  with	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  soul:	  “In	  the	  true	  or	  philosophic	  soul	  reason,	  passions,	  
and	  desire	  work	  in	  concert”	  (Crombie,	  1962).	  	  Similarly,	  Higgins	  (2012)	  theorized	  that	  
there	  are	  three	  primary	  forms	  of	  motivation—value	  (wanting	  to	  have	  good	  results),	  truth	  
(wanting	  to	  establish	  what	  is	  real),	  and	  control	  (wanting	  to	  manage	  what	  happens).	  	  Each	  
of	  these	  motives	  represents	  the	  possibility	  of	  fulfillment	  or	  success—each	  represents	  a	  way	  
of	  being	  effective—but	  the	  key	  to	  the	  good	  life	  is	  the	  effective	  organization	  of	  these	  motives	  
(Higgins,	  2012).	  	  
Value	  motivation,	  or	  the	  desire	  to	  have	  good	  results	  (Higgins	  2012;	  Franks	  &	  
Higgins,	  2012),	  is	  well-­‐established	  in	  the	  well-­‐being	  literature.	  	  This	  is	  most	  prevalent	  in	  
the	  research	  on	  outcomes	  described	  above.	  	  The	  other	  two	  forms	  of	  effectiveness—
associated	  with	  truth	  and	  control	  motivations—have	  been	  subject	  to	  less	  scientific	  
exploration,	  but	  some	  important	  research	  has	  been	  done.	  	  Truth	  motivation,	  or	  the	  desire	  
to	  establish	  what	  is	  real	  (Higgins,	  2012;	  Franks	  &	  Higgins,	  2012),	  has	  been	  linked	  to	  
motivation	  quite	  apart	  from	  positive	  outcomes.	  	  For	  example,	  people	  are	  motivated	  to	  
attain	  accurate	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world	  and	  themselves,	  even	  if	  this	  knowledge	  is	  referring	  
to	  undesirable	  traits	  or	  personal	  attributes	  (Swann,	  1990).	  	  Similarly,	  control	  motivation,	  or	  
wanting	  to	  manage	  what	  happens,	  is	  also	  independent	  of	  having	  valued	  outcomes	  (Higgins,	  
2012;	  Franks	  &	  Higgins,	  2012).	  	  For	  example,	  research	  on	  affect	  regulation	  has	  shown	  that	  
people	  do	  not	  simply	  want	  to	  maximize	  their	  positive	  emotions,	  but	  instead	  regulate	  them	  
so	  that	  they	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  demands	  of	  particular	  situations	  (Koole	  &	  Kuhle,	  2007;	  
see	  also	  the	  self-­‐determination	  motive	  of	  Ryan	  &	  Deci,	  2000).	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Speaking	  to	  the	  fundamental	  nature	  of	  these	  motives,	  Franks	  and	  Higgins	  (2012)	  
provide	  a	  review	  suggesting	  that	  all	  three	  are	  evident	  across	  the	  animal	  kingdom	  and	  that,	  
moreover,	  their	  successful	  organization	  is	  critical	  for	  well-­‐being	  in	  humans	  and	  other	  
animals.	  	  This	  harmony	  of	  goals	  or	  motivational	  integrity	  represents	  a	  unique	  approach	  to	  
understanding	  happiness	  in	  the	  psychology	  literature.	  Though	  not	  explicitly	  recognized	  as	  
such,	  it	  has	  been	  indicated	  in	  various	  empirical	  studies	  that	  show	  both	  that	  greater	  
motivational	  interrelatedness	  or	  integrity	  leads	  to	  greater	  happiness,	  and	  that	  when	  any	  of	  
the	  motivations	  becomes	  too	  primary	  over	  the	  others,	  reductions	  in	  well-­‐being	  result.	  	  For	  
example,	  the	  research	  on	  self-­‐affirmation,	  a	  technique	  by	  which	  people	  affirm	  positive	  
aspects	  of	  their	  personality	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  sense	  of	  a	  well-­‐integrated	  self,	  shows	  that	  
this	  attainment	  of	  self-­‐integrity	  leads	  to	  greater	  well-­‐being	  (Sherman	  &	  Cohen,	  2006).	  	  On	  
the	  negative	  side,	  if	  truth	  motivation	  is	  too	  prevalent	  over	  value	  and	  control	  motivations,	  
too	  many	  psychological	  resources	  will	  be	  spent	  continually	  thinking	  about	  and	  reevaluating	  
distressing	  elements	  of	  one’s	  personality	  or	  life—a	  process	  known	  as	  rumination	  (Nolen-­‐
Hoeksema,	  2000).	  	  Thus,	  success	  in	  each	  of	  the	  motivational	  domains	  is	  not	  all	  that	  is	  
necessary	  for	  eudaimonia:	  true	  flourishing	  is	  also	  dependent	  upon	  the	  interrelatedness	  of	  
these	  fundamental	  motivations,	  including	  not	  only	  one	  motivation	  supporting	  another	  but	  
also	  constraining	  another	  (Higgins,	  2012).	  	  
It	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  this	  theoretical	  approach	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  deep	  thinkers	  in	  
the	  philosophical	  tradition,	  but	  exists	  within	  our	  everyday	  parlance	  when	  one	  considers	  the	  
meaning	  of	  the	  words	  “integrity”	  and	  “integration.”	  	  With	  respect	  to	  the	  latter,	  a	  key	  
definition	  of	  “integration”	  is	  the	  “incorporation	  as	  equals”	  of	  members	  of	  disparate	  
categories	  or	  groups,	  linked	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  not	  allowing	  any	  of	  the	  motivations	  to	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dominate	  (Meriam-­‐Webster,	  2014).	  	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  noting	  that	  this	  idea	  of	  “integration”	  
has	  a	  history	  in	  psychology,	  serving	  as	  the	  aim	  of	  psychotherapy	  (e.g.	  Dorcas	  &	  Shaffer,	  
1945).	  	  “Integrity,”	  which	  is	  another	  related	  concept,	  contains	  both	  of	  the	  definitions	  of	  ‘the	  
good	  life’	  alluded	  to	  throughout	  this	  dissertation.	  	  It	  is	  defined	  both	  as	  an	  “unimpaired	  
condition”	  or	  “the	  quality	  or	  state	  of	  being	  complete,”	  and	  “the	  firm	  adherence	  to	  a	  code…of	  
values”	  (Merriam-­‐Webster,	  2014).	  Thus	  we	  see	  that	  above	  and	  beyond	  the	  philosophical	  
conceptualizations	  presented,	  our	  basic	  usage	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  integrity	  points	  to	  the	  
convergence	  of	  the	  two	  senses	  of	  the	  good	  life	  linked	  in	  virtue—doing	  well	  and	  doing	  good.	  	  
	   This	  theoretical	  approach	  provided	  a	  foundation	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  measure	  that	  
could	  determine	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  an	  individual	  had	  achieved	  this	  kind	  of	  motivational	  
harmony,	  by	  focusing	  primarily	  on	  the	  interrelations	  among	  value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  
effectiveness	  and	  the	  experience	  of	  chronic	  regulatory	  fit.	  	  One	  of	  the	  items	  in	  our	  measure,	  
for	  example,	  is	  “My	  life	  is	  going	  in	  the	  right	  direction.”	  	  Going	  in	  the	  right	  direction	  entails	  
the	  effective	  relationship	  between	  managing	  to	  go	  (control)	  and	  ensuring	  that	  the	  direction	  
of	  movement	  is	  correct	  (truth)	  given	  the	  goal	  (value),	  where	  truth,	  control,	  and	  value	  all	  
support	  and	  constrain	  one	  another	  (see	  Higgins,	  2012).	  	  Another	  is	  “I	  ‘feel	  right’	  about	  my	  
life,”	  which	  is	  consistent	  with	  previous	  research	  on	  regulatory	  fit	  (Higgins,	  2000;	  2005a).	  
Such	  a	  measure,	  representing	  as	  it	  does	  the	  internal	  harmony	  of	  fundamental	  ways	  
of	  being	  effective,	  would	  also	  necessarily	  relate	  to	  existing	  constructs	  measuring	  life	  
outcomes	  and	  well-­‐being,	  since	  having	  positive	  life	  outcomes	  and	  achieving	  a	  sense	  of	  self-­‐
efficacy	  and	  integrity	  are	  all	  associated	  with	  this	  internal	  harmony	  of	  motives.	  	  Since	  the	  
measure	  would	  represent	  the	  emergent	  property	  described	  above	  as	  the	  “unity	  of	  the	  
virtues,”	  it	  would	  also	  be	  related	  to	  those	  character	  strengths	  and	  abilities	  that	  enable	  those	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positive	  life	  outcomes.	  	  Most	  importantly,	  as	  the	  embodiment	  of	  the	  experience	  of	  virtue,	  it	  
should	  serve	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  moral	  character—predicting	  higher	  levels	  of	  moral	  behavior	  
in	  the	  past,	  present,	  and	  future.	  	  In	  the	  following	  studies,	  we	  describe	  the	  creation	  and	  
validation	  of	  the	  Effectiveness	  of	  Motive	  Organization	  (EMO)	  scale—a	  measure	  of	  this	  
motivational	  integrity	  and	  relational	  harmony.	  
Study	  1:	  Effectiveness	  of	  Motive	  Organization	  
	  
This	  study	  will	  make	  the	  first	  direct	  connection	  to	  the	  virtues	  as	  outlined	  by	  
Peterson	  and	  Seligman	  (2004).	  	  It	  will	  show	  that	  not	  only	  is	  EMO	  predicted	  by	  greater	  
overall	  character	  strength,	  but	  that	  it	  predicts	  less	  variability	  among	  the	  virtues	  given	  that	  
they	  work	  together	  in	  harmony	  (Aquinas,	  1981/1274;	  Porter,	  1993).	  	  This	  study	  will	  show	  
that	  EMO	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  not	  simply	  the	  strength	  of	  effectiveness	  of	  different	  kinds	  of	  
motivations	  (Franks	  &	  Higgins,	  2012),	  but	  their	  organizational	  relationship	  to	  one	  another.	  	  
This	  study	  will	  show	  that	  EMO	  is	  predicted	  by	  truth	  effectiveness,	  control	  effectiveness,	  and	  
value	  effectiveness,	  and	  that	  higher	  EMO	  is	  associated	  not	  only	  with	  higher	  mean	  values	  of	  
effectiveness,	  but	  lower	  levels	  of	  variability	  between	  the	  different	  kinds	  of	  effectiveness.	  	  	  
All	  of	  these	  results	  will	  serve	  to	  conceptually	  validate	  EMO	  as	  a	  construct	  prior	  to	  
subsequent	  studies	  that	  test	  EMO	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  happiness	  and	  morality—a	  measure	  of	  a	  
virtuous	  moral	  character.	  	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
	   Three	  hundred	  eighty-­‐nine	  participants	  were	  drawn	  from	  Amazon’s	  Mechanical	  
Turk	  (MTurk)	  pool	  and	  paid	  the	  sum	  of	  $2.00.	  	  Participants	  consisted	  of	  155	  males,	  224	  
females,	  and	  9	  unspecified.	  	  Since	  participants	  needed	  to	  change	  websites	  in	  order	  to	  take	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the	  VIA	  Inventory	  of	  Strengths	  Survey	  as	  noted	  below,	  the	  number	  who	  completed	  that	  
portion	  of	  the	  study	  was	  smaller,	  consisting	  of	  95	  males,	  159	  females,	  and	  3	  unspecified	  
(257	  total).	  	  There	  were	  no	  differences	  according	  to	  sex	  on	  any	  of	  the	  measures	  reported	  
below.	  	  Because	  it	  was	  essential	  that	  respondents	  have	  full	  comprehension	  of	  the	  items	  in	  
our	  EMO	  questionnaire,	  the	  MTurk	  samples	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper	  were	  limited	  to	  the	  
United	  States	  to	  maximize	  English	  proficiency.	  
Procedure	  
	   Participants	  filled	  out	  the	  Effectiveness	  of	  Motive	  Organization	  scale	  (EMO;	  see	  
Appendix	  for	  full	  scale)	  followed	  by	  the	  Effectiveness	  Questionnaire	  (Franks,	  2012).	  	  The	  
Effectiveness	  Questionnaire	  is	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  an	  individual	  has	  
experienced	  success	  in	  the	  domains	  of	  value	  (e.g.	  “I	  think	  I	  have	  all	  that	  I	  desire.”),	  truth	  
(e.g.	  “I	  am	  exceptional	  at	  figuring	  things	  out.”),	  and	  control	  (e.g.	  “Organizing	  has	  proven	  to	  
be	  one	  of	  my	  strengths.”).	  	  The	  scale	  consists	  of	  17	  questions	  answered	  on	  7-­‐point	  scales	  
ranging	  from	  “strongly	  disagree”	  to	  “strongly	  agree.”	  	  Some	  items	  are	  measures	  of	  
ineffectiveness	  in	  these	  domains	  and	  are	  reverse-­‐scored.	  	  The	  average	  of	  the	  scale	  items	  in	  
each	  domain	  produces	  three	  subscales	  which	  will	  be	  analyzed	  below:	  value	  effectiveness,	  
truth	  effectiveness,	  and	  control	  effectiveness.	  	  	  
These	  questions	  were	  followed	  by	  a	  series	  of	  demographic	  questions	  including	  sex,	  
age,	  and	  household	  income,	  and	  a	  link	  to	  the	  VIA-­‐Character	  website,	  where	  participants	  
filled	  out	  the	  VIA	  Inventory	  of	  Strengths	  Survey	  (Peterson	  &	  Seligman,	  2004).	  	  The	  survey	  
consists	  of	  240	  items	  assessing	  the	  presence	  or	  absence	  of	  24	  different	  virtues.	  	  Since	  we	  
also	  expected	  the	  EMO	  to	  correlate	  with	  self-­‐reported	  happiness	  (which,	  as	  mentioned	  
above,	  has	  an	  inescapably	  ethical	  element,	  see	  King	  &	  Napa,	  1998	  or	  Phillips,	  Misenheimer,	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&	  Knobe,	  2011),	  we	  included	  three	  items	  to	  measure	  how	  happy	  participants	  felt	  their	  lives	  
were:	  “Compared	  to	  others,	  my	  life	  is	  happy,”	  “I	  have	  a	  happy	  life,”	  and	  “My	  life	  is	  full	  of	  
happiness.”	  	  Each	  of	  these	  was	  rated	  on	  a	  6-­‐point	  scale	  from	  1-­‐strongly	  disagree	  to	  6-­‐
strongly	  agree.	  	  The	  items	  on	  this	  “happiness”	  scale	  had	  high	  internal	  reliability	  (α	  =	  0.88).	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
	   Scale	  Reliability.	  A	  factor	  analysis	  on	  the	  12	  items	  in	  the	  EMO	  was	  performed	  using	  
Kaiser	  normalization,	  showing	  only	  one	  factor	  with	  an	  eigenvalue	  above	  one.	  The	  factor	  
loadings	  for	  each	  item	  as	  well	  as	  the	  questionnaire	  itself	  are	  available	  in	  the	  Appendix.	  	  We	  
note	  that	  all	  of	  the	  items	  have	  a	  factor	  loading	  in	  excess	  of	  0.4,	  well	  above	  the	  needed	  
loadings	  for	  a	  sample	  of	  this	  size	  (Hair	  et	  al,	  1998).	  	  The	  EMO	  scale	  overall	  also	  had	  high	  
internal	  reliability	  (α	  =	  0.90).	  	  Having	  established	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  scale,	  we	  moved	  to	  
analyzing	  its	  theoretical	  validity.	  
	   Theoretical	  Validity.	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  we	  expected	  EMO	  to	  positively	  correlate	  
with	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  domains	  of	  value,	  truth,	  and	  control.	  	  The	  data	  supported	  this	  
prediction.	  	  EMO	  was	  significantly	  positively	  correlated	  with	  effectiveness	  in	  value	  (r	  =	  
0.66,	  p	  <	  0.001),	  truth	  (r	  =	  0.46,	  p	  <	  0.001),	  and	  control	  (r	  =	  0.58,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  	  Furthermore,	  
these	  relations	  were	  independent	  of	  one	  another,	  since	  each	  of	  these	  relations	  remained	  
significant	  when	  controlling	  for	  each	  of	  the	  others	  in	  a	  multiple	  regression	  (value:	  β	  =	  0.48,	  
t(385)	  =	  11.22,	  p	  <	  0.001;	  truth:	  β	  =	  0.16,	  t(385)	  =	  3.62,	  p	  <	  0.001;	  control:	  β	  =	  0.21,	  t(385)	  =	  
4.32,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  
Importantly,	  our	  hypotheses	  were	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  prediction	  that	  EMO	  would	  be	  
associated	  with	  higher	  means	  of	  each	  kind	  of	  effectiveness,	  but	  that	  it	  would	  also	  be	  
associated	  with	  greater	  concordance	  and	  harmony	  among	  the	  types	  of	  effectiveness,	  as	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Figure	  5.1:	  Value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  effectiveness	  as	  a	  function	  of	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  
organization	  scale	  scores	  (observations	  have	  been	  ‘jittered’	  to	  prevent	  stacking).	  	  This	  
figure	  particularly	  highlights	  the	  positive	  overall	  mean	  relationship	  between	  these	  scales	  
and	  the	  EMO,	  and	  also	  suggests	  the	  reduction	  in	  variability	  as	  scores	  on	  the	  EMO	  increase,	  a	  
feature	  more	  prominently	  displayed	  in	  Figure	  5.2.	  
	  
expressed	  in	  lower	  variance	  among	  them.	  To	  measure	  this	  variability,	  we	  computed	  the	  
variance	  among	  the	  three	  constructs	  (value,	  truth,	  and	  control)	  for	  each	  individual.	  	  Lower	  
ratings	  on	  this	  score	  indicated	  a	  greater	  concordance	  between	  the	  three	  constructs.	  	  To	  
show	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  was	  associated	  with	  lower	  variability	  
over	  and	  above	  the	  mean	  level	  relationship	  (given	  that	  variance	  significantly	  decreases	  as	  
the	  overall	  mean	  level	  of	  averaging	  the	  value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  scores	  increases,	  β	  =	  -­‐0.25,	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Figure	  5.2:	  Value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  effectiveness	  variance	  as	  a	  function	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  
of	  motive	  organization	  (observations	  have	  been	  ‘jittered’	  to	  prevent	  stacking).	  
	  
predicted,	  higher	  EMO	  scores	  were	  associated	  with	  significantly	  lower	  variability	  among	  
value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  effectiveness	  (β	  =	  -­‐0.25,	  t(386)	  =	  -­‐3.73,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  	  
To	  provide	  an	  illustrative	  example,	  we	  examined	  four	  participants	  who	  had	  identical	  
overall	  mean	  level	  of	  value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  effectiveness.	  	  These	  three	  individuals,	  
although	  they	  had	  equal	  overall	  means	  (all	  averaged	  a	  5.64	  on	  their	  combined	  value,	  truth,	  
and	  control	  effectiveness),	  had	  different	  variances	  between	  the	  three	  constructs:	  1.86,	  1.17,	  
and	  1.06,	  and	  0.83	  (to	  provide	  context,	  the	  range	  of	  variances	  ran	  from	  0.25	  to	  2.26,	  so	  
these	  three	  variances	  were	  relatively	  average)	  which	  corresponded	  to	  four	  different	  scores	  
on	  the	  EMO:	  3.77,	  3.31,	  3.15,	  and	  2.92,	  respectively	  (which,	  in	  turn	  represent	  z-­‐scores	  of	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value,	  truth	  and	  control	  effectiveness	  had	  the	  most	  effective	  motive	  organization,	  and	  the	  
individual	  with	  the	  highest	  variance	  had	  the	  least	  effective	  motive	  organization.	  This	  
specific	  example	  illustrates	  the	  general	  point	  that	  even	  when	  overall	  effectiveness	  is	  held	  
constant,	  more	  effective	  motive	  organization	  is	  associated	  with	  greater	  harmony	  among	  the	  
three	  different	  motivations.	  	  Thus,	  the	  EMO	  is	  not	  only	  a	  useful	  measure	  of	  overall	  
effectiveness	  in	  the	  value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  domains,	  but	  a	  measure	  of	  their	  convergent	  
organization	  as	  well.	  Both	  of	  these	  effects	  (the	  mean	  effect	  in	  particular,	  but	  also	  the	  
variance	  effect)	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  5.1.	  	  The	  variance	  effect	  is	  featured	  more	  prominently	  
in	  Figure	  5.2.	  
	   We	  applied	  this	  same	  approach	  to	  the	  VIA	  Inventory	  of	  Strengths	  Survey.	  	  First,	  with	  
the	  exceptions	  of	  Fairness	  and	  Humility,	  we	  found	  that	  EMO	  scores	  were	  significantly	  
associated	  with	  each	  of	  the	  character	  strengths	  and	  virtues	  (3	  at	  p	  <	  0.01	  and	  19	  at	  p	  <	  
0.001).	  	  The	  results	  for	  each	  individual	  strength	  and	  virtue	  are	  available	  in	  Table	  5.1.	  	  
Higher	  scores	  on	  the	  EMO	  were	  significantly	  predictive	  of	  a	  higher	  overall	  mean	  level	  of	  
strength	  and	  virtue	  (β	  =	  0.47,	  t(255)	  =	  8.44,	  p	  <	  0.001),	  derived	  from	  averaging	  participant	  
scores	  across	  strengths	  and	  virtues	  (α	  =	  0.95).	  Furthermore,	  higher	  EMO	  scores—even	  
when	  controlling	  for	  overall	  mean	  strength/virtue,	  since	  there	  was	  again	  a	  significant	  
negative	  relation	  between	  mean	  strength/virtue	  and	  strength/virtue	  variance	  (β	  =	  -­‐0.27,	  
t(255)	  =	  -­‐4.54,	  p	  <	  0.001)—predicted	  a	  lower	  overall	  level	  of	  variance	  among	  the	  strengths	  
and	  virtues	  (β	  =	  -­‐0.19,	  t(254)	  =	  -­‐2.82,	  p	  =	  0.005).	  	  This	  result	  demonstrates	  that	  not	  only	  is	  
EMO	  a	  predictor	  of	  different	  fundamental	  strengths	  and	  virtues,	  but	  that	  it	  also	  predicts	  
convergence	  among	  these	  strengths	  and	  virtues.	  	  In	  line	  with	  ancient	  and	  classical	  
understandings	  of	  the	  virtues,	  we	  find	  that	  the	  more	  a	  person	  has	  attained	  the	  good	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Appreciation	  of	  Beauty	   0.20**	  
Bravery	   0.35***	  
Love	   0.36***	  
Prudence	   0.24***	  
Teamwork	   0.22***	  
Creativity	   0.28***	  
Curiosity	   0.51***	  
Fairness	   0.06	  
Forgiveness	   0.22***	  
Gratitude	   0.38***	  
Honesty	   0.30***	  
Hope	   0.57***	  
Humor	   0.37***	  
Perseverance	   0.48***	  
Judgment	   0.22***	  
Kindness	   0.21**	  
Leadership	   0.18**	  
Love	  of	  Learning	   0.26***	  
Humility	   -­‐0.01	  
Perspective	   0.41***	  
Self-­‐Regulation	   0.36***	  
Social	  Intelligence	   0.33***	  
Spirituality	   0.37***	  
Zest	   0.65***	  
• = p < 0.05; ** = p < 0.01; *** = p < 0.001 
Table	  5.1:	  Relationship	  between	  EMO	  and	  24	  fundamental	  character	  strengths	  and	  virtues.	  
	  
effective	  life,	  the	  more	  his	  or	  her	  strengths	  and	  virtues	  work	  together	  in	  unity	  (Porter,	  
1993).	  
	   Interestingly,	  we	  found	  these	  same	  patterns	  of	  results	  for	  the	  happiness	  construct	  in	  
this	  study.	  	  Those	  who	  reported	  having	  a	  happier	  life	  showed	  lower	  variance	  between	  the	  
measures	  of	  effectiveness	  in	  the	  value,	  truth,	  control	  domains	  over	  and	  above	  overall	  
effectiveness	  (β	  =	  -­‐0.25,	  t(386)	  =	  -­‐4.14,	  p	  <	  0.001),	  and	  a	  similar	  pattern	  for	  the	  virtues	  as	  
well	  (β	  =	  -­‐0.23,	  t(254)	  =	  -­‐3.47,	  p	  =	  0.001).	  	  However,	  happiness	  was	  not	  predicted	  
independently	  by	  all	  three	  kinds	  of	  effectiveness.	  	  It	  was	  significantly	  predicted	  by	  value	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effectiveness	  (β	  =	  0.51,	  t(385)	  =	  10.96,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  and	  control	  effectiveness	  (β	  =	  0.15,	  t(385)	  
=	  2.82,	  p	  =	  0.005),	  but	  not	  by	  truth	  effectiveness	  (β	  =	  0.08,	  t(385)	  =	  1.61,	  p	  =	  0.10).	  	  This	  
suggests	  two	  things.	  First,	  the	  subjective	  notion	  of	  happiness	  means	  more	  psychologically	  
than	  just	  a	  maximization	  of	  pleasure.	  Second,	  the	  EMO	  measure	  is	  associated	  with	  more	  
ways	  of	  being	  effective	  than	  just	  subjective	  happiness	  per	  se—it	  contributes	  to	  truth	  
effectiveness	  as	  well,	  which	  will	  see	  when	  we	  study	  both	  life	  happiness	  and	  life	  
meaningfulness	  in	  Study	  2.	  
	   We	  know	  that	  the	  EMO	  measure	  is	  not	  simply	  a	  measure	  of	  happiness	  because	  the	  
EMO	  positively	  predicts	  truth	  effectiveness	  and	  happiness	  does	  not.	  	  	  But	  to	  further	  
differentiate	  the	  EMO	  and	  happiness,	  we	  examined	  the	  relation	  between	  happiness,	  EMO,	  
and	  income.	  As	  expected,	  we	  found	  that	  higher	  EMO	  scores	  were	  associated	  with	  
significantly	  higher	  levels	  of	  happiness	  (β	  =	  0.70,	  t(387)	  =	  19.09,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  and	  higher	  EMO	  
scores	  were	  also	  associated	  with	  higher	  incomes	  (β	  =	  0.23,	  t(375)	  =	  4.60,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  	  It	  is	  
possible	  that	  these	  results	  stem	  from	  the	  positive	  relation	  between	  income	  and	  happiness	  
(Diener	  &	  Biswas-­‐Diener,	  2002),	  which	  we	  replicated	  here	  (β	  =	  0.21,	  t(375)	  =	  4.11,	  p	  <	  
0.001).	  	  The	  positive	  relationship	  between	  income	  and	  happiness	  is	  generally	  posited	  as	  
resulting	  from	  money	  leading	  to	  better	  outcomes,	  which,	  in	  turn,	  leads	  to	  greater	  levels	  of	  
happiness	  (Easterlin,	  1974).	  	  However,	  an	  organization	  of	  motives	  model	  may	  provide	  an	  
alternative	  interpretation.	  	  	  
It	  is	  possible	  that	  people	  with	  a	  more	  effective	  motive	  organization	  1)	  have	  higher	  
incomes	  because	  they	  are	  generally	  more	  effective	  in	  the	  workplace,	  which	  leads	  to	  better	  
jobs	  and	  higher	  salaries	  and	  2)	  are	  happier.	  	  From	  this	  perspective,	  the	  connection	  between	  
income	  and	  happiness	  is	  an	  artifact	  of	  the	  effectiveness-­‐income	  and	  effectiveness-­‐
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happiness	  relationships.	  	  Our	  data	  are	  consistent	  with	  this	  perspective.	  	  When	  controlling	  
for	  EMO,	  the	  relation	  between	  happiness	  and	  income	  is	  no	  longer	  significant	  (β	  =	  0.05,	  
t(374)	  =	  1.31,	  p	  =	  0.19),	  only	  the	  relation	  between	  EMO	  and	  happiness	  remained	  significant	  
(β	  =	  0.68,	  t(372)	  =	  17.94,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  Furthermore,	  the	  opposite	  was	  not	  true.	  	  That	  is,	  the	  
relation	  between	  EMO	  and	  income	  remained	  significant	  even	  when	  controlling	  for	  
happiness	  (β	  =	  0.09,	  t(374)	  =	  2.50,	  p	  =	  0.01).	  It	  is	  possible,	  then,	  that	  the	  relation	  between	  
income	  and	  happiness	  is	  actually	  due	  to	  each	  of	  them	  being	  positively	  related	  to	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization.	  	  This	  further	  differentiates	  the	  EMO	  construct	  from	  
subjective	  feelings	  of	  happiness,	  showing	  that	  EMO	  captures	  more	  than	  a	  subjective	  feeling.	  	  
This	  will	  be	  further	  differentiated	  in	  the	  subsequent	  studies	  in	  this	  chapter.	  
	   The	  results	  of	  Study	  1	  show	  that	  our	  ‘effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization’	  construct	  
is	  associated	  with	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  various	  character	  strengths	  and	  virtues,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  predicted	  integrity	  and	  relational	  harmony	  among	  value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  motives.	  
The	  results	  also	  show	  that	  EMO	  is	  not	  only	  measuring	  having	  ‘a	  life	  of	  happiness’	  as	  
reflected	  in	  the	  items	  “Compared	  to	  others,	  my	  life	  is	  happy,”	  “I	  have	  a	  happy	  life,”	  and	  “My	  
life	  is	  full	  of	  happiness”	  because	  it	  reveals	  significant	  relationships	  that	  the	  ‘happiness’	  
scale	  does	  not,	  including	  truth	  effectiveness	  and	  an	  independent	  relation	  to	  income.	  Having	  
shown	  this,	  we	  move	  next	  to	  establishing	  that	  the	  ‘effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization’	  
construct	  as	  measured	  by	  the	  EMO	  accounts	  for	  a	  broader	  understanding	  of	  ‘the	  good	  life’	  
beyond	  existing	  ‘happiness’-­‐related	  constructs.	  
Study	  2:	  Distinguishing	  EMO	  and	  Existing	  Happiness-­‐Related	  Constructs	  	  
	  
	   This	  study	  will	  examine	  the	  relationships	  between	  EMO	  and	  ‘happiness’-­‐related	  
constructs,	  as	  well	  as	  distinguish	  it	  from	  other	  important	  well-­‐being	  constructs	  in	  the	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happiness	  literature:	  satisfaction	  with	  life	  (Diener	  et	  al,	  1985),	  vitality	  (Ryan	  &	  Frederick,	  
1997),	  self-­‐esteem	  (Rosenberg,	  1965),	  life	  orientation	  (Scheier	  et	  al,	  1994),	  and	  flourishing	  
(Diener	  et	  al,	  2009).	  	  This	  will	  show	  that	  the	  EMO’s	  relationship	  to	  ‘happiness’	  (or,	  more	  
generally,	  ‘the	  good	  life’)	  is	  unique	  among	  well-­‐being	  constructs.	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
	   Two	  hundred	  fifty-­‐two	  participants	  (125	  males;	  127	  females)	  were	  recruited	  from	  
MTurk	  for	  the	  sum	  of	  $1.50.	  	  Since	  there	  were	  significant	  sex	  differences	  for	  some	  of	  the	  
measures	  (for	  example,	  females	  scored	  significantly	  higher	  on	  the	  Flourishing	  Scale	  
compared	  to	  males:	  t(250)	  =	  -­‐3.04,	  p	  =	  0.003),	  sex	  differences	  were	  controlled	  for	  in	  each	  of	  
the	  analyses	  below.	  
Procedure	  
	   Participants	  first	  filled	  out	  the	  EMO	  and	  then	  answered	  the	  same	  questions	  related	  
to	  happiness	  as	  in	  Study	  1.	  	  In	  addition	  to	  happiness,	  we	  also	  measured	  meaningfulness	  
since	  it	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  have	  a	  distinct	  relation	  to	  well-­‐being	  (Baumeister	  et	  al,	  in	  press),	  
which	  is	  particularly	  important	  given	  the	  lack	  of	  an	  independent	  relationship	  between	  the	  
happiness	  construct	  and	  truth	  effectiveness.	  	  The	  meaningfulness	  questions	  were	  identical	  
to	  the	  happiness	  questions	  except	  that	  they	  substituted	  the	  word	  “meaning”	  for	  “happy.”	  	  
These	  questions	  were	  followed	  by	  the	  Flourishing	  Scale	  (Diener	  et	  al,	  2009),	  the	  
Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  Scale	  (Diener	  et	  al,	  1985),	  the	  General	  Self-­‐Efficacy	  Scale	  (Schwarzer	  
&	  Jerusalem,	  1995),	  the	  Need	  for	  Cognition	  Scale	  (Cacioppo	  et	  al,	  1994),	  the	  Life	  
Orientation	  Test	  (Scheier	  et	  al,	  1994),	  the	  Locus	  of	  Control	  Scale	  (Rotter,	  1989),	  the	  
Subjective	  Vitality	  Scale	  (Ryan	  &	  Frederick,	  1997),	  the	  Rosenberg	  Self-­‐Esteem	  Scale	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(Rosenberg,	  1965),	  the	  Implicit	  Theory	  of	  Intelligence	  Scale	  (Abd-­‐El-­‐Fatah	  &	  Yates,	  2006),	  
the	  Ruminative	  Responses	  Scale	  (Treynor	  et	  al,	  2003),	  the	  10-­‐item	  Big	  Five	  Inventory	  
(Rammstedt	  &	  John,	  2007),	  and	  an	  Agency	  Scale	  (Wegner,	  Sparrow,	  &	  Winerman,	  2004).	  	  
We	  also	  took	  demographic	  measures	  of	  age,	  sex,	  income,	  and	  employment	  status.	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
	   Convergent	  Validity.	  As	  in	  the	  previous	  study,	  the	  EMO	  had	  high	  internal	  reliability	  
(α	  =	  0.92).	  	  As	  expected,	  it	  also	  had	  significant	  positive	  correlations	  with	  measures	  related	  
to	  value	  (the	  Flourishing	  Scale,	  Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  Scale,	  Life	  Orientation	  Test,	  and	  
Rosenberg	  Self-­‐Esteem	  Scale),	  truth	  (the	  Need	  for	  Cognition	  Scale,	  an	  incremental	  Theory	  
of	  Intelligence,	  Openness	  to	  Experience),	  and	  control	  (the	  General	  Self-­‐Efficacy	  Scale,	  
internal	  Locus	  of	  Control,	  and	  the	  Agency	  Scale).	  	  It	  also	  was	  negatively	  correlated	  with	  the	  
Ruminative	  Responses	  Scale,	  which	  may	  be	  indicative	  of	  having	  low	  control	  and	  value	  
effectiveness	  (an	  inability	  to	  stop	  engaging	  in	  counterfactual	  thinking	  even	  when	  it	  is	  
disruptive	  and	  producing	  anxiety)	  and	  possibly	  low	  truth	  effectiveness	  as	  well	  (not	  being	  
able	  to	  figure	  out	  what	  really	  happened).	  	  The	  correlations	  between	  the	  EMO	  and	  each	  of	  
these	  scales	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  5.2.	  
Consistent	  with	  the	  results	  from	  Study	  1,	  we	  found	  higher	  scores	  on	  the	  EMO	  to	  be	  
significantly	  associated	  with	  greater	  happiness,	  controlling	  for	  meaningfulness	  (β	  =	  0.37,	  
t(248)	  =	  7.47,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  	  Complementing	  our	  earlier	  results,	  we	  also	  found	  that	  higher	  
EMO	  scores	  were	  associated	  with	  greater	  meaningfulness,	  controlling	  for	  happiness	  (β	  =	  
0.31,	  t(248)	  =	  5.87,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  	  These	  relationships	  are	  also	  shown	  in	  Table	  5.3.	  
Discriminant	  Validity.	  Because	  the	  correlations	  between	  EMO	  and	  a	  number	  of	  
other	  constructs	  were	  quite	  high	  and	  because	  we	  have	  outlined	  conceptual	  connections	  as	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Construct	   Correlation	  with	  EMO	  
Flourishing	  Scale	   0.79***	  
General	  Self-­‐Efficacy	  Scale	   0.64***	  
Need	  for	  Cognition	  Scale	   0.33***	  
Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  Scale	   0.81***	  
Life	  Orientation	  Test	   0.77***	  
Locus	  of	  Control	  Scale	  (Internal)	   0.46***	  
Subjective	  Vitality	  Scale	   0.74***	  
Rosenberg	  Self-­‐Esteem	  Scale	   0.75***	  
Implicit	  Theory	  of	  Intelligence	  Scale	  (Incremental)	   0.32***	  
Ruminative	  Responses	  Scale	   -­‐0.57***	  
Agency	  Scale	   0.19**	  
Big	  5	  –	  Extraversion	   0.43***	  
Big	  5	  –	  Openness	  to	  Experience	   0.22***	  
Big	  5	  –	  Conscientiousness	   0.48***	  
Big	  5	  –	  Agreeableness	   0.37***	  
Big	  5	  –	  Neuroticism	   -­‐0.51***	  
Happiness	  (controlling	  for	  Meaningfulness)	   0.37***	  
Meaningfulness	  (controlling	  for	  Happiness)	   0.31***	  
*	  =	  p	  <	  0.05;	  **	  =	  p	  <	  0.01;	  ***	  =	  p	  <	  0.001	  
	  
Table	  5.2:	  Relationship	  between	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  and	  other	  
constructs	  (multiple	  regression	  betas	  controlling	  for	  sex).	  
	  
well,	  it	  was	  necessary	  also	  to	  distinguish	  EMO	  from	  these	  constructs	  in	  order	  to	  
demonstrate	  that	  EMO	  adds	  additional	  value	  as	  a	  construct	  (i.e.,	  discriminant	  validity).	  	  To	  
this	  end,	  for	  each	  of	  the	  constructs	  that	  correlated	  with	  EMO	  above	  0.70,	  we	  included	  it	  
with	  EMO	  in	  two	  different	  multiple	  regressions:	  1)	  predicting	  happiness	  controlling	  for	  
meaningfulness	  and	  2)	  predicting	  meaningfulness	  controlling	  for	  happiness.	  
Demonstrating	  its	  divergent	  validity,	  in	  all	  of	  these	  models,	  EMO	  accounted	  for	  a	  significant	  
portion	  of	  the	  variance	  in	  happiness	  (p’s	  <	  0.001)	  and	  a	  significant	  portion	  of	  the	  variance	  
in	  meaningfulness	  (p’s	  <	  0.001).	  	  Moreover,	  our	  analyses	  showed	  that	  including	  EMO	  in	  a	  
multiple	  regression	  reduced	  the	  relation	  to	  non-­‐significance	  between	  meaningfulness	  and	  
the	  Subjective	  Vitality	  Scale,	  Life	  Orientation	  Test,	  and	  Rosenberg	  Self-­‐Esteem	  Scale	  (the	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Scale	   Happiness	   Meaningfulness	  
Flourishing	  Scale	   0.37***	  (0.28***)	   0.36***	  (0.29***)	  
Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  Scale	   0.37***	  (0.27***)	   0.20***	  (0.10†)	  
Subjective	  Vitality	  Scale	   0.23***	  (0.13**)	   0.05	  (-­‐0.04)	  
Life	  Orientation	  Test	   0.28***	  (0.19***)	   0.10*	  (0.00)	  
Rosenberg	  Self-­‐Esteem	  Scale	   0.21***	  (0.12**)	   0.15**	  (0.07)	  
	  	  	  	  *	  =	  p	  <	  0.05;	  **	  =	  p	  <	  0.01;	  ***	  =	  p	  <	  0.001	  
	  
Table	  5.3:	  Multiple	  regressions	  for	  each	  scale	  predicting	  happiness	  and	  predicting	  
meaningfulness	  (each	  controlling	  for	  the	  other,	  and	  both	  controlling	  for	  sex	  differences).	  In	  
each	  regression,	  the	  beta	  for	  a	  scale’s	  relationship	  to	  happiness	  or	  meaningfulness	  when	  
the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  is	  also	  controlled	  for	  is	  and	  is	  given	  in	  parentheses.	  	  	  
	  
multiple	  regression	  betas	  are	  available	  in	  Table	  5.3	  and	  the	  effect	  of	  EMO	  controlling	  for	  the	  
alternative	  scales	  is	  in	  Table	  5.4).	  	  
These	  results	  provide	  strong	  initial	  evidence	  discriminating	  EMO	  from	  Subjective	  
Vitality,	  Life	  Orientation,	  and	  Self-­‐Esteem,	  and	  some	  initial	  evidence	  discriminating	  EMO	  
from	  Flourishing	  Scale	  and	  Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  Scale,	  which	  were	  also	  the	  constructs	  most	  
highly	  correlated	  with	  EMO.	  	  How	  then,	  might	  EMO	  differ	  from	  the	  Flourishing	  Scale	  and	  
Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  Scale?	  Happiness	  and	  meaningfulness,	  on	  their	  own,	  do	  not	  
necessarily	  capture	  value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  all	  working	  together.	  Is	  there	  an	  example	  of	  a	  
construct	  that	  would	  reflect	  this	  relational	  aspect	  that	  could	  distinguish	  our	  model	  from	  
flourishing	  and	  satisfaction	  with	  life?	  One	  possibility	  is	  employment	  status.	  	  Why	  
employment	  status?	  Successful	  or	  effective	  employment	  involves	  correctly	  (truth)	  
managing	  (control)	  activities	  directed	  toward	  attaining	  particular	  goals	  (value).	  	  Thus,	  we	  
thought	  that	  employment	  status	  (employed	  vs.	  unemployed)	  might	  be	  a	  good	  indicator	  of	  
value,	  truth,	  and	  control	  working	  together.	  If	  so,	  then	  employment	  (controlling	  for	  income)	  




Scale	   Happiness	   Meaningfulness	  
Flourishing	  Scale	  	   0.28***	   0.22***	  
Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  Scale	   0.24***	   0.26***	  
Subjective	  Vitality	  Scale	   0.28***	   0.33***	  
Life	  Orientation	  Test	   0.26***	   0.31***	  
Rosenberg	  Self-­‐Esteem	  Scale	   0.30***	   0.28***	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  *	  =	  p	  <	  0.05;	  **	  =	  p	  <	  0.01;	  ***	  =	  p	  <	  0.001	  
	  
Table	  5.4:	  Multiple	  regressions	  for	  the	  association	  between	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  
organization,	  happiness,	  and	  meaningfulness	  (each	  controlling	  for	  the	  other,	  and	  both	  
controlling	  for	  sex	  differences)	  over	  and	  above	  each	  alternative	  scale.	  	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  create	  a	  dichotomous	  variable	  for	  employment,	  we	  compared	  those	  who	  
stated	  that	  they	  were	  currently	  employed	  (N	  =	  189)	  or	  stay-­‐at-­‐home	  moms	  or	  dads	  (N	  =	  
21)	  to	  those	  who	  stated	  that	  they	  were	  currently	  seeking	  employment	  (N	  =	  20)	  or	  disabled	  
or	  unable	  to	  work	  (N	  =	  5).	  	  We	  excluded	  students	  and	  retirees	  from	  the	  analysis	  (N	  =	  20).	  	  
Again,	  since	  income	  is	  related	  to	  happiness,	  we	  controlled	  for	  happiness	  in	  each	  of	  our	  
analyses.	  	  We	  did	  find	  that	  employment	  (controlling	  for	  income,	  sex,	  and	  happiness)	  was	  
associated	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  EMO	  (β	  =	  0.10,	  t(224)	  =	  2.81,	  p	  =	  0.005).	  In	  contrast,	  
employment	  did	  not	  have	  a	  significant	  association	  with	  either	  the	  Flourishing	  Scale	  (t	  <	  1)	  
or	  the	  Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  Scale	  (β	  =	  0.06,	  t(224)	  =	  1.65,	  p	  =	  0.10).26	  This	  was	  encouraging	  
because	  it	  illustrates	  how	  examining	  an	  objective	  outcome	  related	  to	  well-­‐being	  like	  
employment	  can	  reveal	  the	  added	  value	  of	  the	  organization	  of	  motives	  model	  as	  measured	  
by	  EMO.	  
The	  results	  of	  Study	  2	  show	  that	  there	  is	  a	  unique	  relation	  between	  EMO	  and	  the	  
happiness	  and	  meaningfulness	  that	  is	  part	  of	  ‘the	  good	  life.’	  	  However,	  what	  about	  the	  other	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Employment	  status	  was	  also	  unrelated	  to	  the	  other	  constructed	  examined	  above:	  the	  Life	  Orientation	  Test	  
(t	  <	  1),	  Subjective	  Vitality	  Scale	  (t(245)	  =	  1.44,	  p	  =	  0.15),	  or	  Rosenberg	  Self-­‐Esteem	  Scale	  (t(245)	  =	  1.09,	  p	  =	  
0.28).	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half	  of	  ‘the	  good	  life’—moral	  character?	  	  Is	  EMO	  empirically	  predictive	  of	  moral	  values	  and	  
behavior?	  	  The	  following	  four	  studies	  examine	  this	  question.	  In	  addition,	  Study	  6	  will	  
further	  distinguish	  EMO	  as	  a	  unique	  construct	  relative	  to	  ‘flourishing’	  and	  ‘satisfaction	  with	  
life’	  with	  which	  it	  is	  especially	  highly	  correlated.	  
Study	  3:	  EMO	  and	  Values	  
	  
This	  study	  will	  show	  that	  EMO	  is	  uniquely	  associated	  with	  self-­‐transcendent	  values	  
in	  the	  Schwartz	  Value	  Inventory	  (specifically,	  benevolence;	  Schwartz,	  1992),	  and	  is	  
unrelated	  to	  values	  associated	  with	  achievement,	  despite	  being	  predictive	  of	  well-­‐being	  
and	  financial	  success.	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
	   One	  hundred	  twenty	  participants	  (48	  males	  and	  72	  females)	  were	  recruited	  from	  
Amazon’s	  MTurk	  participant	  pool	  for	  the	  sum	  of	  $1.50.	  	  Since	  there	  were	  significant	  
differences	  in	  reported	  Benevolence	  according	  to	  sex,	  with	  females	  reporting	  higher	  
Benevolence	  values	  compared	  to	  males	  (t(118)	  =	  -­‐2.38,	  p	  =	  0.02),	  we	  controlled	  for	  sex	  
differences	  in	  each	  of	  the	  following	  analyses.	  
Procedure	  
	   The	  procedure	  for	  this	  study	  was	  comparatively	  brief.	  	  Participants	  filled	  out	  the	  
EMO	  followed	  by	  the	  56-­‐item	  Schwartz	  Value	  Inventory	  (Schwartz,	  1992).	  	  This	  latter	  
questionnaire	  measures	  an	  individual’s	  endorsement	  of	  a	  number	  of	  different	  values,	  which	  
are	  then	  combined	  into	  a	  variety	  of	  subscales.	  	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  present	  research,	  we	  
were	  most	  interested	  in	  the	  values	  associated	  with	  Benevolence:	  “Helpful,”	  “Honest,”	  
“Forgiving,”	  “Loyal,”	  “Responsible,”	  “A	  spiritual	  life,”	  “Mature	  love,”	  and	  “Meaning	  in	  life.”	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Other	  subscales	  include	  Hedonism,	  Achievement,	  Power,	  Universalism,	  Conformity,	  
Security,	  Tradition,	  Self-­‐Direction,	  and	  Stimulation.	  	  Scale	  scoring	  also	  dictates	  controlling	  
for	  individual	  differences	  in	  overall	  endorsement.	  What	  this	  means,	  importantly,	  is	  that	  for	  
each	  of	  the	  regressions	  below	  for	  each	  separate	  value,	  the	  mean	  level	  of	  value	  endorsement	  
across	  all	  values	  is	  controlled	  for	  (Schwartz,	  2009).	  	  Thus,	  the	  specific	  relation	  between	  
EMO	  and	  a	  particular	  value	  could	  be	  significantly	  positive	  by	  itself,	  but	  it	  would	  not	  count	  
as	  a	  significant	  relation	  if	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  significant	  after	  the	  mean	  level	  of	  value	  
endorsement	  across	  all	  values	  is	  controlled	  for.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  EMO	  is	  only	  considered	  to	  have	  
a	  significant	  relation	  to	  a	  value	  if	  the	  endorsement	  of	  that	  particular	  value	  by	  participants	  
with	  high	  EMO	  stands	  out	  above	  their	  general	  endorsement	  of	  all	  values	  (i.e.,	  it	  is	  a	  unique	  
relation).	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
	   As	  in	  previous	  studies,	  the	  EMO	  showed	  high	  internal	  reliability	  (α	  =	  0.89).	  	  As	  
expected,	  the	  EMO	  was	  significantly	  (i.e.,	  uniquely)	  predictive	  of	  values	  related	  to	  
Benevolence,	  with	  those	  scoring	  higher	  on	  EMO	  more	  strongly	  endorsing	  the	  Benevolence	  
value	  subscale	  (β	  =	  0.10,	  t(116)	  =	  2.00,	  p	  =	  0.05).27	  There	  were	  no	  other	  significant	  (unique)	  
relationships	  between	  EMO	  and	  any	  other	  value	  subscale.	  The	  relationships	  between	  EMO	  
and	  each	  of	  the	  value	  subscales	  are	  shown	  in	  Table	  5.5.	  
	   These	  results	  suggest	  that	  when	  one	  experiences	  integrity	  of	  motivations,	  it	  relates	  
to	  one	  placing	  an	  emphasis	  on	  benevolence	  values	  over	  and	  above	  other	  values.	  	  For	  the	  
case	  of	  the	  self-­‐enhancing	  values	  (power,	  achievement,	  hedonism),	  this	  is	  perhaps	  
unsurprising	  given	  EMO’s	  expected	  emphasis	  on	  moral	  virtue	  in	  ‘the	  good	  life.’	  But	  what	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  This	  relationship	  was	  even	  stronger	  when	  sex	  differences	  were	  not	  controlled	  for	  (β	  =	  0.12,	  t(117)	  =	  2.50,	  p	  
=	  0.01).	  	  The	  relationships	  to	  the	  other	  subscales	  remained	  non-­‐significant.	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Value	  Subscale	   Effectiveness	  of	  Motive	  Organization	  
Hedonism	   -­‐0.01	  
Achievement	   0.02	  
Power	   -­‐0.10	  
Benevolence	   0.10*	  
Universalism	   -­‐0.05	  
Conformity	   -­‐0.04	  
Security	   0.01	  
Tradition	   0.01	  
Self-­‐Direction	   0.08	  
Stimulation	   -­‐0.06	  
	  	  	  *	  =	  p	  <	  0.05;	  **	  =	  p	  <	  0.01;	  ***	  =	  p	  <	  0.001	  
	  
Table	  5.5:	  Relations	  between	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  and	  relative	  value	  
emphasis.	  
	  
about	  the	  non-­‐relationship	  with	  universalism?	  	  Consistent	  with	  the	  results	  in	  Study	  1,	  it	  
appears	  that	  those	  who	  rate	  themselves	  as	  high	  on	  EMO,	  while	  concerned	  with	  the	  well-­‐
being	  of	  others,	  do	  not	  seem	  especially	  concerned	  with	  an	  abstract	  or	  general	  equality;	  note	  
the	  non-­‐relationship	  with	  fairness	  or	  humility	  in	  Study	  1,	  both	  of	  which	  theoretically	  relate	  
to	  the	  universalism	  value	  category.	  This	  non-­‐relationship	  will	  be	  discussed	  further	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  this	  section.	  
	   The	  results	  of	  Study	  3	  suggest	  that	  there	  is,	  as	  hypothesized,	  a	  convergence	  through	  
virtue	  between	  the	  two	  senses	  of	  the	  “good	  life”—“good”	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  happy	  and	  
meaningful	  and	  “good”	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  moral.	  The	  fact	  that	  there	  is	  a	  special	  association	  
between	  EMO	  and	  benevolence	  is	  consistent	  with	  our	  hypothesis.	  	  Beyond	  values,	  does	  
EMO	  also	  predict	  higher	  rates	  of	  moral	  behavior?	  
Study	  4:	  EMO	  and	  Past	  Altruism	  
	  
	   Given	  the	  above	  connections	  to	  the	  virtues	  and	  benevolence	  values—and	  how	  those	  
values,	  when	  coupled	  with	  a	  high	  reported	  sense	  of	  responsibility,	  produce	  altruistic	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behavior	  (Schwartz,	  1973;	  Schwartz	  &	  Howard,	  1980)—those	  who	  score	  higher	  on	  the	  
EMO	  scale	  should	  also	  report	  higher	  rates	  of	  altruism	  because	  they	  had	  higher	  self-­‐
reported	  agency	  (i.e.,	  a	  high	  sense	  of	  responsibility)	  in	  Study	  1	  (Wegner,	  Sparrow,	  &	  
Winerman,	  2004).	  	  This	  study	  will	  investigate	  that	  connection	  using	  the	  Self-­‐Report	  
Altruism	  Scale	  (SRA;	  Rushton,	  Chrisjohn,	  &	  Fekken,	  1981).	  	  Specifically,	  we	  wished	  to	  see	  
whether,	  consistent	  with	  our	  association	  of	  EMO	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  virtuous	  character,	  
those	  reporting	  higher	  levels	  of	  EMO	  also	  reported	  higher	  frequencies	  of	  altruistic	  activity.	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
	   Two	  hundred	  thirty-­‐nine	  participants	  were	  recruited	  from	  the	  Columbia	  Behavioral	  
Research	  Lab’s	  participant	  pool.	  	  Those	  participants	  only	  completing	  the	  surveys	  listed	  
below	  were	  compensated	  $5.00	  for	  their	  participation.	  	  Other	  participants	  (randomly	  
selected)	  were	  invited	  to	  continue	  onto	  an	  unrelated	  economic	  game	  task.	  	  No	  demographic	  
data	  was	  collected	  for	  this	  study.	  
Procedure	  
	   Participants	  completed	  all	  of	  the	  surveys	  on	  a	  computer.	  	  The	  surveys	  were	  
presented	  in	  random	  order	  and	  consisted	  of	  the	  Effectiveness	  of	  Motive	  Organization	  scale	  
(EMO;	  Cornwell,	  Franks,	  &	  Higgins,	  2014),	  the	  Self-­‐Report	  Altruism	  Scale	  (SRA;	  Rushton,	  
Chrisjohn,	  &	  Fekken,	  1981),	  the	  Mode	  Effectiveness	  Survey	  (MES;	  Cornwell	  et	  al,	  2014),	  the	  
Regulatory	  Focus	  Questionnaire	  (RFQ;	  Higgins	  et	  al,	  2001),	  the	  Regulatory	  Mode	  
Questionnaire	  (RMQ;	  Kruglanski	  et	  al,	  2001),	  the	  Schwartz	  Value	  Inventory	  (Schwartz,	  
1992),	  and	  the	  Social	  Value	  Orientation	  slider	  task	  (SVO;	  Murphy,	  Ackermann,	  &	  Handgraaf,	  
2011).	  	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  study,	  only	  the	  EMO	  and	  SRA	  scales	  will	  be	  analyzed	  below.	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Results	  and	  Discussion	  
Replicating	  Study	  2,	  we	  found	  a	  strong	  positive	  relationship	  between	  Benevolence	  
values	  and	  EMO	  controlling	  for	  overall	  value	  endorsement	  (β	  =	  0.09,	  t(237)	  =	  2.89,	  p	  =	  
0.004).	  	  Unlike	  the	  previous	  study	  that	  had	  a	  smaller	  sample,	  we	  also	  found	  a	  significant	  
positive	  relation	  between	  EMO	  and	  conformity	  (β	  =	  0.09,	  t(237)	  =	  2.24,	  p	  =	  0.03)	  and	  a	  
significant	  negative	  relation	  with	  stimulation	  (β	  =	  -­‐0.11,	  t(237)	  =	  -­‐2.08,	  p	  =	  0.04).28	  	  No	  
other	  values	  had	  significant	  relations	  with	  EMO.	  	  Since	  the	  relation	  between	  EMO	  and	  
benevolence	  is	  substantially	  stronger	  than	  the	  other	  two,	  these	  results	  are	  generally	  
consistent	  with	  Study	  3.	  
	   The	  frequencies	  across	  altruistic	  behaviors	  were	  relatively	  reliable,	  such	  that	  high	  
frequency	  of	  altruism	  in	  each	  category	  of	  behavior	  was	  well	  predicted	  by	  high	  frequency	  in	  
each	  of	  the	  other	  categories	  of	  behavior	  (α	  =	  0.90).	  	  Therefore,	  for	  our	  basic	  analysis,	  we	  
collapsed	  across	  the	  different	  behaviors	  to	  see	  whether	  higher	  scores	  on	  the	  EMO	  scale	  
correlated	  with	  higher	  frequencies	  of	  engaging	  in	  each	  of	  the	  forms	  of	  altruism	  in	  the	  SRA	  
scale.	  	  As	  expected,	  we	  found	  a	  significant	  positive	  association	  between	  the	  EMO	  scale	  and	  
the	  SRA	  scale	  (β	  =	  0.29,	  t(237)	  =	  4.66,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  	  We	  also	  note	  that	  there	  is	  the	  possibility	  
of	  a	  social	  desirability	  bias	  involved	  in	  this	  scale,	  so	  we	  also	  analyzed	  this	  relationship	  
while	  controlling	  for	  the	  “Lie”	  scale	  contained	  in	  the	  RMQ	  (Kruglanski	  et	  al,	  2001).	  	  Even	  
when	  controlling	  for	  this	  social	  desirability	  bias	  construct,	  the	  relationship	  between	  EMO	  
and	  the	  SRA	  was	  still	  significantly	  positive	  (β	  =	  0.26,	  t(236)	  =	  4.37,	  p	  <	  0.001).	  	  The	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  Though	  the	  inconsistency	  of	  results	  regarding	  these	  two	  value	  categories	  across	  studies	  precludes	  the	  
ability	  to	  make	  hard	  and	  fast	  conclusions	  about	  them,	  it	  is	  worth	  noting	  that	  they	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  
theoretical	  structure	  of	  EMO.	  	  EMO	  leads	  to	  a	  “fit”	  with	  the	  environment,	  which	  would	  be	  consistent	  with	  
Conformity	  values.	  	  Furthermore,	  Stimulation	  is	  generally	  associated	  with	  the	  pursuance	  of	  hedonic	  pleasure	  
to	  the	  possible	  detriment	  of	  other	  values,	  so	  it	  would	  make	  sense	  that	  EMO	  would	  have	  a	  negative	  relation	  to	  
it.	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Altruistic	  Behavior	  	   Effectiveness	  of	  Motive	  Organization	  
Helped	  push	  a	  stranger’s	  car	  from	  the	  snow.	   0.08	  
Gave	  directions	  to	  a	  stranger.	   0.27***	  
Made	  change	  for	  a	  stranger.	   0.22***	  
Gave	  money	  to	  a	  charity.	   0.26***	  
Gave	  money	  to	  a	  stranger	  who	  needed	  it.	   0.13*	  
Donated	  goods	  or	  clothes	  to	  charity.	   0.24***	  
Done	  volunteer	  work	  for	  a	  charity.	   0.18**	  
Donated	  blood.	   0.13*	  
Helped	  carry	  a	  stranger’s	  belongings.	   0.18**	  
Delayed	  an	  elevator	  and	  held	  door	  for	  a	  
stranger.	   0.24***	  
Allowed	  someone	  to	  cut	  in	  line.	   0.20**	  
Given	  a	  stranger	  a	  lift	  in	  his/her	  car.	   0.07	  
Pointed	  out	  a	  clerk’s	  error	  in	  undercharging	  for	  
an	  item.	   0.24***	  
Allowed	  a	  neighbor	  to	  borrow	  something	  of	  
value.	   0.18**	  
Bought	  “charity”	  Christmas	  cards	  for	  a	  good	  
cause.	   0.03	  
Helped	  a	  classmate	  not	  known	  well	  with	  an	  
assignment	  or	  homework.	   0.24***	  
Voluntarily	  looked	  after	  a	  neighbor’s	  pets	  
without	  being	  asked	  for	  free.	  	   0.07	  
Offered	  to	  help	  an	  elderly	  or	  handicapped	  
person	  cross	  the	  street.	   0.14*	  
Offered	  his/her	  seat	  to	  someone	  standing	  on	  a	  
bus	  or	  train.	   0.24***	  
Helped	  an	  acquaintance	  move	  households.	   0.11†	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  †	  =	  p	  <	  0.10;	  *	  =	  p	  <	  0.05;	  **	  =	  p	  <	  0.01;	  ***	  =	  p	  <	  0.001	  
Table	  5.6:	  Correlations	  between	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  and	  frequency	  of	  
engaging	  in	  particular	  altruistic	  behaviors.	  
	  
correlations	  between	  EMO	  and	  each	  of	  the	  particular	  altruistic	  behaviors	  is	  included	  in	  
Table	  5.6.	  	  Also	  as	  predicted,	  Benevolence	  values	  (controlling	  for	  overall	  value	  emphasis)	  
were	  also	  positively	  associated	  with	  self-­‐reported	  altruism	  (β	  =	  0.31,	  t(236)	  =	  2.51,	  p	  =	  
0.01).	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Given	  these	  associations,	  we	  next	  ran	  a	  mediation	  analysis	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  
relation	  between	  Benevolence	  values	  and	  self-­‐reported	  altruism	  was	  explained	  by	  EMO.	  	  
We	  ran	  a	  bootstrapped	  (10,000	  repetitions)	  mediation	  analysis	  including	  benevolence	  as	  
the	  independent	  variable,	  EMO	  as	  the	  predicted	  mediator,	  and	  overall	  value	  emphasis	  as	  a	  
covariate.	  	  As	  predicted,	  including	  EMO	  in	  a	  multiple	  regression	  with	  Benevolence	  values	  
and	  overall	  value	  emphasis	  reduced	  the	  relation	  between	  altruism	  and	  Benevolence	  to	  
marginal	  significance	  (β	  =	  0.23,	  t(235)	  =	  1.91,	  p	  =	  0.06).	  	  This	  effect	  resulted	  in	  a	  significant	  
mediation	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  Benevolence	  values	  and	  self-­‐reported	  altruism	  by	  
EMO	  scores	  (bootstrapped	  bias-­‐corrected	  95%	  CI:	  [0.012,	  0.105]).	  	  	  
These	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  impact	  of	  an	  effective	  motive	  organization	  is	  not	  
limited	  to	  differences	  in	  value	  emphasis,	  but	  also	  in	  behavior	  itself	  (as	  reported).	  	  This	  is	  
true	  across	  a	  number	  of	  behaviors,	  not	  simply	  those	  typically	  studied	  by	  psychologists	  (e.g.	  
charitable	  giving).	  	  However,	  this	  task	  recalled	  only	  past	  altruistic	  behaviors.	  	  It	  remains	  to	  
be	  seen	  whether	  the	  EMO	  scale	  can	  predict	  future	  altruistic	  behaviors	  or	  whether	  it	  can	  
predict	  altruistic	  behaviors	  “in	  the	  moment.”	  	  To	  test	  these	  possibilities,	  we	  designed	  the	  
following	  two	  studies.	   	  
Study	  5:	  EMO	  and	  Future	  Giving	  
	  
	   This	  study	  will	  demonstrate	  EMO’s	  test-­‐retest	  reliability	  and	  show	  that	  EMO	  
measured	  at	  time	  point	  1	  is	  predictive	  of	  reported	  charitable	  giving	  at	  time	  point	  2	  (four	  
weeks	  later).	  	  This	  will	  establish	  whether	  EMO	  as	  a	  construct	  is	  predictive	  of	  future	  
behavior.	  	  In	  this	  case,	  if	  we	  are	  correct	  in	  associating	  EMO	  with	  the	  experience	  of	  a	  
virtuous	  character,	  higher	  levels	  of	  EMO	  reported	  at	  time	  point	  1	  should	  be	  associated	  with	  




	   Seventy-­‐three	  participants	  were	  recruited	  from	  the	  Columbia	  Business	  School’s	  
Behavioral	  Research	  Lab	  (BRL)	  to	  take	  part	  in	  this	  two-­‐part	  study.	  	  For	  part	  one,	  
participants	  received	  $1.00.	  	  For	  part	  two,	  which	  took	  place	  between	  four	  and	  six	  weeks	  
after	  part	  one,	  participants	  received	  an	  additional	  $5.00.	  	  Of	  the	  original	  73,	  a	  total	  of	  48	  
participated	  in	  part	  two	  of	  the	  study.	  	  There	  were	  no	  differences	  found	  between	  those	  who	  
returned	  for	  round	  two	  and	  those	  who	  did	  not	  on	  levels	  of	  EMO	  (t	  <	  1),	  income	  (t	  <1),	  
employment	  status	  (t	  <	  1),	  or	  reported	  charitable	  giving	  (t	  <	  1).	  Any	  analyses	  relating	  to	  
variables	  from	  round	  one	  are	  using	  the	  full	  sample,	  and	  any	  pertaining	  to	  round	  two	  use	  
the	  smaller	  sample	  of	  those	  who	  returned	  for	  the	  second	  round.	  	  The	  round	  one	  sample	  
consisted	  of	  30	  males	  and	  43	  females,	  and	  the	  round	  two	  sample	  consisted	  of	  18	  males	  and	  
30	  females.	  	  There	  were	  no	  significant	  sex	  differences	  for	  any	  of	  the	  variables	  analyzed	  in	  
this	  study.	  
Procedure	  
	   Participants	  completed	  the	  study	  in	  the	  lab	  on	  a	  computer.	  	  They	  first	  filled	  out	  the	  
EMO	  scale,	  then	  responded	  to	  a	  number	  of	  demographic	  and	  general	  life	  questions.	  	  The	  
demographic	  questions	  included	  age,	  sex,	  household	  income,	  and	  ethnic	  background.	  	  The	  
general	  life	  questions	  included	  employment	  status	  (either	  employed	  or	  unemployed)	  and	  a	  
dichotomous	  variable	  indicating	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  participant	  had	  given	  money	  to	  charity	  
at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  previous	  four	  weeks	  (“Have	  you	  given	  money	  to	  charity	  in	  the	  past	  
four	  weeks?”).	  	  Round	  two	  of	  the	  study	  included	  identical	  questions.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  we	  were	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able	  to	  make	  predictions	  about	  how	  EMO	  measured	  during	  round	  one	  would	  predict	  
behavior	  over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  following	  four	  weeks.	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
	   As	  in	  previous	  studies,	  the	  EMO	  showed	  high	  internal	  reliability	  both	  in	  round	  one	  
(α	  =	  0.88)	  and	  in	  round	  two	  (α	  =	  0.89).	  	  It	  also	  showed	  high	  test-­‐retest	  reliability	  (r	  =	  0.80,	  
p	  <	  0.0001).	  	  In	  order	  to	  test	  whether	  the	  measured	  variables	  had	  any	  predictive	  impact	  on	  
whether	  or	  not	  participants	  gave	  to	  charity	  in	  the	  previous	  four	  weeks,	  we	  used	  a	  multiple	  
logistic	  regression	  on	  that	  dichotomous	  variable.	  	  Since	  many	  of	  the	  participants	  in	  this	  
study	  were	  students,	  and	  because	  having	  disposable	  income	  can	  lead	  to	  higher	  rates	  of	  
charitable	  giving,	  we	  controlled	  for	  household	  income	  and	  employment	  status	  in	  our	  
models.	  
	   Within	  the	  time-­‐one	  study,	  as	  expected,	  controlling	  for	  income	  and	  employment	  
status,	  those	  with	  higher	  measured	  EMO	  were	  more	  likely	  to	  report	  at	  round	  one	  having	  
given	  money	  to	  charity	  in	  the	  previous	  four	  weeks	  (OR	  =	  2.92,	  z	  =	  2.16,	  p	  =	  0.03).29	  	  Also	  in	  
line	  with	  our	  predictions,	  those	  with	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  EMO	  measured	  at	  round	  one	  were	  
more	  likely	  to	  report	  at	  round	  two	  having	  given	  money	  to	  charity	  in	  the	  four	  weeks	  
following	  the	  study	  (OR	  =	  6.40,	  z	  =	  2.41,	  p	  =	  0.02).30	  	  This	  effect	  is	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  5.3.	  	  
	   This	  result	  suggests	  that	  EMO	  as	  a	  construct	  does	  not	  simply	  create	  the	  impression	  
that	  one	  has	  engaged	  in	  frequent	  altruistic	  behavior	  in	  the	  past,	  but	  is	  predictive	  of	  
engaging	  in	  altruistic	  behavior	  (i.e.	  charitable	  giving)	  in	  the	  four	  weeks	  following	  
measurement.	  	  This	  evidence	  is	  consistent	  with	  our	  prediction	  that	  EMO	  represents	  the	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  This	  effect	  is	  also	  present	  when	  not	  controlling	  for	  income	  or	  employment	  status	  (OR	  =	  2.38,	  z	  =	  2.01,	  p	  =	  
0.04).	  
30	  This	  effect	  remains	  significant	  even	  when	  employment	  and	  income	  are	  not	  controlled	  for	  (OR	  =	  3.29,	  z	  =	  




Figure	  5.3:	  Predicted	  likelihood	  of	  giving	  to	  charity	  (0	  =	  No;	  1	  =	  Yes)	  in	  the	  past	  four	  weeks	  
at	  round	  two,	  predicted	  by	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  at	  round	  one	  
(observations	  have	  been	  ‘jittered’	  to	  prevent	  stacking).	  	  
	  
experience	  of	  virtue	  in	  moral	  character—character	  measured	  at	  time	  point	  1	  predicts	  
behavior	  consistent	  with	  that	  character	  at	  time	  point	  2.	  	  	  
However,	  both	  this	  and	  the	  previous	  study	  relied	  on	  self-­‐report.	  	  Though	  the	  self-­‐
report	  in	  this	  case	  occurred	  long	  after	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  EMO	  scale,	  and	  this	  relation	  
remains	  significant	  even	  when	  controlling	  for	  the	  second	  EMO	  administration	  is	  controlled	  
for,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  EMO	  is	  associated	  with	  overestimating	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  one	  is	  
charitable	  and	  altruistic.	  	  In	  order	  to	  account	  for	  this	  possibility,	  we	  designed	  a	  study	  in	  
which	  the	  moral	  behavior	  could	  be	  directly	  observed.	  	  	  
Another	  issue	  with	  the	  previous	  two	  studies	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  do	  enough	  to	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also	  report	  greater	  happiness,	  and	  there	  is	  evidence	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  a	  good	  mood	  can	  
increase	  altruistic	  behavior	  (Isen,	  1987).	  	  In	  addition,	  perhaps	  one	  of	  the	  other	  scales	  with	  
which	  EMO	  is	  highly	  correlated,	  such	  as	  the	  flourishing	  or	  satisfaction	  with	  life	  scale,	  would	  
be	  equally	  predictive	  of	  these	  behaviors	  and	  values.	  	  Therefore,	  we	  included	  measures	  of	  
each	  of	  these	  alternative	  explanatory	  variables	  in	  our	  final	  study.	  
Study	  6:	  EMO	  and	  Present	  Helping	  
	  
Given	  that	  a	  major	  obstacle	  to	  moral	  character	  described	  in	  the	  helping	  literature	  is	  
the	  power	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  determining	  helping	  behavior,	  strong	  support	  for	  EMO’s	  
predictive	  power	  would	  be	  to	  demonstrate	  that	  EMO	  as	  a	  personality	  construct	  can	  predict	  
helping	  behavior	  in	  a	  variation	  of	  the	  famous	  Darley	  and	  Batson	  (1973)	  helping	  
experiment.	  	  In	  this	  study,	  we	  also	  included	  measures	  of	  the	  Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  Scale	  
(Diener	  et	  al,	  1985)	  and	  the	  Flourishing	  Scale	  (Diener	  et	  al,	  2009)	  in	  order	  to	  show	  that	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  uniquely	  predicts	  ethical	  behavior	  independent	  of	  
traditional	  measures	  of	  well-­‐being	  with	  which	  it	  is	  correlated.	  
Methods	  
Participants	  
	   Sixty-­‐one	  participants	  were	  recruited	  from	  the	  Behavioral	  Research	  Lab	  at	  the	  
Columbia	  Business	  School.	  	  Participants	  consisted	  of	  24	  males	  and	  37	  females	  and	  there	  
were	  no	  significant	  sex	  differences	  for	  any	  of	  the	  variables	  in	  this	  study.	  	  All	  participants	  
were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  the	  two	  conditions	  below,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  two	  
participants	  assigned	  to	  an	  “intermediate	  hurry”	  condition,	  before	  that	  condition	  was	  
abandoned.	  	  Those	  two	  participants’	  data	  will	  be	  retained	  for	  the	  analyses	  of	  personality	  
variables,	  but	  excluded	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  situational	  variables.	  	  Six	  participants	  (2	  
	  141	  
males	  and	  4	  females)	  rushed	  past	  the	  confederate	  before	  he	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  drop	  
his	  papers	  and	  paperclips	  (i.e.	  before	  help	  was	  needed),	  and	  so	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  
analysis	  (4	  of	  these	  participants	  were	  assigned	  to	  the	  “low	  hurry”	  condition	  and	  2	  were	  
assigned	  to	  the	  “high	  hurry”	  condition).	  	  Four	  participants	  (2	  females	  and	  2	  males)	  
correctly	  identified	  the	  individual	  needing	  help	  as	  a	  confederate	  and	  so	  were	  also	  excluded	  
from	  the	  analysis.	  	  This	  left	  a	  sample	  of	  51	  participants.	  
Procedure	  
	   The	  general	  structure	  of	  the	  study	  followed	  closely	  the	  classic	  study	  by	  Darley	  and	  
Batson	  (1973).	  	  However,	  since	  there	  were	  some	  substantial	  differences	  as	  well,	  the	  
methodology	  will	  be	  laid	  out	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  Participants	  first	  entered	  the	  lab	  and	  
completed	  a	  series	  of	  questionnaires	  on	  a	  computer.	  	  These	  included	  the	  EMO	  scale,	  the	  
Flourishing	  Scale	  (Diener	  et	  al,	  2009),	  the	  Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  Scale	  (Diener	  et	  al,	  1985),	  
the	  Mode	  Effectiveness	  Questionnaire	  (Cornwell	  et	  al,	  2014),	  and	  the	  Regulatory	  Focus	  
Questionnaire	  (Kruglanski	  et	  al,	  2001).	  	  Participants	  were	  then	  presented	  with	  a	  short	  
paragraph	  drawn	  from	  Lustig,	  May,	  and	  Hasher	  (2001),	  which	  they	  were	  told	  to	  try	  their	  
best	  to	  memorize	  as	  they	  would	  be	  asked	  to	  recall	  it	  later.	  
	   This	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  brief	  anagram	  task,	  in	  which	  participants	  were	  presented	  
with	  five	  sets	  of	  five	  scrambled	  words	  (identical	  to	  Studies	  1-­‐3	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  
except	  that	  they	  received	  no	  direct	  feedback	  about	  their	  performance	  in	  this	  case).	  	  
Participants	  were	  told	  that	  between	  two	  and	  five	  of	  the	  presented	  “words”	  actually	  
represented	  real	  anagrams,	  and	  a	  random	  number	  were	  non-­‐words,	  which	  ought	  to	  be	  left	  
blank.	  	  This	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  participants	  were	  unaware	  of	  how	  well	  they	  did	  on	  the	  task.	  	  
Following	  this	  task,	  they	  were	  prompted	  with	  a	  set	  of	  follow-­‐up	  questions,	  including	  a	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question	  about	  how	  happy	  the	  participants	  felt	  at	  that	  moment	  (on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  –	  “not	  at	  
all”	  to	  7	  –	  “very	  much”)	  in	  order	  to	  control	  for	  possible	  happy	  mood	  effects	  on	  our	  
dependent	  measure.	  	  After	  the	  completion	  of	  this	  set	  of	  questions,	  participants	  were	  asked	  
to	  recall	  the	  paragraph	  they	  saw	  prior	  to	  the	  anagram	  task.	  
	   The	  computer	  then	  directed	  the	  participant	  to	  get	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  experimenter,	  
who	  informed	  him	  or	  her	  that	  the	  folder	  containing	  the	  final	  questionnaire	  and	  the	  cash	  
payment	  for	  participating	  in	  the	  study	  was	  with	  another	  researcher	  in	  a	  room	  on	  the	  other	  
side	  of	  the	  building.	  	  The	  experimenter	  then	  drew	  a	  map	  of	  the	  building	  showing	  the	  
participant	  where	  to	  go	  to	  receive	  his	  or	  her	  payment.	  	  The	  participant	  was	  then	  told	  that	  
this	  other	  researcher	  was	  either	  running	  participants	  on	  a	  related	  experiment	  all	  day,	  and	  
so	  the	  participant	  might	  as	  well	  head	  over	  now	  (low-­‐hurry	  condition),	  or	  that	  the	  other	  
experimenter	  is	  probably	  finishing	  the	  study	  right	  now,	  so	  the	  participant	  should	  hurry	  in	  
order	  that	  he	  or	  she	  not	  miss	  this	  researcher	  (high-­‐hurry	  condition).	  
	   Along	  the	  hallway	  connecting	  the	  two	  rooms	  was	  another	  hallway	  that	  
perpendicularly	  intersected	  with	  it.	  	  As	  the	  participant	  made	  his	  or	  her	  way	  between	  the	  
two	  rooms,	  a	  confederate	  carrying	  papers	  and	  a	  box	  of	  paperclips	  emerged	  from	  that	  
hallway,	  tripped,	  and	  dropped	  all	  of	  his	  papers	  and	  paperclips	  on	  the	  ground	  around	  him.	  	  
He	  then	  proceeded	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  items	  he	  dropped.	  	  The	  dependent	  variable	  was	  whether	  
the	  participant	  stopped	  to	  help	  the	  confederate	  to	  pick	  up	  the	  papers	  and	  paperclips	  or,	  
instead,	  walked	  around	  the	  confederate	  without	  helping	  him	  in	  order	  to	  get	  to	  the	  other	  
room.	  
	   There	  were	  a	  few	  differences	  between	  this	  experiment	  and	  the	  original	  Darley	  and	  
Batson	  (1973)	  study.	  	  First,	  participants	  were	  only	  assigned	  to	  high-­‐	  and	  low-­‐hurry	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conditions,	  omitting	  the	  intermediate-­‐hurry	  condition	  of	  the	  original	  study.31	  	  Second,	  this	  
study	  involved	  a	  milder	  type	  of	  helping	  incident	  that	  a	  student	  would	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  
encounter	  than	  the	  original	  study’s	  face-­‐down	  moaning	  individual.	  	  The	  third	  crucial	  
difference	  lies	  in	  what	  was	  the	  reason	  for	  rushing.	  	  In	  the	  original	  Darley	  and	  Batson	  (1973)	  
study,	  participants	  were	  volunteers	  from	  the	  local	  seminary	  who	  were	  completing	  two	  
portions	  of	  an	  interview	  in	  two	  different	  buildings.	  	  In	  rushing	  to	  get	  to	  the	  second	  portion	  
of	  the	  interview,	  participants	  were	  rushing	  to	  help	  another	  interviewer.	  	  Thus,	  their	  
situation	  was	  one	  of	  choosing	  between	  helping	  the	  experimenters	  and	  helping	  the	  
supposedly	  injured	  confederate.	  	  In	  our	  study,	  we	  made	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  the	  
reaching	  the	  second	  experimenter	  a	  selfish	  one—participants	  needed	  to	  reach	  the	  second	  
experimenter	  in	  time	  in	  order	  to	  get	  paid.	  	  Thus,	  in	  our	  study	  there	  was	  more	  clearly	  an	  
element	  of	  selfishness	  in	  the	  hurrying	  than	  in	  the	  original	  Darley	  and	  Batson	  (1973)	  study.	  
Results	  and	  Discussion	  
	   As	  in	  previous	  studies,	  the	  EMO	  scale	  was	  highly	  internally	  reliable	  (α =	  0.83).	  	  As	  in	  
Study	  2,	  higher	  ratings	  on	  the	  EMO	  scale	  were	  significantly	  positively	  correlated	  with	  
higher	  ratings	  on	  both	  the	  Flourishing	  (r	  =	  0.66,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  and	  the	  Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  
Scale	  (r	  =	  0.72,	  p	  <	  0.001)	  scales.	  The	  EMO	  scale	  was	  not,	  however,	  correlated	  with	  happy	  
mood	  (r	  =	  0.10,	  p	  =	  0.38);	  but	  even	  so,	  since	  it	  could	  theoretically	  be	  related	  to	  willingness	  
to	  help,	  we	  controlled	  for	  it	  in	  the	  analysis.	  Because	  of	  these	  scale	  interrelationships,	  we	  
conducted	  a	  multiple	  logistic	  regression	  predicting	  helping	  behavior	  to	  determine	  the	  EMO	  
scale’s	  independent	  predictive	  power	  when	  controlling	  for	  Flourishing,	  Satisfaction	  with	  
Life,	  happy	  mood,	  and	  experimental	  condition	  (degree	  of	  “hurry”).	  	  The	  logistic	  regression	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  However,	  as	  noted	  above,	  two	  participants	  were	  placed	  in	  an	  “intermediate	  hurry”	  condition,	  which	  was	  
later	  abandoned	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  simple	  comparison	  of	  “high”	  versus	  “low”	  hurry.	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Figure	  5.4:	  Likelihood	  of	  helping	  (0	  =	  No	  help;	  1	  =	  Help)	  associated	  with	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  
motive	  organization	  over	  and	  above	  flourishing	  and	  satisfaction	  with	  life	  (“EMO	  
Predominance;”	  observations	  have	  been	  ‘jittered’	  to	  prevent	  stacking).	  
	  
revealed	  a	  significant	  effect	  only	  for	  the	  EMO	  scale,	  with	  those	  scoring	  higher	  on	  the	  scale	  
being	  more	  likely	  to	  help	  than	  those	  scoring	  lower	  on	  the	  scale	  (OR	  =	  9.60,	  z	  =	  2.15,	  p	  =	  
0.03).	  	  
Importantly,	  none	  of	  the	  other	  scales	  was	  significantly	  related	  to	  helping	  behavior	  
with	  the	  exception	  of	  Satisfaction	  with	  Life,	  which	  was	  negatively	  associated	  with	  helping	  
(OR	  =	  0.30,	  z	  =	  -­‐2.32,	  p	  =	  0.02).	  Interestingly,	  this	  effect	  only	  emerges	  when	  the	  EMO	  and	  
the	  Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  Scale	  are	  regressed	  together,	  suggesting	  that	  the	  elements	  of	  EMO	  
associated	  with	  moral	  behavior	  are	  those	  that	  distinguish	  it	  from	  the	  conceptualization	  of	  
happiness	  as	  desire-­‐satisfaction	  (which,	  according	  to	  our	  theoretical	  model,	  would	  be	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the	  Flourishing	  and	  Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  constructs,	  as	  noted	  above,	  are	  responsible	  for	  
EMO’s	  positive	  relation	  to	  ethical	  behavior.	  	  The	  results	  also	  show	  that	  the	  greater	  ethical	  
behavior	  of	  individuals	  higher	  in	  EMO	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  their	  being	  in	  a	  happier	  mood.	  
For	  visualization	  purposes,	  the	  effect	  of	  EMO	  over	  and	  above	  Satisfaction	  with	  Life	  and	  
Flourishing	  is	  available	  in	  Figure	  5.4.	  	  
	   Finally,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  were	  no	  differences	  in	  helping	  behavior	  
according	  to	  high	  versus	  low	  hurry	  condition	  (z	  <	  1),	  which	  could	  be	  due	  to	  the	  differences	  
in	  this	  study	  from	  the	  original	  Darley	  and	  Batson	  study	  (1973),	  as	  noted	  earlier.	  	  
Nevertheless,	  the	  upshot	  of	  this	  study	  is	  contrary	  to	  a	  well-­‐established	  bias	  in	  social	  
psychology:	  that	  the	  situation	  always	  rules	  personality	  differences	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
helping	  others.	  	  In	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  construct,	  it	  appears	  that	  we	  
have	  a	  personality	  variable	  that	  is	  significantly	  associated	  with	  altruistic	  and	  helping	  
behaviors	  in	  the	  past,	  predictive	  of	  charity	  in	  the	  future,	  and	  predictive	  of	  helping	  in	  the	  
present	  over	  and	  above	  situational	  influences.	  
5.5	   The	  Role	  of	  Virtue	  in	  Moral	  Character	  
	  
	   The	  forgoing	  research	  suggests	  that	  there	  is	  a	  concordance	  between	  well-­‐being	  (‘the	  
good	  life’	  of	  good	  feeling)	  and	  morality	  (‘the	  good	  life’	  of	  good	  behavior)	  insofar	  as	  each	  is	  
related	  to	  an	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization—harmony	  and	  integrity—as	  measured	  
by	  the	  EMO	  scale.	  	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  virtue	  in	  the	  development	  of	  moral	  
character.	  	  In	  Studies	  1	  and	  2,	  we	  saw	  the	  various	  ways	  that	  EMO	  is	  positively	  related	  to	  
different	  kinds	  of	  ‘happiness’	  or	  well-­‐being,	  including	  having	  a	  meaningful	  life	  that	  is	  not	  
simply	  a	  life	  of	  feeling	  happy.	  Studies	  3,	  4,	  5,	  and	  6	  showed	  how	  the	  same	  ‘effectiveness	  of	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motive	  organization’	  construct	  is	  also	  associated	  with	  emphasis	  on	  benevolence	  values	  and	  
higher	  levels	  of	  altruistic	  and	  pro-­‐social	  moral	  behavior.	  
Taken	  together,	  these	  findings	  are	  consistent	  with	  the	  concept	  of	  virtue.	  	  The	  life	  
lived	  in	  accordance	  with	  virtue	  is	  “good”	  both	  in	  the	  sense	  of	  doing	  well	  and	  of	  doing	  good.	  	  
Thus	  we	  see	  preliminary	  empirical	  evidence	  that	  the	  experience	  of	  moral	  character	  can	  be	  
measured	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization.	  	  This	  conceptualization	  of	  
the	  good	  life	  as	  the	  convergence	  of	  well-­‐being	  and	  good-­‐doing	  could	  provide	  important	  
insights	  into	  recent	  research	  on	  the	  study	  of	  character	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  virtues	  (Keyes	  
&	  Haidt,	  2003;	  Peterson	  &	  Seligman,	  2004;	  Schwartz	  &	  Sharpe,	  2006;	  Haidt,	  2006).	  
5.6	   Implications	  for	  Future	  Research	  
	  
	   One	  major	  drawback	  of	  most	  of	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  research	  is	  that	  it	  is	  primarily	  
correlational.	  	  With	  the	  exceptions	  of	  the	  examination	  of	  EMO’s	  relationship	  to	  helping	  
behavior	  and	  giving	  to	  charity	  in	  the	  future,	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  relations	  is	  unclear.	  For	  
example,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  not	  only	  does	  an	  effective	  motive	  organization,	  i.e.,	  integrity,	  
strengthen	  individuals’	  emphasis	  on	  benevolence	  values,	  but	  also	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  
benevolence	  could	  improve	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization.	  In	  order	  to	  determine	  
better	  how	  each	  of	  these	  directions	  plays	  out,	  it	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  conduct	  a	  longitudinal	  
study.	  An	  intriguing	  possibility	  is	  that	  both	  directions	  are	  true	  and	  this	  interrelationship	  
could	  constitute	  a	  “virtuous	  cycle”	  of	  sorts.	  Another	  possibility	  worthy	  of	  further	  study	  is	  
that	  this	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  construct	  may	  “scale	  up”	  from	  the	  individual	  
level	  to	  the	  institutional	  or	  group	  level.	  	  After	  all,	  when	  discussing	  the	  various	  aspects	  of	  the	  
soul,	  Plato	  did	  so	  analogously	  with	  the	  various	  institutional	  structures	  and	  categories	  
within	  society	  as	  a	  whole	  (Plato,	  trans.	  1992).	  	  The	  implication	  is	  that,	  just	  as	  the	  person	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with	  the	  virtuous	  or	  well-­‐integrated	  soul	  experiences	  the	  best	  life,	  a	  society	  with	  the	  most	  
harmoniously	  interrelated	  institutions	  would	  be	  the	  best	  society	  in	  the	  attainment	  of	  the	  
common	  good	  and	  the	  preservation	  of	  the	  social	  peace.	  	  Clearly	  different	  individuals	  have	  
different	  roles	  associated	  with	  different	  tasks—whether	  they	  be	  related	  to	  effective	  truth	  
(e.g.,	  clergy	  or	  academics),	  control	  (e.g.,	  military	  or	  police	  personnel),	  or	  value	  (e.g.,	  
business	  or	  political	  leaders)—and	  perhaps	  their	  harmonious	  and	  well-­‐integrated	  
interrelationships	  produce	  better	  overall	  performance	  of	  the	  group	  (see	  Higgins,	  2012).	  
	   One	  final	  implication	  needs	  to	  be	  fleshed	  out	  as	  well,	  which	  could	  be	  called	  the	  
potential	  “dark	  side”	  of	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization.	  It	  may	  not	  be	  always	  the	  
case	  (and	  certainly	  shouldn’t	  be	  the	  case	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  a	  non-­‐consequentialist)	  
that	  the	  ultimate	  goal	  should	  be	  the	  maximization	  of	  each	  person’s	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  
organization.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  EMO	  was	  not	  associated	  with	  emphasizing	  
character	  strengths	  like	  fairness	  and	  humility,	  and	  values	  associated	  with	  universalism.	  	  
The	  implication	  is	  that	  those	  who	  rate	  themselves	  highly	  on	  EMO,	  though	  more	  likely	  to	  
engage	  in	  pro-­‐social	  behavior	  on	  an	  individual	  level,	  may	  also	  be	  satisfied	  with	  the	  
structure	  of	  society	  as	  it	  actually	  exists,	  and	  be	  less	  sensitive	  to	  systemic	  injustice.	  	  A	  
related	  danger	  may	  be	  that	  insofar	  as	  one	  feels	  as	  though	  one’s	  life	  is	  a	  good	  fit	  with	  the	  
world,	  one	  may	  also	  feel	  as	  though	  the	  world	  is	  a	  good	  fit	  with	  one’s	  life.	  	  Regulatory	  fit	  
(and,	  by	  extension	  in	  this	  case,	  the	  chronic	  fit	  of	  EMO)	  has	  been	  associated	  with	  providing	  
biased	  judgments	  that	  have	  been	  insufficiently	  verified	  (Vaughn	  et	  al,	  2006).	  	  One	  need	  look	  
no	  farther	  than	  Aristotle	  who	  famously	  justified	  slavery	  and	  the	  subjugation	  of	  women	  
(trans.	  2009),	  and	  even	  Aquinas	  who	  held	  views	  relatively	  more	  progressive	  than	  Aristotle	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(such	  as	  respecting	  the	  equality	  of	  the	  sexes)	  still	  argued	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  heretics	  on	  
the	  grounds	  that	  it	  was	  for	  their	  own	  good	  as	  well	  as	  the	  good	  of	  others	  (1274/1981).	  	  	  
It	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  even	  though	  non-­‐virtue-­‐based	  views	  of	  morality,	  
such	  as	  the	  ‘prevention	  focus-­‐morality	  of	  the	  Right’	  form	  of	  ethics,	  insufficiently	  account	  for	  
human	  flourishing,	  they	  may	  in	  many	  ways	  be	  better	  at	  protecting	  the	  basic	  rights	  of	  those	  
who	  do	  not	  feel	  a	  strong	  fit	  with	  their	  environment	  or	  society.	  Even	  if	  we	  expand	  the	  study	  
of	  moral	  psychology	  to	  adequately	  deal	  with	  virtue,	  as	  our	  studies	  attempted	  to	  do	  with	  the	  
integrity	  and	  harmony	  associated	  with	  an	  effective	  motive	  organization	  (EMO)	  and	  with	  
virtue	  related	  to	  ideal	  standards,	  we	  should	  still	  maintain	  the	  importance	  of	  alternative	  
approaches	  to	  morality	  to	  address	  these	  other	  concerns.	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Chapter	  6:	  Implications	  and	  Conclusions	  
	  
	   The	  major	  aim	  of	  the	  above	  programs	  of	  research	  was	  to	  establish	  the	  importance	  of	  
virtue	  as	  a	  construct	  in	  our	  approach	  to	  moral	  psychology.	  	  I	  did	  so	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  moral	  
judgment,	  moral	  decisions,	  and	  moral	  character	  through	  the	  application	  of	  the	  tools	  
afforded	  us	  by	  contemporary	  psychology	  to	  important	  philosophical	  and	  theological	  
concepts.	  	  The	  overall	  goal	  was	  to	  push	  for	  an	  expansion	  of	  moral	  concepts	  in	  our	  cognitive	  
and	  behavioral	  models	  of	  morality	  to	  include	  motivations	  associated	  with	  the	  achievement	  
of	  virtue	  in	  relation	  to	  ideal	  standards	  as	  distinct	  from	  those	  associated	  with	  the	  
maintenance	  of	  our	  duties	  and	  obligations	  (ought	  standards),	  and	  to	  include	  the	  harmony	  
and	  integrity	  associated	  with	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization.	  
	   I	  hoped	  to	  generate	  interest	  in	  a	  new	  approach	  to	  the	  intersection	  of	  happiness	  and	  
well-­‐being—	  again	  consistent	  with	  a	  theory	  of	  virtue	  as	  moral	  excellence	  and	  personal	  
flourishing	  —which	  has	  been	  given	  more	  attention	  in	  the	  past	  decade,	  rooted	  in	  both	  
ancient	  wisdom	  and	  modern	  science.	  	  The	  constructs	  outlined	  above	  will	  hopefully	  show	  an	  
important	  link	  between	  morality	  understood	  as	  the	  achievement	  of	  virtue	  and	  happiness	  
understood	  as	  “the	  good	  life,”	  leading	  to	  a	  reintegration	  of	  morality	  and	  happiness.	  Such	  a	  
reintegration	  has	  a	  number	  of	  implications	  for	  a	  variety	  of	  fields	  of	  study,	  two	  of	  which	  I	  
will	  highlight	  below.	  	  	  
6.1	   Reconceptualizing	  Morality	  
	  
	   One	  of	  the	  upshots	  of	  this	  research	  is	  that	  a	  full	  conceptualization	  of	  morality	  will	  
require	  considering	  each	  of	  the	  basic	  motivations	  of	  truth,	  control,	  and	  value.	  	  Such	  
consideration	  will	  not	  only	  account	  for	  the	  most	  recent	  advances	  in	  motivation	  science,	  but	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will	  also	  help	  modern	  approaches	  to	  morality	  grapple	  more	  effectively	  with	  ancient	  and	  
classical	  theories	  of	  the	  person,	  many	  of	  which	  rely	  on	  a	  view	  of	  humanity	  driven	  by	  these	  
three	  motives	  (though	  they	  take	  on	  different	  names	  throughout	  history).	  	  	  
Implications	  for	  Moral	  Philosophy	  
	  
	   This	  research	  also	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  moral	  philosophy.	  	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  
previous	  chapters,	  philosophical	  approaches	  to	  morality	  tend	  to	  fall	  into	  three	  schools:	  
consequentialism,	  deontology,	  and	  virtue	  ethics.	  	  In	  the	  preceding	  chapters	  I	  have	  leaned	  
most	  heavily	  on	  virtue	  ethics	  and	  perhaps	  been	  most	  dismissive	  of	  consequentialism,	  
though	  this	  is	  likely	  driven	  by	  what	  I	  see	  as	  an	  unfair	  prominence	  given	  to	  the	  latter	  at	  the	  
expense	  of	  the	  former	  by	  a	  host	  of	  social	  scientists	  (e.g.	  Greene,	  2013;	  Pinker,	  2002).	  	  Even	  
so,	  each	  of	  these	  schools	  (including	  virtue	  ethics)	  tends	  to	  overemphasize	  one	  of	  the	  three	  
types	  of	  motivation,	  with	  a	  nod	  to	  a	  second	  motivation,	  often	  excluding	  the	  third	  in	  its	  
entirety.	  
	   Consequentialism’s	  flaws	  should	  be	  most	  apparent	  at	  this	  point.	  	  Consequentialism	  
prioritizes	  value	  as	  the	  ultimate	  standard	  for	  moral	  judgment	  and	  behavior.	  	  If	  the	  valuation	  
of	  the	  consequences	  of	  behavior	  provides	  the	  only	  standard	  by	  which	  an	  action	  can	  be	  
judged	  right	  or	  wrong,	  then	  questions	  of	  truth	  and	  control	  take	  a	  “back	  seat.”	  	  This	  pattern	  
of	  emphasis	  may	  be	  particularly	  problematic,	  given	  evidence	  that	  truth	  and	  control	  may	  
actually	  represent	  equally	  fundamental	  motivations	  compared	  to	  value	  (Cornwell,	  Franks,	  
&	  Higgins,	  2014b).	  	  Consequentialism	  leaves	  some	  room	  for	  truth	  motives.	  	  Though	  it	  tends	  
to	  treat	  ultimate	  questions	  as	  already	  answered—the	  “good”	  is	  the	  “greatest	  total	  
happiness”—but	  leaves	  questions	  of	  means	  open	  to	  problem-­‐solving:	  since	  we	  can	  assume	  
that	  we’re	  all	  agreed	  on	  what	  the	  good	  is,	  what	  ways	  can	  society	  be	  structured	  to	  deliver	  on	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it	  (Mill,	  1863/2007)?	  	  What	  this	  philosophy	  leaves	  aside,	  however,	  are	  control	  motives.	  	  
Restructuring	  society	  appropriately	  (making	  moral	  philosophy	  “wonky”	  in	  the	  phrase	  of	  
one	  psychologist,	  see	  Greene,	  2013)	  means	  that	  people	  won’t	  necessarily	  have	  to	  make	  
contributions	  to	  their	  own	  happiness.	  	  Their	  happiness	  may	  simply	  be	  provided	  for	  them	  
rather	  than	  their	  being	  in	  charge	  of	  managing	  to	  make	  it	  happen	  (control).	  	  However,	  many	  
individuals	  find	  their	  sense	  of	  meaning	  and	  life	  effectiveness	  from	  engaging	  in	  activities	  
that	  are	  themselves	  unpleasant	  (e.g.,	  many	  child-­‐rearing	  activities),	  and	  the	  “poor	  little	  rich	  
kid”	  is	  poor	  in	  life	  effectiveness	  precisely	  because	  all	  his	  or	  her	  needs	  are	  being	  met	  by	  the	  
actions	  of	  others.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  diminish	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  happiness-­‐
maximization	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  our	  ethical	  discourse,	  but	  it	  does	  throw	  consequentialists	  back	  
upon	  the	  original	  question	  originally	  treated	  as	  settled:	  what	  is	  ‘the	  good’	  for	  human	  
beings?	  	  Focusing	  on	  valued	  outcomes	  in	  isolation	  will	  not	  get	  us	  there.	  
	   	  Deontology	  has	  its	  own	  difficulties	  as	  well.	  	  Deontologists	  tend	  to	  prioritize	  truth,	  
with	  a	  subsidiary	  emphasis	  on	  control.	  	  What	  deontologists	  set	  aside,	  in	  the	  mirror	  image	  of	  
consequentialism,	  is	  value.	  	  Kant	  bases	  moral	  precepts	  upon	  a	  principle	  of	  internal	  
consistency—that	  which	  can	  be	  treated	  as	  a	  universal	  maxim	  is	  to	  be	  done	  (Kant,	  
1785/1993).	  	  Thus,	  morality	  becomes	  almost	  entirely	  an	  enterprise	  of	  truth	  motives	  in	  
action—the	  constant	  assessment	  and	  discovery	  of	  permissible	  or	  obligatory	  action	  through	  
the	  application	  of	  this	  principle.	  	  This	  approach	  involves	  control	  as	  well,	  because,	  as	  Kant	  
notes,	  this	  approach	  to	  morality	  brings	  about	  perfect	  autonomy	  (Kant,	  1785/1993).	  	  Such	  
autonomy	  is	  possible	  through	  always	  behaving	  consistently	  with	  what	  reason	  demands	  
through	  the	  application	  of	  this	  principle	  of	  consistency.	  	  However,	  this	  approach	  almost	  
purposefully	  leaves	  aside	  questions	  of	  value	  motives.	  	  These	  principles	  of	  action	  are	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intended	  to	  apply	  regardless	  of	  the	  consequences	  they	  bring	  about,	  or	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  
they	  fit	  with	  a	  person’s	  abilities	  or	  environment	  (indeed,	  all	  of	  these	  factors	  are	  explicitly	  
called	  out	  as	  necessarily	  irrelevant	  to	  morality	  by	  Kant,	  1785/1993).	  	  	  
	   Finally,	  virtue	  ethics,	  though	  I	  rely	  on	  many	  of	  its	  assumptions	  for	  an	  exploration	  of	  
the	  different	  kinds	  of	  value	  in	  this	  dissertation,	  also	  has	  its	  motivational	  shortcomings.	  	  
Virtue	  ethics	  prioritizes	  control,	  since	  it	  focuses	  on	  the	  habits	  which	  are	  to	  be	  acquired	  so	  
that	  one	  may	  live	  in	  accordance	  with	  human	  nature	  and	  achieve	  perfect	  happiness.	  	  It	  also	  
focuses	  on	  controlling	  one’s	  actions	  to	  match	  one’s	  ideal	  standards.	  That	  is,	  questions	  of	  
value	  enter	  into	  this	  approach	  as	  well,	  since	  flourishing	  is	  constituted	  by	  living	  in	  
accordance	  with	  human	  nature	  as	  it	  actually	  is,	  which	  necessitates	  being	  able	  to	  rise	  to	  the	  
challenges	  of	  life	  and	  one’s	  environment,	  and	  ideal	  standards	  are	  desired	  end-­‐states.	  	  
Unfortunately,	  this	  approach	  leaves	  aside	  the	  question	  of	  truth,	  particularly	  universal	  or	  
metaphysical	  questions	  of	  truth,	  much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  that	  consequentialism	  assumes	  the	  
question	  of	  truth	  as	  already	  settled.	  	  Virtue	  ethics	  can	  push	  and	  motivate	  the	  acquisition	  of	  
certain	  kinds	  of	  virtues	  to	  deal	  with	  situations	  as	  they	  are	  found,	  but	  it	  has	  difficulty	  going	  
beyond	  the	  local	  context	  in	  making	  pronouncements	  about	  human	  nature	  as	  a	  whole	  or	  
how	  we	  are	  to	  live	  together	  globally	  (see	  the	  discussion	  of	  this	  drawback	  by	  Greene,	  2013).	  	  
Indeed,	  many	  contemporary	  defenders	  of	  virtue	  ethics	  have	  been	  criticized	  for	  what	  is	  
perceived	  as	  their	  cultural	  relativism	  (though	  virtue	  ethicists	  have	  been	  attempting	  to	  
counter	  this	  charge;	  see	  Nussbaum,	  1988).	  It	  is	  perhaps	  its	  inability	  to	  grapple	  with	  this	  
universal	  level	  of	  engagement	  that	  led	  philosophers	  to	  the	  schools	  of	  deontology	  and	  
consequentialism	  with	  the	  advent	  of	  the	  Enlightenment	  in	  the	  first	  place.	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   Discussions	  within	  moral	  philosophy	  are	  at	  a	  unique	  juncture	  in	  human	  history.	  	  
Never	  before	  have	  all	  three	  schools	  been	  seriously	  considered	  one	  with	  another	  within	  the	  
academy	  (virtue	  ethics	  reigned	  unopposed	  for	  centuries,	  and	  went	  into	  remission	  during	  
the	  modern	  era	  until	  the	  past	  few	  decades).	  	  This	  conversation	  is	  taking	  place	  in	  an	  
increasingly	  global	  context,	  one	  that	  is	  beginning	  to	  recognize	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  
“happiness,”	  so	  the	  number	  of	  perspectives	  being	  set	  aside	  is	  shrinking.	  	  It	  is	  quite	  
conceivable	  that	  a	  theory	  of	  ethics	  that	  has	  a	  role	  for	  each	  of	  the	  different	  fundamental	  
motives	  (value,	  truth,	  and	  control)	  may	  eventually	  be	  settled	  upon,	  no	  doubt	  resting	  on	  the	  
hard	  work	  already	  done	  by	  philosophers	  in	  each	  of	  the	  three	  major	  schools.	  
6.2	   Reconceptualizing	  Happiness	  
	  
	   ‘Happiness’	  also	  needs	  to	  be	  further	  developed	  as	  well.	  	  The	  research	  contained	  in	  
this	  dissertation	  only	  constitutes	  a	  very	  small	  contribution	  in	  this	  respect,	  given	  the	  
increased	  interest	  by	  a	  number	  of	  researchers	  across	  different	  fields	  of	  psychology,	  
particularly	  positive	  psychology	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Peterson,	  Park,	  &	  Seligman,	  2005).	  	  As	  noted	  in	  
the	  previous	  chapter,	  in	  response	  to	  a	  number	  of	  criticisms	  that	  measures	  of	  happiness	  may	  
be	  overly	  simplistic,	  researchers	  have	  begun	  studying	  the	  concept	  of	  meaningfulness	  in	  
contrast	  to	  happiness	  per	  se	  (Baumeister	  et	  al,	  in	  press).	  	  This	  is	  important	  both	  because	  of	  
the	  high	  correlation	  between	  a	  sense	  of	  having	  a	  happy	  life	  and	  a	  meaningful	  life	  (Oishi	  &	  
Diener,	  2014),	  and	  because	  the	  idea	  of	  life	  having	  meaning	  seems	  to	  be	  such	  an	  integral	  
part	  in	  lay	  views	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  live	  a	  happy	  life.	  	  It	  certainly	  plays	  a	  major	  role	  in	  the	  
thinking	  of	  philosophers.	  
	   Experimental	  philosophers	  have	  also	  noted	  the	  inescapably	  moral	  element	  to	  
judgments	  of	  other	  peoples’	  happiness	  as	  well.	  	  Specifically,	  individuals	  are	  less	  willing	  to	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judge	  a	  person	  as	  “happy”	  if	  the	  way	  she	  is	  achieving	  her	  happy	  emotions	  involves	  
behaviors	  that	  many	  see	  as	  hedonistic	  at	  best	  or	  self-­‐destructive	  at	  worst	  compared	  to	  
other	  ways	  of	  life	  judged	  as	  more	  noble	  (Phillips,	  Misenheimer,	  &	  Knobe,	  2011).	  	  The	  
upshot	  of	  this	  research	  is	  that	  there	  is	  much	  more	  to	  judgments	  of	  the	  happiness	  of	  one’s	  
own	  and	  others’	  lives	  than	  simple	  subjective	  or	  hedonic	  experience.	  	  This	  has	  in	  many	  ways	  
driven	  the	  veritable	  explosion	  of	  research	  on	  moral	  character	  among	  psychology	  
researchers	  who	  see	  an	  important	  link	  between	  character,	  moral	  action,	  and	  personal	  
happiness	  (Peterson	  &	  Seligman,	  2004;	  Haidt,	  2006)—a	  foundation	  with	  which	  the	  above	  
research	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  is	  entirely	  consistent.	  What	  EMO	  adds	  
to	  this	  research	  is	  the	  integration	  across	  these	  two	  views	  of	  happiness.	  EMO,	  by	  recognizing	  
the	  contributions	  of	  both	  notions	  of	  happiness—subjective	  well-­‐being	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  
(value)	  and	  character	  strengths	  and	  psychological	  resources	  on	  the	  other	  (truth	  and	  
control)—integrates	  this	  research	  while	  recognizing	  the	  important	  contributions	  of	  each.	  
	   The	  major	  take-­‐away	  point	  of	  this	  discussion	  is	  that	  happiness	  is	  a	  very	  slippery	  
concept	  that	  often	  means	  much	  more	  than	  only	  those	  things	  measured	  in	  any	  particular	  
psychology	  study.	  	  Therefore,	  any	  attempt	  to	  simply	  maximize	  any	  of	  these	  measures	  of	  
happiness	  could	  very	  likely	  overlook	  other	  important	  aspects	  of	  what	  it	  means	  to	  flourish.	  	  
We	  have	  made	  tremendous	  advances	  in	  what	  we	  know	  about	  human	  flourishing,	  but	  the	  
existing	  literature,	  including	  the	  present	  studies,	  represent	  only	  the	  beginning	  of	  such	  
advances.	  
Implications	  for	  Positive	  Psychology	  
	  
	   Researchers	  in	  the	  field	  of	  positive	  psychology	  have	  contributed	  disproportionately	  
to	  these	  many	  advances,	  but	  the	  present	  research,	  and	  especially	  the	  research	  on	  EMO,	  has	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important	  implications	  for	  how	  to	  advance	  further.	  	  First,	  the	  research	  in	  positive	  
psychology	  often	  occurs	  on	  an	  individual	  level.	  	  As	  stated	  in	  the	  conclusions	  of	  the	  previous	  
chapter,	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  at	  least	  a	  theoretical	  foundation	  for	  believing	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  
well-­‐being	  associated	  with	  the	  harmonious	  interrelation	  of	  motivations	  on	  an	  individual	  
level	  could	  be	  scaled	  up	  to	  the	  harmonious	  interrelation	  of	  roles	  on	  a	  group	  or	  institutional	  
level.	  	  Elements	  of	  positive	  psychology	  may	  be	  similarly	  scaled	  up	  as	  well	  in	  an	  analogous	  
way.	  	  Indeed,	  institutional	  implications	  of	  positive	  psychology	  research	  have	  begun	  to	  
receive	  attention	  (e.g.	  Park	  &	  Peterson,	  2008).	  
	   Second,	  the	  upshot	  of	  the	  research	  on	  character	  strengths	  and	  virtues	  was	  that	  
individuals	  should	  “play	  to	  their	  strengths.”	  	  That	  is,	  those	  who	  have	  a	  particular	  virtue	  
over	  and	  above	  other	  virtues	  ought	  to	  spend	  the	  most	  amount	  of	  resources	  in	  cultivation	  of	  
that	  virtue	  (Peterson	  &	  Seligman,	  2004).	  	  However,	  our	  research	  on	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  
motive	  organization	  suggests	  something	  different	  (see	  also	  Higgins,	  2012;	  Franks	  &	  
Higgins,	  2012;	  Schwartz	  &	  Sharpe,	  2006).	  We	  found	  that	  higher	  levels	  of	  EMO	  were	  
associated	  with	  lower	  variability	  among	  the	  character	  strengths	  and	  virtues,	  controlling	  for	  
their	  overall	  mean.	  	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  strengthening	  a	  particular	  virtue	  over	  the	  others	  
may	  actually	  increase	  variability	  and	  decrease	  EMO,	  which	  in	  turn	  could	  decrease	  well-­‐
being	  given	  the	  positive	  association	  between	  EMO	  and	  measures	  of	  well-­‐being	  (although,	  as	  
noted	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter,	  this	  needs	  to	  be	  tested	  longitudinally).	  	  Perhaps	  a	  “unity	  of	  
the	  virtues”	  model	  may	  be	  a	  more	  appropriate	  approach	  to	  how	  character	  strengths	  and	  
virtues	  relate	  to	  each	  other	  and	  produce	  life	  effectiveness	  and	  well-­‐being.	  
	   The	  final	  implication	  is	  the	  relationship	  between	  morality	  and	  happiness.	  	  The	  entire	  
concept	  of	  a	  “virtue”	  among	  philosophers	  constitutes	  the	  convergence	  of	  the	  two	  concepts	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within	  any	  given	  individual:	  those	  experiencing	  the	  most	  virtues	  are	  both	  the	  happiest	  
people	  and	  the	  most	  moral.	  	  There	  is	  also	  the	  important	  question	  of	  whether	  happiness	  
may	  make	  people	  more	  moral	  or	  morality	  may	  make	  people	  more	  happy—a	  “virtuous	  
cycle.”	  	  Such	  relationships	  are	  important	  for	  any	  research	  taking	  place	  at	  the	  intersection	  of	  
moral	  and	  positive	  psychology.	  
6.3	   Convergence	  of	  the	  Two	  Meanings	  of	  the	  Good	  Life	  
	  
	   The	  purpose	  of	  this	  dissertation	  was	  to	  establish	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  
virtue—the	  point	  of	  convergence	  of	  the	  two	  meanings	  of	  a	  good	  life:	  morality	  and	  
happiness—for	  three	  critical	  areas	  of	  study	  by	  moral	  psychologists:	  moral	  judgment,	  moral	  
decision	  making	  and	  behavior,	  and	  the	  nascent	  field	  of	  moral	  character.	  	  In	  the	  third	  
chapter,	  consistent	  with	  recent	  work	  in	  moral	  psychology,	  I	  argued	  that	  understanding	  
individual	  differences	  in	  moral	  judgment	  as	  related	  to	  differences	  in	  the	  moral	  reference	  
points	  used	  in	  making	  those	  judgments	  (ideals	  vs.	  oughts)	  could	  help	  to	  explain	  why	  some	  
people	  persist	  in	  a	  view	  of	  certain	  harmless	  actions	  as	  wrong.	  	  These	  two	  reference	  points,	  
corresponding	  to	  two	  distinct	  approaches	  in	  making	  judgments,	  appear	  to	  be	  processed	  in	  
two	  different	  motivational	  systems	  (promotion	  vs.	  prevention)	  with	  different	  kinds	  of	  
goals.	  	  This	  research	  has	  a	  number	  of	  implications	  for	  the	  field	  of	  moral	  judgment.	  
	   These	  two	  kinds	  of	  goals	  correspond	  to	  two	  different	  types	  of	  self-­‐guides	  that	  are	  
used	  as	  personal	  reference	  points	  when	  making	  a	  decision.	  	  When	  one’s	  way	  of	  going	  about	  
making	  a	  moral	  decision	  “fits”	  with	  the	  type	  of	  goal	  being	  pursued,	  the	  regulatory	  fit	  effect	  
intensifies	  evaluative	  reactions	  to	  what	  one	  is	  doing.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  experience	  of	  moral	  
emotions	  acts	  as	  feedback	  to	  indicate	  how	  one’s	  decision	  relates	  to	  these	  two	  types	  of	  goals.	  	  
This	  research	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  decision	  theory,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  research	  on	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moral	  emotions.	  	  It	  can	  also	  help	  to	  make	  predictions	  about	  how	  these	  different	  moral	  self-­‐
guides	  influence	  moral	  and	  immoral	  behavior	  across	  time.	  
	   Shifting	  to	  moral	  character,	  the	  motivational	  approach	  instantiated	  the	  convergence	  
of	  happiness	  and	  morality	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  good	  life.	  	  An	  examination	  of	  the	  philosophical	  
literature	  surrounding	  theories	  of	  virtue	  provided	  the	  theoretical	  grounding	  for	  the	  notion	  
of	  moral	  character,	  and	  showed	  the	  possibility	  for	  its	  measurement	  in	  ancient	  and	  classical	  
theories	  of	  the	  “good	  soul.”	  	  These	  theories	  ground	  moral	  character	  in	  ideal	  organization	  of	  
motives	  that	  corresponds	  to	  the	  harmonious	  integrity	  of	  truth,	  value,	  and	  control	  
motivations.	  	  Such	  integrity	  is,	  in	  a	  sense,	  chronic	  regulatory	  fit—from	  “feeling	  right”	  about	  
a	  behavior,	  intention,	  or	  belief	  to	  “feeling	  right”	  about	  one’s	  life	  in	  general.	  	  The	  
effectiveness	  of	  motive	  organization	  showed	  important	  unique	  relations	  to	  both	  well-­‐being	  
and	  ethical	  behavior,	  suggesting	  that	  it	  represents	  such	  a	  virtuous	  convergence	  of	  
happiness	  and	  morality.	  	  These	  results	  have	  important	  implications	  for	  the	  study	  of	  
happiness,	  the	  study	  of	  moral	  character,	  and	  their	  relations	  with	  one	  another.	  
	   None	  of	  the	  empirical	  predictions	  in	  this	  paper	  would	  have	  been	  intelligible,	  or	  
indeed	  possible,	  without	  the	  concept	  of	  virtue.	  	  Virtue	  provides	  an	  alternative	  way	  of	  
looking	  at	  morality—as	  providing	  the	  framework	  for	  the	  eager	  progressive	  achievement	  of	  
true	  happiness	  rather	  than	  simply	  amounting	  to	  the	  vigilantly	  maintained	  rules	  providing	  
for	  social	  peace	  and	  basic	  human	  welfare.	  	  Such	  a	  formulation	  presents	  a	  number	  of	  
difficulties	  and	  challenges	  to	  anyone	  looking	  to	  advance	  the	  common	  good	  (especially	  those	  
who	  would	  like	  to	  be	  able	  to	  have	  questions	  of	  what	  constitutes	  ‘the	  good’	  settled	  and	  
attend	  instead	  to	  its	  maximization),	  but	  I	  believe	  it	  provides	  a	  more	  descriptively	  accurate	  
understanding	  of	  how	  morality	  works	  in	  the	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  lives	  of	  everyday	  people.	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It	  also	  gives	  “morality”	  a	  broader	  definition,	  allowing	  its	  influence	  to	  creep	  into	  
activities	  and	  situations	  that	  many	  people	  had	  heretofore	  walled	  off	  from	  moral	  
consideration.	  Such	  moral	  considerations	  up	  to	  this	  point	  have	  been	  fended	  off	  by	  the	  fact	  
that	  they	  often,	  when	  their	  foundational	  principles	  are	  systematically	  applied,	  lead	  to	  
policies	  with	  negative	  effects	  (such	  as	  public	  ownership	  of	  all	  property).	  	  However,	  if	  
morality	  is	  approached	  in	  a	  more	  associative	  way,	  with	  exemplars	  as	  its	  reference	  point	  
rather	  than	  deductively	  rigorous	  rules,	  this	  need	  to	  take	  things	  to	  their	  logical	  conclusion	  is	  
obviated.	  	  The	  exemplar	  itself	  serves	  as	  the	  conclusion.	  	  Thus	  people	  can	  be	  inspired	  to	  be	  
better	  than	  they	  currently	  are	  without	  the	  fear	  that	  these	  calls	  to	  virtuous	  activity	  will	  be	  
accompanied	  by	  logically	  rigorous	  legal	  prosecution	  (or	  persecution).	  	  
These	  results	  also	  suggest	  a	  fuller	  notion	  of	  what	  happiness	  is,	  and	  its	  intrinsic	  
connection	  to	  morality.	  	  That	  is,	  happiness	  is	  not	  simply	  doing	  or	  believing	  the	  right	  things	  
(control	  and	  truth)	  or	  a	  subjective	  feeling	  of	  satisfaction	  (value),	  but	  something	  that	  
considers	  all	  of	  these	  three	  aspects	  and	  represents	  their	  harmonious	  integration.	  	  These	  
broader	  investigations	  of	  happiness	  have	  been	  underway	  in	  the	  last	  decade,	  and	  this	  
represents	  a	  contribution	  to	  that	  effort.	  	  They	  can	  help	  to	  resolve	  seemingly	  contradictory	  
ideas,	  such	  as	  the	  fact	  that	  satisfying	  most	  needs	  associated	  with	  evolutionary	  survival	  are	  
accompanied	  by	  positive	  feelings,	  whereas	  the	  centrally	  important	  need	  (in	  terms	  of	  
evolutionary	  fitness)	  of	  having	  children	  appears	  to	  reduce	  happiness	  (Kenrick	  et	  al,	  2010).	  	  
By	  considering	  a	  fuller	  notion	  of	  happiness	  (e.g.,	  having	  and	  rearing	  children	  as	  giving	  
meaning	  to	  one’s	  life,	  as	  “going	  in	  the	  right	  direction”),	  not	  only	  can	  we	  achieve	  a	  virtue-­‐like	  
convergence	  between	  morality	  and	  well-­‐being,	  there	  can	  be	  a	  more	  productive	  relation	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between	  the	  happiness	  literatures	  and	  those	  considering	  our	  evolutionary	  origins	  (or	  even,	  
relatedly,	  non-­‐human	  animal	  behavior	  literatures,	  e.g.	  Franks	  &	  Higgins,	  2012).	  
The	  concept	  of	  virtue	  has	  laid	  the	  groundwork	  for	  a	  fresh	  investigation	  into	  the	  
phenomena	  of	  moral	  and	  positive	  psychology.	  	  This	  dissertation	  represents	  an	  attempt	  to	  
use	  this	  concept	  as	  a	  way	  for	  these	  two	  fields	  to	  communicate	  more	  effectively	  with	  one	  
another.	  	  Each	  way	  in	  which	  virtue	  improves	  our	  thinking	  with	  respect	  to	  moral	  judgment,	  
moral	  decision	  making	  and	  behavior,	  and	  moral	  character	  provides	  new	  avenues	  by	  which	  
we	  can	  understand	  this	  important	  phenomenon	  that	  in	  many	  ways	  defines	  how	  we	  live	  
together	  and	  relate	  to	  one	  another.	  	  The	  implication	  is	  that	  by	  investigating	  these	  
phenomena	  from	  this	  new	  perspective,	  we	  can	  begin	  to	  understand	  the	  real	  meaning	  of	  ‘the	  
good	  life’—the	  principal	  aim	  of	  ‘the	  pursuit	  of	  happiness.’	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Appendix:	  Effectiveness	  of	  Motive	  Organization	  Scale	  
1. My	  life	  is	  going	  in	  the	  right	  direction.	  [0.77]	  
1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
not	  at	  all	  like	  me	  	   	   	  	  	  somewhat	  like	  me	   	   	  	  	  very	  much	  like	  me	  
2. I	  find	  that	  the	  challenges	  in	  my	  life	  are	  suited	  to	  my	  abilities.	  [0.59]	  
1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
not	  at	  all	  like	  me	  	   	   	  	  	  somewhat	  like	  me	   	   	  	  	  very	  much	  like	  me	  
3. I	  don't	  want	  to	  do	  most	  of	  the	  things	  I	  have	  to	  do.	  [-­‐0.52]	  
1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
not	  at	  all	  like	  me	  	   	   	  	  	  somewhat	  like	  me	   	   	  	  	  very	  much	  like	  me	  
4. I	  feel	  effective.	  	  [0.75]	  
1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
not	  at	  all	  like	  me	  	   	   	  	  	  somewhat	  like	  me	   	   	  	  	  very	  much	  like	  me	  
5. I	  have	  a	  lot	  of	  difficulty	  getting	  what	  I	  'really'	  want.	  [-­‐0.57]	  
1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
not	  at	  all	  like	  me	  	   	   	  	  	  somewhat	  like	  me	   	   	  	  	  very	  much	  like	  me	  
6. My	  ideas,	  thoughts,	  and	  actions	  just	  'flow.'	  [0.50]	  
1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
not	  at	  all	  like	  me	  	   	   	  	  	  somewhat	  like	  me	   	   	  	  	  very	  much	  like	  me	  
7. I	  feel	  in	  life	  that	  I'm	  exactly	  where	  I	  need	  to	  be.	  [0.76]	  
1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
not	  at	  all	  like	  me	  	   	   	  	  	  somewhat	  like	  me	   	   	  	  	  very	  much	  like	  me	  
8. My	  actions	  have	  an	  effect	  on	  the	  world.	  [0.56]	  
1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
not	  at	  all	  like	  me	  	   	   	  	  	  somewhat	  like	  me	   	   	  	  	  very	  much	  like	  me	  
9. I	  feel	  "right"	  about	  my	  life.	  [0.80]	  
1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
not	  at	  all	  like	  me	  	   	   	  	  	  somewhat	  like	  me	   	   	  	  	  very	  much	  like	  me	  
10. I	  rarely	  feel	  as	  though	  I'm	  thriving.	  [-­‐0.68]	  
1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
not	  at	  all	  like	  me	  	   	   	  	  	  somewhat	  like	  me	   	   	  	  	  very	  much	  like	  me	  
11. I	  find	  that	  I	  am	  always	  learning	  new	  things.	  [0.45]	  
1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
not	  at	  all	  like	  me	  	   	   	  	  	  somewhat	  like	  me	   	   	  	  	  very	  much	  like	  me	  
12. I	  feel	  like	  I	  am	  doing	  what	  I'm	  meant	  to	  be	  doing.	  [0.74]	  
1	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  2	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  3	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  4	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  
not	  at	  all	  like	  me	  	   	   	  	  	  somewhat	  like	  me	   	   	  	  	  very	  much	  like	  me	  
	  
	  
